#FrozenMechanicals Crisis: Comments to CRB by Twelve International Songwriter Groups Opposing Frozen Mechanicals Part 2

[Editor Charlie sez: This post demonstrates that no single songwriter group–including NSAI–speaks for every songwriter in the world and that songwriters around the world do not want their incomes smashed. So that’s a bit of a pickle.]

Part 2 of 2 parts, read part 1 here.

COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BOARD (CRB)

In re DOCKET NO. 21-CRB-0001-PR-(2023-2027)

Making and Distributing Phonorecords (Phonorecords IV)

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking re: 37 C.F.R. Part 385 Subpart B

Comments Submitted by the Songwriters Guild of America, Inc.,  the Society of Composers & Lyricists, Music Creators North America, and the individual music creators Rick Carnes and Ashley Irwin

These Comments Are Endorsed by the Following Music Creator Organizations:

Alliance for Women Film Composers (AWFC). https://theawfc.com

Alliance of Latin American Composers & Authors (AlcaMusica) https://www.alcamusica.org

Asia-Pacific Music Creators Alliance (APMA), https://apmaciam.wixsite.com/home/news

European Composers and Songwriters Alliance (ECSA), https://composeralliance.org

The Ivors Academy (IVORS), https://ivorsacademy.com 

Music Answers (M.A.), https://www.musicanswers.org

Pan-African Composers and Songwriters Alliance (PACSA), http://www.pacsa.org

Screen Composers Guild of Canada (SCGC), https://screencomposers.ca

Songwriters Association of Canada (SAC), http://www.songwriters.ca

[Continued from Part 1]

IV. Discussion of Objections By Independent Music Creators


A. The Willing Buyer-Willing Seller Standard and the Conflicts of Interest Inherent in the Present Settlement Negotiation Process

In evaluating whether the terms of the settlement proposal set forth in the May 25 Motion to Adopt “provide a reasonable basis for setting statutory terms or rates,” the US Copyright Act establishes a blueprint in §115(c)(1)(F) for determining the reasonability and adequacy of any such proposed, industry-wide agreement:   

The Copyright Royalty Judges shall establish rates and terms that most clearly represent the rates and terms that would have been negotiated in the marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing seller(emphasis added).

The US Treasury Department provides further insight into the “willing buyer-willing seller” construct in the Code of Federal Regulations:[21]

Valuation of Property; in general:  The value of the property is the price at which such property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell, and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts (emphasis added).

Thus, while under certain circumstances the US Copyright Act provides that private agreements and licenses may be entered into between copyright owners and prospective users that apply various other indicia and metrics to gauge the advisability of one particular royalty rate over another, that latitude does not exist in regard to proposals for the adoption of industry-wide settlements by the CRB “binding on all copyright owners of musical works” per §801(b)(7)(A).

The circumstances under which the settlement negotiations were conducted that produced the proposed royalty rate freeze set forth in the May 25 Motion to Adopt can be fairly characterized  –under the above standards– as being exactly the opposite of what both Congress and the Executive Branch have in mind in defining “reasonability” under the “willing seller-willing buyer” formula.  Rather than arm’s length negotiations between parties on opposites sides of the table, the referenced discussions that produced the settlement agreement instead seem to have taken place solely among vertically integrated parties and their trade association agents, apparently with little or no input from independent music creators and copyright owners[22] upon whom “those rates and terms [will be] binding.”

More to the point, the corporate parties participating in such settlement discussions could by definition plausibly have been compromised by the conflicts of interest inherent in the fact that the corporate overseers of each major label participating in the “negotiation” likewise control the affiliated music publishers of each such label.  UMG is not only one of the three largest record labels in the world, it also is one of the world’s three largest music publisher owners of copyrights in musical compositions, with both UMG entities reporting to the same corporate ownership (Vivendi, Inc. of France).[23]  The same holds true for both WMG (in regard to the multinational corporation Access Industries headquartered in New York)[24] and SME (in regard to the Sony Corporation of Japan).[25]  

Together, these three international conglomerates control close to 70% of the market for sound recordings and musical compositions in the world.[26]  All three represent both sides in any Subpart B mechanical royalty rate discussions, rendering the concept of “willing buyer-willing seller” almost farcical in relation to fashioning a fair proposal to the CRB.  Simply put, in this case, the buyers are the sellers (and the prospective licensors are the prospective licensees). 


NMPA’s role in these negotiations was, and is, as the trade association for music publishers operating in the US, including the above-mentioned major music publishing firms that serve as their most powerful and influential board members by far– and who answer to the same owners as those against whom they and NMPA are allegedly negotiating.  It is unclear what level of input independent music publishers were enabled to exercise in the negotiations, including those with representatives on the board of the trade association.  

In regard to NSAI, its demonstrably uniform alignment with NMPA on a broad array of music industry issues over recent years has in our view appeared so unwavering as to approach potential inseparability.  As a result, we believe we are correct to be concerned that the organization cannot be said in this instance to represent music creator rights and interests in an independent, unbiased manner.  In an informal survey conducted by the well-respected music industry publication Trichordist, to our knowledge not a single music creator entity (either organizational or individual) responded that it intended to join NSAI and its narrow membership in support of the “royalty freeze” proposal.[27]  Organizations and individuals representing hundreds of thousands of songwriters, composers and lyricists, on the other hand, have publicly voiced objection to the proposed royalty rate freeze. 

Based upon these facts and circumstances alone, the settlement agreement produced by the Settling Parties can in no way be considered to have been fashioned upon “willing buyer-willing seller” principles.  As such, respectfully, it should not be relied upon as the basis for a conclusion by the CRB that the proposed settlement “[provides] a reasonable basis for setting statutory terms or rates,” per §801(b)(7)(A) of the Copyright Act and otherwise.

B. Lack of Transparency in the Negotiating and Settlement Process

As previously noted, the Independent Music Creator Community remains additionally concerned over the general lack of transparency that has marked the entire process described above.  We are especially disquieted by the unexplained contents of a “separate Memorandum of Understanding addressing certain related issues” referenced in the March 2 Notice as having been negotiated among the three major labels and publishers and NMPA, with the conspicuous absence of NSAI. 

Has such an MOU been presented to the CRB for approval or adoption?  Has it been seen by NSAI?  Is NSAI endorsing it?  These are important, additional details and questions that require comprehensive answers to complete a full evaluation of any settlement alleged to be reasonable and based upon “willing buyer-willing seller” principles.

Further on the issue of transparency, we also are compelled to raise the issue of NSAI’s public statements purportedly made to explain its support for a five-year continuation of the Subpart B royalty rate freeze. These statements give insight into the level of factual distortion that may have been foisted upon NSAI during negotiations, and that may have hampered it in evaluating the advisability of the settlement, as discussed below.

C. Misleading Mechanical Royalty Statistics

In an open letter to its “Fellow Songwriters and Composers” published by NSAI on or about June 2, 2021,[28] the organization presented the following analysis of its position in favor of continuing the Subpart B royalty freeze:

Based on industry revenue analysis, it is anticipated that physical mechanical royalties will amount to less than 1% of the total mechanical royalty revenue in the United States during 2023-2028, the rate period this CRB proceeding covers [sic]. History and experience told us not to create a powerful opponent when there is a strong possibility of losing with little to gain. So, we decided to focus on the digital streaming services and streaming rates during the next trial. While 1% of revenue is meaningful, waging war was not worth the risk, especially since the rate may have been lowered!

The statistics presented by NSAI in its statement are patently misleading and/or incorrect, contradicted by data published by the principle trade association of US recording companies, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) (a participating party in the Phonorecords IV proceeding).  According to the RIAA’s Year-End 2020 Revenue Report,[29] the record industry’s total US revenues in both 2019 and 2020 from the combined categories of physical phonorecords and permanent downloads surpassed $1 billion in each of those years, correlating on a percentage basis to 14.3% of total revenues in 2020 and 17% of total revenues in 2019:

RIAA US RECORDING REVENUES (rounded)     2020                                        2019

VINYL                                                                      $620M (5.1%)                        $480M (4.3%)

CDs                                                                         $483M (4.0%)                        $631M (5.7%)

DOWNLOADED ALBUMS                                     $320M (2.6%)                        $369M (3.3%)

DOWNLOADED SINGLES                                      $312M (2.6%)                        $408M (3.7%)

TOTAL PERCENTAGES                                            14.3%                                      17.0%

The data published by the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) for 2020 regarding global recorded music revenues is even more starkly indicative of the continuing statistical and economic importance of physical phonorecords and permanent downloads.  According to IFPI, those two categories combined for over 25% of total worldwide earnings.[30]

On the basis of these numbers, it would seem a near impossibility for mechanical royalties attributable to physical phonorecords and permanent downloads (projected by NSAI to be less than 1% of US mechanical revenues by 2027) to represent anywhere near such a tiny comparable percentage to total recording revenue in the same categories.  That is especially so when one takes into account the fact that recording revenues from vinyl recordings are actually growing at a substantial rate (a 30% increase in 2020), not diminishing.  In fact, recent reports for the first half of 2021 indicate that this vinyl growth trend is actually accelerating.  Vinyl sales in quarters one and two of 2021 reportedly rose a whopping 108% over the same period in 2020,[31] and demand for vinyl records is outpacing manufacturing capabilities on both a national and global basis.[32] 

Thus, while no one can plausibly argue that “traditional” mechanical uses of music have not shifted significantly toward streaming on demand in the digital age, that is not to say that Subpart B uses in the US are disappearing or anything close to it.  Subpart B mechanical royalty income remains a substantial and continuing revenue source for many music creators and independent music publishers, almost certainly amounting to tens of millions of dollars per year out of the $823.5 million in mechanical royalties NMPA reports are generated annually in the US.[33]  

And make no mistake about it.  Those tens of millions in annual Subpart B revenues are keeping thousands of songwriters and composers financially afloat in an age that continues to be dominated by unlicensed uses of music on the Internet, and far-below market value royalty rates being paid for music streaming.  The freezing of the Subpart B royalty rate starting in 2006 has inarguably caused significant financial harm to creators in an era when they could least afford it. 

One independent music publishing company owner with substantial, practical insight into this issue, recently offered the following observations:

The royalty amount for digital streams is a micro-penny. Unless we are talking about top songwriters with hundreds of millions to billions of streams, there is an excellent chance he or she still may be driving an Uber to support a family.  It literally takes hundreds of streams to equal the 9.1 cent mechanical publishers receive for a physical sale or download.  That’s why the physical and download mechanical rate is so important to independent creators, and especially to those just starting out.

Vinyl sales are still strong among many retailers, including Amazon. CDs remain a significant media format, and many listeners still prefer to ‘own’ rather than temporarily cache the music they listen to.  Major music publishers do not face the same struggles as independent publishers and songwriters. They are part of multi-national conglomerates that own both the major publishers and major record labels. Major publishers that agree to freeze the statutory rate are simply leaving more money in the pockets of the labels that are their sister companies.  We, on the other hand, are trying to preserve the only sources of revenue that we have.  We don’t have another pocket.  That’s why we must fight to be heard.[34]

D. NFTs

On a very much related issue, the emergence of non-fungible tokens (NFTs) and related block chain technologies seem to have been glaringly omitted from the mechanical royalty analysis presented in NSAI’s informal statement and explanations of the proposed Subpart B settlement.   Although the longevity periods of such trends are notoriously difficult to predict, NFTs appear to be forming the basis of new, specialized and mainstream music products and associated downloads. 

As a category of recording industry revenues, NFT estimates for 2020-21 are in the tens of millions of dollars (out of billions of dollars in NFT earnings in all categories during that period so far).[35]  The question of whether this issue was raised in the Phonorecords IV Subpart B settlement negotiations is an important one, on both a conceptual and a financial basis.  Given the wide range of NFT supported consumer products that may be introduced in the near future, it is not a phenomenon that can be prudently ignored in light of its significant potential effects on the future of US and global mechanical royalties.

NFTs, which by definition are regarded as electronic and non-fungible, have since their introduction in the music realm often been bundled with specialty physical product and downloads to increase their total value.  We pose the rhetorical question of whether there shouldn’t be a conversation taking place at the CRB level as to whether an NFT that is purchased for hundreds, thousands or even millions of dollars (as some recently have been), and which includes a bundled, sometimes unique physical sound carrier or download component, shouldn’t produce more than a one-time, 9.1 cent revenue payment for music creators and copyright administrators?  Are these really sales to the public for private use under §115 of the Copyright Act, and what royalty rate should apply to them?   Might a fixed percentage of the sale price realized be a more equitable means of compensating music creators in such situations?    Millions of dollars in songwriter, composer and independent music publisher revenue may be riding on the answers to those questions.  

On a much broader scale, the same holds true for recorded physical products and downloads that are sold to the general public as part of mainstream NFT packages now and in the future.  Some industry analysts are predicting a further, significant resurgence of vinyl sales and downloads predicated on an NFT boom that will drive purchases of products such as artist box sets and other music collections and compilations.  As we stand on the threshold of what might be a new era reliant in important part on NFT music distribution, the extension of a new, five-year freeze on already frozen Subpart B mechanical rates would further exclude the creative community from participation in the real and potential rewards such new technologies are intended to generate.

While the future may not be clear, the fact that these issues deserve full, public airings and careful consideration before the CRB certainly is.  We should not and cannot permit silent acquiescence through privately negotiated, confidential agreements, to control the future of NFT-related mechanical royalties.  Moreover, we cannot help but wonder whether the NFT issue has been relegated to the unknown contents of the Settling Parties’ MOU (at least executed and possibly negotiated without the participation of NSAI), which we expect may be claimed by those same Settling Parties to be subject to non-disclosure requirements (including those set forth in the protective order in place for these proceedings). 

These are issues of serious concern and great financial importance to the independent music creator community.  We urge that they be addressed transparently and publicly as part of the Phonorecords IV Subpart B proceedings.  At the very minimum, it also seems that NFTs should be excluded from the “music bundles” contemplated by Subpart B.

E. Economic Bars to Effective Music Creator Participation

There is one additional, extremely important issue raised by NSAI’s explanatory statement upon which we believe it is essential to comment.  It concerns the financial ability of independent music creators to participate in CRB proceedings, and the severely compromised bargaining positions of music creators when it comes to the negotiation of so-called “industry settlements” under the current CRB rate setting system.

In defending its position in favor of the continuing Subpart B royalty rate freeze in Phonorecords IV, NSAI offered the following observation:

The question songwriters and composers should be asking is why these false critics [apparently referring to all other music creator organizations] did not participate in the trial [sic] themselves. Any of these groups or individuals could have participated, but they did not even try.

That position presents an interesting juxtaposition to this prior assertion made by NSAI within the same published statement:

What these critics are not telling you is that we did fight that battle in 2006, during CRB I, when we asked the Copyright Royalty Board to increase the physical rate, while critics were nowhere to be found.[36]  [footnote added] Instead, after our side spent more than $20 million, the judges kept the rate exactly where it was, at 9.1 cents [emphasis added].

The point made by NSAI about the necessity of huge participatory expenditures goes a long way toward explaining why the only “songwriter group” participating in the Phonorecords IV settlement discussions is NSAI.[37]  Other music creator organizations do not have millions of dollars –or anything close to it– to allow their full participation in CRB proceedings.  Neither, in reality, does NSAI.  In fact, we wonder how NSAI continues to be able to participate in $20 million battles without accepting support from other groups on its “side” whose conflicted goals and actions may be antithetical to songwriter interests, both long and short term.

Much has changed since 2006.  In practice, the prohibitive costs of participating in CRB rate setting proceedings now form a nearly impenetrable barrier to entry for any independent music creator group wishing to participate while maintaining its autonomy. To participate generally means to acquiesce to those music publishing mega-corporations with the funds to remain in control of the negotiation, settlement and/or litigation process, including the conflicted major music publisher affiliates of the major record labels (some of whom purportedly utilize revenues charged back to their songwriters and composers to pay for positions taken before the CRB that are incompatible with those same music creators’ interests—such as the approval of frozen royalty rates). 

Thus has the current Phonorecords IV Subpart B settlement negotiation process continued to move forward without independent music creator input, tainted by the appearance of conflicts of interest created through vertical integration.  Unsurprisingly, the resulting “settlements” now unfairly threaten to harm the ability of music creators to argue successfully for substantial and desperately needed increases in streaming royalty rates. 

In that regard, shortly after the March 2 Notice was filed by the Settling Parties concerning their anticipated agreement to again freeze Subpart B royalty rates in Phonorecords IV, a witness for the music streaming company Pandora in the Phonorecords III Remand proceeding filed testimony citing the March 2 Notice as proof that frozen or diminished streaming royalty rates are similarly needed as a matter of both sound policy and fairness.[38]   

This predictable backfiring of the Settling Parties’ “roll forward” strategy is likely to be the catalyst for many more, baseless claims by other members of the digital distribution community desperately seeking to avoid paying market value streaming royalty rates under the Phonorecord III Remand and the Phonorecord IV proceeding.  That sad eventuality raises even more complex, potential conflict of interest issues concerning past or current cross ownership/investment arrangements between record companies and digital distributors too labyrinthian to detail in these Comments, but worthy of future consideration.  For now, however, we should consider that the ability of a stronger, broader group of independent music creator organizations and representatives to affordably participate in future CRB rate setting proceedings might avoid many of these unfair and counter-productive results.  It is an inquiry that we believe is worth pursuing through the US Copyright Office.

In the meanwhile, to independent music creator organizations such as ours and our colleagues, the choice to officially participate in the Phonorecords IV proceedings (especially regarding the Subpart B settlement negotiations) as second-class citizens on an economically tilted playing field remained no choice at all.  We instead have chosen to rely on the comments process, and our belief in the authority and wisdom of the CRB to ensure that the principles set forth in §§115 and 801 of the US Copyright Act, among others, are diligently applied.

To us, the events of 2006 occurred too long ago to be used as a pretext not to fight now for higher, more equitable Subpart B mechanical royalty rates, which in the interim have been devalued by a third simply due to inflation, inflicting significant economic harm on creators.  Rather, we submit as independent music creator representatives that the circumstances described throughout these Comments demonstrate beyond doubt –despite the endorsement by NSAI of the Subpart B royalty rate freeze in Phonorecords IV—that the proposed settlement does not come close to providing a reasonable basis for setting royalty rate standards arrived at through a willing buyer-willing seller process.

V. Recommendations

In light of the foregoing, and with likely hundreds of millions of dollars of music creator income at stake for the future rate periods under consideration in Phonorecords IV, the independent music creator signatories to these Comments respectfully submit the following recommendations in regard to this Rulemaking:

  1. For the reasons stated throughout these Comments, we urge the CRB to decline to adopt the settlement agreement as a basis for statutory rates and terms.   Adoption of the settlement and the rules as proposed would represent a miscarriage of justice, placing the imprimatur of the CRB on a negotiation and settlement process that was unfair, non-transparent, and may have been conducted under circumstances that were anything but reasonable pursuant to (and setting crucial precedent for) the required “willing buyer-willing seller” standard.
    
  2. We further urge that the CRB publish for comment at the earliest possible time the full text of the settlement
    agreement as submitted by the Settling Parties, and the MOU referenced in the March 2 Notice.  As Congressman Lloyd Doggett of Texas wrote to the Librarian of Congress and the Register of Copyrights on July 18, 2021, “it seems appropriate that every songwriter who will be affected by the outcome of this proceeding, from San Antonio and Austin, Memphis, to Detroit and beyond, should have the opportunity to read and comment meaningfully on the actual settlement agreement posed for adoption, and the related MOU referenced.”[39]
    
  3. We urge that at minimum, new royalty rates be made applicable to Subpart B uses pursuant to Phonorecords IV, adjusted to reflect changes in the CPI since 2006 as a starting point, and further adjusted according to changes in the CPI each year thereafter (with a permanent floor of 9.1 cents and corresponding per minute rates for physical phonorecords and permanent downloads).   Precedent and support for such a prospective adjustment methodology can be found in §805 of the Copyright Act,[40] as well as in the CPI-based mechanical royalty rate adjustments applied during the period January 1, 1990 through December 31, 1997,[41] and recent §114 decisions, among other sources.  Moreover, at a minimum, it seems that NFTs should also be excluded from the “music bundles” contemplated by Subpart B.  If the Settling Parties wish to establish different rates through private agreements for themselves, that is their prerogative.  Non-participants in such settlements and agreements, however, should not be tied to such settlements and agreements (especially ones not negotiated at arm’s length) by the CRB.
    
  4. We urge that the CRB recommend the undertaking of a study by the US Copyright Office to improve the ability of independent music creators and music publishers to more fully participate in CRB proceedings at reasonable cost.  The current inability of all but the major music publishers and their affiliated music publisher and music creator groups to effectively participate in CRB proceedings due to the costs of such participation must be effectively addressed.  Until then, it is incumbent upon the CRB to help level the playing field by taking into account the interests and predicaments of the independent music creator community, whose Constitutional, creative and economic interests the US Copyright Act is primarily intended to protect pursuant to Article I, §8 of the US Constitution.

VI. Conclusion

We thank the Copyright Royalty Judges and the CRB for this opportunity to participate in the Phonorecord IV proceedings through the submission of these Comments.

Respectfully submitted,

    

Rick Carnes                                                    Ashley Irwin

President, Songwriters Guild of America      President, Society of Composers and Lyricists

Officer, Music Creators North America         Co-Chair, Music Creators North America



List of Other Supporting Organizations

Alliance for Women Film Composers (AWFC). https://theawfc.com

Alliance of Latin American Composers & Authors (AlcaMusica) https://www.alcamusica.org

Asia-Pacific Music Creators Alliance (APMA), https://apmaciam.wixsite.com/home/news

European Composers and Songwriters Alliance (ECSA), https://composeralliance.org

The Ivors Academy (IVORS), https://ivorsacademy.com

Music Answers (M.A.), https://www.musicanswers.org

Pan-African Composers and Songwriters Alliance (PACSA), http://www.pacsa.org

Screen Composers Guild of Canada (SCGC), https://screencomposers.ca

Songwriters Association of Canada (SAC), http://www.songwriters.ca

cc:    Charles J. Sanders, Esq.

         Ms. Carla Hayden, US Librarian of Congress

         Ms. Shira Perlmutter, US Register of Copyrights

         Mr. Eddie Schwartz, President, MCNA and International Council of Music Creators (CIAM)

         The Members of the US Senate and House Sub-Committees on Intellectual Property


[1] https://www.songwritersguild.com/site/index.php

[2] https://thescl.com/

[3]  https://www.musiccreatorsna.org

[4] https://www.songwritersguild.com/site/rick-carnes

[5] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ashley_Irwin

[6] https://www.fairtrademusicinternational.org/

[7] See, e.g., http://www.americanmusicpreservation.com/songwriters.htm

[8] https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm

[9] See, e.g., https://escholarship.org/content/qt332557hg/qt332557hg.pdf

[10] https://copyright.gov/licensing/m200a.pdf

[11] https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm

[12] Ibid..

[13] As songwriter and recording artist Michelle Shocked has so aptly commented on this issue, “many may forgive the past, but we do not forget it.”

[14] https://app.crb.gov/document/download/25288

[15]  https://app.crb.gov/document/download/23883

[16] https://www.musiccreatorsna.org/mcna-letter-regarding-fairness-and-transparency-on-frozen-mechanicals/

[17] https://thetrichordist.com/2021/05/25/coalition-of-songwriter-groups-ask-crb-wheres-the-motion-on-insider-deal-for-frozen-mechanicals/

[18] https://app.crb.gov/document/download/25288

[19] https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-06-25/pdf/2021-12950.pdf     

[20] 801 (b) Functions.—Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the functions of the Copyright Royalty Judges shall be as follows:

…(7)(A). To adopt as a basis for statutory terms and rates or as a basis for the distribution of statutory royalty payments, an agreement concerning such matters reached among some or all of the participants in a proceeding at any time during the proceeding, except that—

(i) the Copyright Royalty Judges shall provide to those that would be bound by the terms, rates, or other determination set by any agreement in a proceeding to determine royalty rates an opportunity to comment on the agreement and shall provide to participants in the proceeding under section 803(b)(2) that would be bound by the terms, rates, or other determination set by the agreement an opportunity to comment on the agreement and object to its adoption as a basis for statutory terms and rates; and

(ii) the Copyright Royalty Judges may decline to adopt the agreement as a basis for statutory terms and rates for participants that are not parties to the agreement, if any participant described in clause (i) objects to the agreement and the Copyright Royalty Judges conclude, based on the record before them if one exists, that the agreement does not provide a reasonable basis for setting statutory terms or rates.

[21]  26 CFR § 25.2512-1

[22] See, e.g., Statement of Anthony Garnier, https://thetrichordist.com/category/frozen-mechanicals/.

[23] https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2021/06/18/biggest-record-labels-of-2021/

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid

[26] Ibid

[27] See, https://thetrichordist.com/2021/06/07/the-ivors-academy-joins-the-no-frozen-mechanicals-campaign/

[28] https://musicrow.com/2021/06/nsai-songwriters-respond-to-criticism-of-decision-not-to-challenge-physical-royalty-rates/

[29] https://www.riaa.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/2020-Year-End-Music-Industry-Revenue-Report.pdf

[30] https://www.ifpi.org/our-industry/industry-data/

[31] https://www.cnbc.com/2021/07/13/music-fans-pushed-sales-of-vinyl-albums-higher-in-first-half-of-2021.html

[32] https://static.billboard.com/files/2021/06/june-08-2021-billboard-bulletin-1623187818.pdf

[33] https://www.royaltyexchange.com/blog/u-s-music-publishing-grows-nearly-10-to-over-4b-in-2020

[34] Comments of Abby North of North Music Group.  See also, “Hit Songwriters are Driving Ubers,”  https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-55232418

[35]  See, e.g.,  https://variety.com/2021/music/news/nft-sales-imusic-business-wild-west-1234970419/;  https://www.businessinsider.com/how-crypto-art-muscians-primary-income-nfts-record-labels-2021-3; https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesbusinesscouncil/2021/06/09/are-nfts-the-new-crypto-a-guide-to-understanding-non-fungible-tokens/?sh=51fc14763d95  

[36] It should be noted that SGA did participate in the 2006 CRB proceedings.  Moreover, perhaps the fact that “critics” in the music creator community were “nowhere to be found” in 2006 is because all espoused the same position in favor of a royalty rate increase for Subpart B uses. 

[37] As the Independent Music Creator signatories have previously pointed out in these Comments, one individual music creator is participating in the Phonorecords IV proceedings. As always, we admire the courage and energy of Mr. George Johnson, whose efforts are appreciated by his fellow creators.  However, as Mr. Johnson has often readily admitted, his ability to match the overwhelming firepower arrayed against him at every turn in these and other proceedings before the CRB severely diminishes his capacity to serve as an effective advocate, and frequently results in his total marginalization by other participants.

[38]  See pages 65-67 at  https://app.crb.gov/document/download/23858; https://thetrichordist.com/2021/06/25/guest-post-by-sealeinthedeal-a-foreseeable-result-of-the-phonorecords-iv-private-settlement-opening-pandoras-box/   

[39] https://thetrichordist.com/category/frozen-mechanicals/

[40] 805. General rule for voluntarily negotiated agreements

Any rates or terms under this title that—

(1) are agreed to by participants to a proceeding under section 803(3),

(2) are adopted by the Copyright Royalty Judges as part of a determination under this chapter, and

(3) are in effect for a period shorter than would otherwise apply under a determination pursuant to this chapter, shall remain in effect for such period of time as would otherwise apply under such determination, except that the Copyright Royalty Judges shall adjust the rates pursuant to the voluntary negotiations to reflect national monetary inflation during the additional period the rates remain in effect [emphasis added].

[41] https://copyright.gov/licensing/m200a.pdf

#FrozenMechanicals Crisis: Comments to CRB by Twelve International Songwriter Groups Opposing Frozen Mechanicals Part 1

[We’re going to break this excellent CRB comment into two parts, so check back tomorrow for Part 2. You can find the whole post on MusicTechPolicy]

[Editor Charlie sez: This post demonstrates that no single songwriter group–including NSAI–speaks for every songwriter in the world and that songwriters around the world do not want their incomes smashed. So that’s a bit of a pickle.]

COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BOARD (CRB)

In re DOCKET NO. 21-CRB-0001-PR-(2023-2027)

Making and Distributing Phonorecords (Phonorecords IV)

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking re: 37 C.F.R. Part 385 Subpart B

Comments Submitted by the Songwriters Guild of America, Inc.,  the Society of Composers & Lyricists, Music Creators North America, and the individual music creators Rick Carnes and Ashley Irwin

These Comments Are Endorsed by the Following Music Creator Organizations:

Alliance for Women Film Composers (AWFC). https://theawfc.com

Alliance of Latin American Composers & Authors (AlcaMusica) https://www.alcamusica.org

Asia-Pacific Music Creators Alliance (APMA), https://apmaciam.wixsite.com/home/news

European Composers and Songwriters Alliance (ECSA), https://composeralliance.org

The Ivors Academy (IVORS), https://ivorsacademy.com 

Music Answers (M.A.), https://www.musicanswers.org

Pan-African Composers and Songwriters Alliance (PACSA), http://www.pacsa.org

Screen Composers Guild of Canada (SCGC), https://screencomposers.ca

Songwriters Association of Canada (SAC), http://www.songwriters.ca

I. Introduction

The following Comments are respectfully submitted by the signatory organizations Songwriters Guild of America, Inc. (“SGA”),[1] Society of Composers & Lyricists (“SCL”),[2] and Music Creators North America (“MCNA”),[3] and by the individuals Rick Carnes[4] and Ashley Irwin[5] (the parties sometimes collectively referred to herein as the “Independent Music Creators”).  These Comments have also been endorsed by the national and international music creator groups additionally listed above.  Together, these commenters and endorsers advocate for and represent the interests of hundreds of thousands of independent songwriters, composers and lyricists in the United States (US) and throughout the world.  

The Independent Music Creators speak today (i) in strong opposition to any rulemaking that would result in the adoption by the CRB of a proposed, continuing freeze on mechanical royalty rates for physical phonorecords, permanent downloads, ringtones, and music bundles, and (ii) against other, non-transparent elements that may be presented to the CRB by the National Music Publishers Association (“NMPA”), the Nashville Songwriters Association International (“NSAI”), and the major record labels Universal Music Group Recordings (“UMG”), Sony Music Entertainment (“SME”), and Warner Music Group Corp (“WMG”).   

II.  Statements of Interest

SGA is the longest established and largest music creator advocacy and copyright administrative organization in the United States run solely by and for songwriters, composers, and their heirs.  Its positions are reasoned and formulated independently and solely in the interests of music creators, without financial influence or other undue interference from parties whose interests vary from or are in conflict with those of songwriters, composers, and other authors of creative works.  Established in 1931, SGA has for 90 years successfully operated with a two-word mission statement: “Protect Songwriters,” and continues to do so throughout the United States and the world.  SGA’s organizational membership stands at approximately 4500 members.  SGA is represented by signatory Rick Carnes, who is signing as an individual music creator and copyright owner, and as an organizational officer.

SCL is the premier US organization for music creators working in all forms of visual media (including film, television, video games, and musical theatre).  It has a membership of over 2000 professional composers and lyricists, and is a founding co-member –along with SGA and other independent music creator groups– of MCNA.  SCL is represented by signatory Ashley Irwin, who is signing as an individual music creator and copyright owner, and as an organizational officer.

MCNA is an alliance of independent songwriter and composer organizations that advocates and educates on behalf of North America’s music creator community. As the only internationally recognized voice of American and Canadian songwriters and composers, MCNA, through its affiliation with the International Council of Music Creators (CIAM), is part of a coalition that represents the professional interests and aspirations of more than half a million creators across Africa, Asia, Austral- Oceania, North and South America, and Europe.  MCNA is represented by signatories Rick Carnes and Ashley Irwin, who are signing as organizational officers.

Of particular relevance to these comments, SGA, SCL and MCNA are also founding members of the international organization Fair Trade Music,[6] which is the leading US and international advocacy group for the principles of transparency, equitable treatment, and financial sustainability for all songwriters and composers.

III.  History of US Statutory Mechanical Royalty Rate-Setting 

As the CRB is well aware, the establishment of a compulsory mechanical rights licensing system, and the setting of a statutory mechanical royalty rate for the manufacture and distribution of sound carriers reproducing musical compositions, has its roots in the US Copyright Act of 1909.  Section 1 (e) of that law provided that once a musical composition had been distributed for the first time on a sound carrier in the US, any other party (i.e., a record company) was free to make and distribute its own recorded version of such composition so long as such party abided by the formalities set forth in the law, and paid a total of 2 cents for each unit of each composition distributed.  Thus began one of the most notorious miscarriages of economic justice in the history of the international music industry. 

By 1978, the tiny US record industry of the early twentieth century had grown into a multi-billion dollar, multi-national corporate entertainment empire that dominated the international music marketplace.  A good deal of the credit for such growth, it is widely acknowledged, is attributable to the fact that the intervening years were marked by one of the greatest periods of creative songwriting and composing that the world had ever seen, centered principally in the United States.  Those 20th century (and later 21st century) songs, composers and lyricists created the foundation on which the American record industry’s domination of global music sales was constructed, and on which it still rests.[7] 

Surreal as it may still seem, however, for that entire seventy-year period of phenomenal record industry growth between 1909 and 1978, the US mechanical royalty rate remained static at 2 cents per composition. According to US Consumer Price Index (CPI) statistics during those seven decades, the buying power of 2 cents in 1909 required the approximate equivalent of 14 to 15 cents in 1978.[8]  A songwriter or composer would have needed to earn about 750% of the original 2 cent royalty rate to have maintained his or her cost-of-living standard.  And yet no increase whatsoever had taken place.

Congress, despite enduring the intense lobbying of the recording industry not to take action, did finally raise the US statutory mechanical rate in 1978 under the “new” US Copyright Act of 1976.  It did so, however, by raising the rate by just 37.5%, to 2.75 cents.  Immediately thereafter, the entire record industry (claiming coincidence rather than collusion) immediately introduced and expanded the concept of the “controlled composition clause” into nearly every American recording contract.[9]  The practical effect of that essentially non-negotiable provision was to contractually freeze and then de-value the new US statutory mechanical royalty rate to 75% of its new level — driving it back down to two cents.

The outcry from the US and global music creator community over the ensuing years was substantial enough to result in gradual rises in the statutory mechanical royalty rate phased in every five years under the statutory rate-setting provisions of the 1976 Copyright Act (with some increases based upon negotiated cost of living increases tagged to various measurements under the CPI).  That process continued until its current 9.1 cent royalty rate zenith was reached in 2006.[10]  And there it has stayed, applicable not only to musical compositions manufactured and distributed in physical phonorecord form, but to permanent downloads in the realm of digital phonorecord deliveries and to certain other uses also specified in 37 C.F.R. Part 385 Subpart B (“Subpart B”). 

Subsequently, the Copyright Royalty Board opted in the rate-setting proceedings Phonorecords I (2006), Phonorecords II (2011) and Phonorecords III (2016) to adopt “roll forward” recommendations regarding the 9.1 cent royalty rate relative to Subpart B, principally without the formal objection of music creators.  In those years, members of the songwriter and composer community were forced to focus on pleading for substantial increases in the pitifully low digital streaming rates that were driving most music creators either into poverty or out of the music industry altogether.  That same drastic problem, unfortunately, remains for music creators.  Streaming royalty rates continue to be the subject of ongoing federal litigation brought by copyright users in the digital music distribution industry to negate rate increases mandated in Phonorecords III.  The case is currently on remand back to the CRB.  

Thus, economic circumstances for songwriters and composers –after fifteen years of a 9.1 cent rate applicable to Subpart B uses– are more dire than ever.  That is especially true in light of the hardships brought on by the recent pandemic.  The vast majority of songwriters and composers simply cannot abide a continuation of this financially strangling status quo any longer.  To do so would be to rubber stamp the extension of a second era of frozen mechanical royalty rates applicable to the sale of physical phonorecords and permanent downloads, for a period that would now stretch to over twenty years and counting (2006-2027). 

To put the effect of such result into numerical perspective, even a simple cost of living application to the subject statutory mechanical royalty rate since 2006 would have already yielded a 2021 royalty rate of 12 cents under CPI measurements.[11]  The 9.1 cent rate, in other words, has already been devalued by one third in real dollars since its implementation.  That leaves aside the historical legacy of the 2-cent rate from 1909, which would in 2021 dollars equal over 55 cents pursuant to those same CPI formulas.[12]  While no one is suggesting this latter extrapolation be considered dispositive on the issue of new rate-setting, it does starkly demonstrate the outrageous unfairness that has been imposed on the music creator community over a period of more than an entire century.[13]

Nevertheless, on March 2, 2021, the three major, multinational record conglomerates UMG, SME and WMG, the US music publisher trade group NMPA (whose largest members include the music publishing affiliates of those major record companies), and inexplicably, the Nashville Songwriters Association International (collectively, the “Settling Parties”), filed a Notice of Settlement in Principle (the “March 2 Notice”)[14] with the CRB, stating as follows:

Once they reach a definitive agreement concerning the Settlement, the Participants expect to propose to the CRJs [Copyright Royalty Judges] that the royalty rates and terms presently set forth in 37 C.F.R. Part 385 Subpart B, and the related definitions and late fees for Subpart B Configurations presently addressed in Subpart A, should be continued for the rate period at issue in the Proceeding [through 2027]. 

One participant in the Phonorecord IV proceedings, pro se music creator and music publisher George Johnson, filed his objections to the adoption with the CRB on April 19, 2021.  He noted specifically the unfairness of the proposed roll forward of the frozen Subpart B royalty rate proposals,[15] among his other objections that also included a substantial lack of transparency by the Settling Parties.   

The remainder of the music creator community, none of whose members seem in any way to have been consulted concerning the anticipated settlement noted in the March 2 Notice by the Settling Parties, were similarly taken aback by the Settling Parties’ actions.   Not only were they blindsided by the pending decision to recommend a continued freeze of the royalty rates and other terms contained in Subpart B, they were also agitated by the lack of more detailed disclosure by the Settling Parties concerning the following statement contained in the March 2 Notice:

NMPA, UMG, WMG and SME have also reached an agreement in principle concerning a separate memorandum of understanding addressing certain related issues.

With a pending deadline of May 18, 2021 set by the CRB for the filing by the Settling Parties of a final proposed settlement, the signatories to these Independent Music Creator Comments –in reliance on, among other provisions, §801 (b) (7) of the US Copyright Act– sent a letter to the CRB dated May 17, 2021[16] stating as follows:

In the interests of justice and fairness, we respectfully implore the CRB to adopt and publicize a period and opportunity for public comment on the record in these and other proceedings, especially in regard to so-called proposed “industry settlements” in which creators and other interested parties have had no opportunity to meaningfully participate prior to their presentation to the CRB for consideration, modification or rejection. In the present case, hundreds of millions of dollars of our future royalties remain at stake, even in a diminished market for traditional, mechanical uses of music. To preclude our ability to comment on proposals that ultimately impact our incomes, our careers, and our families, simply isn’t fair.

Thereafter, the Settling Parties informed the CRB on May 18, 2021 that they had reached an agreement that mirrored the terms set forth in their prior March 2 Notice, but did not file a motion asking the CRB to adopt their settlement.  This procedural anomaly raised alarms among the members of the independent music creator community, who once again had not been consulted in any way by the Settling Parties regarding their settlement discussions, or concerning the subsequent filings announcing agreement on the royalty rate freeze. 

In a second letter to the CRB dated May 24, 2021,[17] the Independent Music Creator signatories to these Comments once again conveyed their concerns:

We believe that this procedural omission (whether permissible or not) may well be calculated to delay and/or compromise the ability of the independent music creator and music publishing communities to file comments in a timely manner, and could result in irreparable harm to our ability to present our views and pose our questions, for example, if one or more of the settling parties subsequently withdraws from the proceeding.  Simply put, we believe the settling parties are seeking to stifle timely discussion and dissent through delay, a strategy which should be rejected as antithetical to due process.

On the next day, the Settling Parties acted to file their “Motion to Adopt Settlement of Statutory Royalty Rates and Terms For Subpart B Configurations” (“the May 25 Motion to Adopt”).[18]  That motion contained the following statement by the Settling Parties:

In all material respects, the Parties propose that the current regulatory provisions applicable to Subpart B Configurations, and Late Fees solely as they concern Subpart B Configurations, remain in effect. They propose a few minor editorial changes to the applicable regulatory language, which are shown below with additions in bold and underlined text and deletions in bold with a strikethrough. To the extent that the provisions set forth below are also applicable to configurations other than Subpart B Configurations, such matters are outside the scope of the Settlement.

The May 25 Motion to Adopt contained no further elaboration concerning the statement originally made in the Settling Parties’ March 2 Notice that “NMPA, UMG, WMG and SME have also reached an agreement in principle concerning a separate memorandum of understanding addressing certain related issues.”

One month later, on June 25, 2021, the CRB published in the Federal Register its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking[19]addressing the May 25 Motion to Adopt filed by the Settling Parties, stating in pertinent part as follows:

The Judges may decline to adopt the agreement as a basis for statutory terms and rates for participants not party to the agreement if any participant objects and the Judges conclude that the agreement does not provide a reasonable basis for setting statutory terms or rates. See §801(b)(7)(A).[20] (Emphasis and Footnote added). If the Judges adopt rates and terms reached pursuant to a negotiated settlement, those rates and terms are binding on all copyright owners of musical works and those using the musical works in the activities described in the proposed regulations….

The Judges solicit comments on whether they should adopt the proposed regulations as statutory rates and terms relating to the making and distribution of physical or digital phonorecords of nondramatic musical works. Comments and objections regarding the rates and terms and the minor revisions must be submitted no later than July 26, 2021.

By submitting these Comments today, the Independent Music Creator community seeks to respectfully explain the myriad reasons why adoption by the CRB of the Settling Parties’ May 25 Motion to Adopt (including the proposed royalty freeze) would not only be inconsistent with the provisions of the US Copyright Act, but will cause great harm to the US and global songwriter and composer communities.  We likewise urge circumspection by the CRB concerning the possibility of any potential “insider” or “self-dealing” settlement arrangement among related companies and trade associations that may have been carried out at the expense of those music creators whom Congress intended (pursuant to Article I §8 of the US Constitution) to be the beneficiaries –not the victims– of the statutory mechanical royalty rate-setting process.

Continued in Part 2

#FrozenMechanicals Crisis: Monica Corton’s Comment to Copyright Royalty Board

July 26, 2021

Chief Copyright Royalty Judge Jesse M. Feder
Copyright Royalty Judge David R. Strickler
Copyright Royalty Judge Steve Ruwe

U.S. Copyright Royalty Board 101 Independence Ave SE

P.O. Box 70977

Washington, DC 20024-0977

SENT VIA ELECTRONIC DELIVERY

RE: DETERMINATION OF ROYALTY RATES AND TERMS FOR MAKING AND DISTRIBUTING PHONORECORDS, DOCKET NUMBER 21-CRB-0001-

PR (2023-2027) (Phonorecords IV)

Honorable Judges:

My name is Monica Corton, and I am the CEO and Founder of Go to Eleven Entertainment, a newly formed independent music publishing company that is funded. I have been in the music publishing business for over thirty years, twenty- seven of which were spent as the Senior Executive Vice President of Creative Affairs & Licensing at Next Decade Entertainment. My experience is in all areas of music licensing, registrations, and royalty payments, and my former clients included the catalogs of Boston, Harry Belafonte, Vic Mizzy (the “Addams Family Theme” and “Green Acres Theme”), Sammy Hagar, and many more.

It is my understanding that the CRB judges are being asked to accept a Motion to Adopt a freeze or a non-rate increase for all mechanical licensing uses for physical phonorecords, i.e., CDs and vinyl, permanent digital downloads, ringtones and music bundles (when multiple songs are downloaded in groups) for the Rate Period of 2023 to 2027. The rates for these types of uses have been frozen and have not increased for any music publisher or songwriter since 2006. In the past, the National Music Publishers Association (“NMPA”) has explained these freezes as a necessary component to their negotiation for an increase in the digital rates for mechanical licenses. For many years (2006-2021), I have gone along with this explanation, but after fifteen (“15”) years of having no increase on any physical product or digital downloads, I now believe it is completely unfair and no longer justifiable for music publishers and songwriters, particularly the independents and DIY creators (do-it-yourself), to have been denied an increase in these rates after

15 years of allowing record labels to get away without paying any increase whatsoever and now face being blocked from a raise for another five (“5”) years.

To date, the justification for not increasing our physical and digital download mechanical royalty rates has been a fear of potentially stalling or disrupting the transition to the distribution of music digitally. We now are long past that transition, and the major record labels who are pressing for a freeze or no increase in our mechanical rates now are very stable businesses. Indeed, they are flourishing. Universal Music Publishing Group is expected to go public, the major labels are signing more catalog than ever before, and they all are claiming a very healthy, booming industry in the media and to their investors. Part of the reason they are so financially sound is because they are not paying their fair share in mechanical royalties to creators when it comes to physical product, digital download, ringtone, and music bundle mechanical royalties.

You might ask, “Why are the parties outlined in the Motion to Adopt Settlement of Statutory Royalty Rates and Terms for Subpart B Configurations agreeing to this freeze on mechanical rates?” Let’s look at who the parties are that are agreeing: all the major labels, all of their sister music publishing companies, such as Sony Music, Universal Music Publishing, Warner/Chappell Music, and the Nashville Songwriters Association International (“NSAI”). The odd man out is NSAI, a songwriter organization based in Nashville. Why would songwriters approve of a rate that does not allow them to make a living from the mechanical licensing of their songs? The answer is unclear as many NSAI members, when asked, tell me that they are unaware that their organization is selling out their member’s copyrights for an under-market mechanical rate price in the 2023-2027 mechanical rate negotiations with the CRB. A perusal of the NSAI website shows nothing about NSAI’s participation in these negotiations or the positions it is taking in such negotiations. If their membership does not know that NSAI is agreeing to freeze these mechanical rates, how can the songwriter member of NSAI be a “willing buyer, willing seller”?

The NMPA’s Motion to Adopt Settlement states “the Settlement represents the consensus of buyers and sellers representing the vast majority of the market for “mechanical” rights for Subpart B Configurations”, yet this is incorrect. It seems likely that songwriters represented by the major labels have no idea that their publisher is agreeing to not increase their mechanical royalties for another 5 years, for a total twenty-one (“21”) years of non-increases in physical product, digital download, ringtone, and music bundle mechanical rates. While these songwriters have been denied any increased rates, nearly everything else in the world has

increased in price substantially. There is no food item, rent, mortgage, car, gasoline, school or tax rate that has not increased from 2006 to 2021 and will not increase from 2023 to 2027.

Further, another concern is that the NMPA has kept the negotiations for this subsection very quiet. As a member of many of the music trade organizations and someone who is paying attention to the pulse of independent publishers and songwriters, I can attest that there has been no discussion of these frozen mechanical rates. Outside of the major companies that control copyrights, there is vast market of independents, foreign music publishers/songwriters, and do-it- yourself (“DIY”) creators who have no voice in these hearings or rate settings.

These are the people who are having a much harder time making a living from their music. Many of them have songs that sell a lot of physical product and digital downloads, as physical product is still doing well in many niche markets where independent music publishers/songwriters and DIY creators live. These creators are not well-educated in music publishing, either from an industry knowledge of licensing perspective or a legal perspective (where they would follow the day-to- day happenings of the CRB hearings.) They are the silent 40+% of the market that makes up the independent side of music publishing. We are a mighty group. We represent thousands of creators, and our numbers are increasing the balance of the business every year, so much so that Sony Music just bought AWAL, a formerly independent label that administered master rights for thousands of DIY creators and was owned by Kobalt. Please read (https://www.rollingstone.com/pro/features/why-did-sony-music-just-spend-430- million-on-kobalt-indie-label-awal-1122350/).

Are you certain that those AWAL artists, who often also are the songwriters of the songs that they record, have any idea that their new label owner is advocating for them not to get a mechanical rate increase for physical copies, digital downloads, ringtones, and music bundles for the next 5 years, after already 15 years of not receiving an increase in their mechanical rates? I would argue that a significant majority of them have no idea that this is happening.

There is reference in several places that the major labels and major publishers are party to some “side deal” which ostensibly could mean the major publishers are receiving some extra compensation for these frozen rates with some additional payments that effectively make the major music publishers mechanical rates increase their rates for physical mechanicals, digital downloads, ringtones, and music bundles. What is this settlement? Who is party to it? How will it affect the music publishing industry at large?

I would ask that the CRB consider raising the mechanical rates for physical product, digital downloads, ringtones, and music bundles to at least a standard of living increase since 2006, which I have calculated using the CPI Inflation Calculator that is provided by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm). This would mean that the physical mechanical rate and the digital download rate for songs under five minutes would increase to $.12 per unit and the per minute rate for anything over five minutes would increase to $.02 per minute. The ringtone rate would increase to $.33 per ringtone, and the music bundle rate should increase proportionally as well. Unfortunately, I am unclear regarding where the music bundle rates stand now, but the calculator is very easy to use, and I leave it to the CRB judges to assist reasonably in determining the increase for said music bundle mechanical royalty rate(s). These mechanical rates should take effect on January 1, 2023 and be the starting point for the next rate period. In addition, the rate should increase each year of the 5-year term as is the standard with all other mechanical rates that are set by the CRB.

I believe this is the only fair and equitable way to deal with these frozen mechanical rates, and I hope that my explanation on behalf of thousands of independent publishers and songwriters who represent the independent and DIY communities will give the CRB judges pause to reconsider the physical product, digital download, ringtone, and music bundle mechanical rates included in Subpart B for the period 2023-2027. I am happy to elaborate in any way regarding any aspect of this letter should the CRB judges like further explanation on my reasoning herein.

Best wishes,

Monica Corton
CEO & Founder

Go to Eleven Entertainment

Frozen Mechanicals Crisis: @NorthMusicGroup Comment to Copyright Royalty Board

July 26, 2021

Via Electronic Delivery

Copyright Royalty Board 37 CFR Part 385

[Docket No. 21–CRB–0001–PR (2023–2027)]

Determination of Rates and Terms for Making and Distributing Phonorecords (Phonorecords IV)

Copyright Royalty Judge David R. Strickler
Chief Copyright Royalty Judge Jesse M. Feder
Copyright Royalty Judge Steven Ruwe
US Copyright Royalty Board
101 Independence Ave SE
Washington, DC 20024

To Your Honors:

My name is Abby North. I am a music publishing administrator based in Los Angeles. My views expressed in this letter are solely my own.

With my husband, I am a copyright owner of the classic song “Unchained Melody,” among other copyrights.  I also administer musical works on behalf of songwriters, their families and heirs. My clients depend on royalties to pay for life’s essentials.

It is imperative that the Judges understand that despite what some parties may argue, Subpart B royalties absolutely are meaningful to songwriters.

There is no dispute over the fact that streaming is the most prominent form of music distribution, as reported in the popular press.  But mounting evidence shows a significant and consistent growth in vinyl production.  CDs remain popular among some listeners. Other listeners prefer to have permanently available digital copies, i.e., downloads.

Vinyl, once written off for dead, has enjoyed almost 15 years of consecutive growth, with more than 19 million vinyl records sold in the US so far this year.  Per Digital Music News, this is an increase of 108% over the previous year. The Judges need only look to this year’s Record Store Day on July 17 for confirmation of the vinyl resurgence.  

Amazon Music now offers a “Vinyl of the Month” club, curated by “the experts at Amazon Music.”

Vinyl pressing plants are overwhelmed by the volume of orders they are fulfilling, and it is commonly understood in the industry that vinyl sales would be far higher if production could keep up with demand.

Vinyl is now treated as a merchandise item by many labels and artists, and as such it is a significant contributor to the overall earnings of many artists, from the smallest independent to Taylor Swift.

An artist/songwriter of Taylor Swift’s stature may not rely on earnings from vinyl, but other songwriters most certainly do. This is particularly true of artist/songwriters who have seen their high margin vinyl sales cannibalized by streaming (as was noted in the recent report by the UK Parliament’s Digital Culture Media & Sport Committee on the Economics of Music Streaming).  And ALL songwriters rely on any source of revenue available for exploitation of their songs.

As a rightsholder and administrator of legacy and current copyrights, I can testify that mechanicals from physical and download media are a substantial share of overall royalties.

In reviewing my clients’ 2Q21 statements, one legacy songwriter received 57% of his period royalties from physical mechanicals and 9% from download mechanicals. Another writer had uniquely high grand rights and sync royalties for the period, but still saw 17% of overall royalties from physical and download mechanicals. If we remove the grand rights and sync amounts, the overall total from physical and download mechanicals is 35%.

It is clear that streaming rates, even at 15.1%, are not sustainable for most songwriters. It is obvious that without a more equitable streaming revenue distribution model, we will continue to see songwriters leave the business entirely, or at least be forced to pick up side gigs to increase their income.

These facts provide the undeniable case against freezing the Subpart B rate at $.091 per unit.  Arguments I have heard from insiders defending their decision to freeze the rates are that downloads will decline if Apple stops supporting iTunes, and that physical sales are so negligible that they just do not matter. Walk into any record store or follow fans to the merch stands at a concert and you will see and hear the real story. Also, Apple is not the only distributor of digital downloads.

It appears that significant and impactful decisions are allowed to be made by a tiny group of participants that is in the room primarily because this group has tens of millions of dollars to fund legal expenses. This very small group with undeniably substantial resources and very deep pockets decided that it is in support of a rate freeze.

This very small group is now asking the Judges to apply its private deal to each and every songwriter in the world.  And yet, almost none of these songwriters were included in that decision to freeze the rate.

The ability for just two trade organizations to have such an oppressive global impact is staggering. What about the rest of the songwriters and independent publishers and their due process rights?

Respectfully, I implore the Judges to keep in mind that the NMPA does not represent all music publishers, and the NMPA itself owns no copyrights.   At best, the NMPA Board of Directors could speak solely for the music publishers that employ them.

NSAI is one of many United States songwriter organizations, and like the NMPA, owns no copyrights. It most certainly does not represent all songwriters from all US songwriter organizations, and it certainly does not represent songwriters around the world who are not affiliated with songwriter organizations. 

As an illustration of global songwriter opposition, both the UK’s Ivors Academy and the European Composer and Songwriter Alliance have each come out against frozen mechanicals.

I ask the Judges to recognize that NSAI and the NMPA do not have such broad authority to reasonably put forth decisions that affect all the world’s songwriters and publishers.

In the recent Web V decision, the Judges acknowledged the need for an inflation-indexed increase in the statutory rate for sound recordings.  Due to the inevitable decline in buying power created by inflation, the physical and download mechanical rate must correspondingly increase.

I have no objection to a settlement related to mechanicals. I do have an objection to a freeze proposed without authority that does not both increase the old $.091 rate and also include an adjustment for inflation at a bare minimum.

To freeze the rate for 20 years ignores the debilitating impact of inflation, ignores the needs of songwriters and truly independent music publishers like me who are not represented before the CRB, and frankly, displays a willingness to undervalue music.

It is imperative that in the future, publishers and songwriters at large, domestically, and globally be given a mechanism to participate in the rate-setting process, whether or not they have millions of dollars to spend on lawyers.

Music is crucial to human well-being. The American Songbook and its many creators are a treasured element of United States, and in fact, world culture.

How can something so important, so meaningful and so rare not be deserving of a rate increase that at least mitigates the effect of inflation?

Sincerely,

Abby North

North Music Group LLC

Frozen Mechanicals Crisis: @DavidPoeMusic’s Comment to the Copyright Royalty Board

[The great David Poe was among the first songwriters to post a comment opposing freezing the mechanical royalty rate for physical and downloads promoted by the NMPA and the Nashville Songwriters Association International. We’re going to be posting the comments, but wanted to start with David Poe’s passionate and well-reasoned comment that you can download here.]

July 12, 2021

Via Electronic Delivery

Chief Copyright Royalty Judge Jesse M. Feder

Copyright Royalty Judge David R. Strickler

Copyright Royalty Judge Steve Ruwe

US Copyright Royalty Board

101 Independence Ave SE / P.O. Box 70977 Washington, DC 20024-097

To Your Honors:

Choices you will make regarding mechanical rates will impact the current and future musicmakers’ ability to contribute to our most profound national export: art.

Musicmakers intuitively understand how we stand on the shoulders of giants. Similarly, each aspect of music- adjacent policy sets a precedent for another. And for years, the devaluation of music has been trending: when music piracy made music free, cover charges at local live venues disappeared; when media conglomeration became legal, playlists became homogenous, and far less localized; when algorithms control streaming services, offerings became more generic, by design.

A culture that declares music to be worth less can expect worthless music. It can also expect more musical careers to be sustained only by those who can afford to lose money.

Consider this: our Top Ten is full of artists who are children of the affluent — those who can afford to do this gig. Not children of millionaires: Stevie Wonder, Aretha Franklin, Bob Dylan. The quality of the contributions made by

those who come from privileged upbringings may be a matter of taste, but we can be certain that lessening the ability for musicmakers to make a credible living will beget barriers to entry and a less equitable cohort.

Beyond the cultural impact, common sense arguments against re-freezing mechanical rates that have already in place for two generations include:

  1. Money. The rate that was a little less than a dime in 2009 is functionally worth a little more than a nickel now

— its buying power will only decrease with time.

2. Ethics. Objectively speaking, the proposed freeze represents neither a free nor a fairly-regulated market. It is best characterized as “willing buyer, unwilling seller.”

3. Support from authentic shareholders. Exponentially more musicmakers and music advocacy groups oppose re-freezing mechanical rates. Organizations doing so comprise a distinctly inclusive cohort that looks like America, as well as the diverse, borderless history of music. Among groups opposing frozen mechanicals are the Songwriters Guild of America, the Alliance of Women Film Composers, the Alliance of Latin- American Composers & Authors, the Pan-African Composers and Songwriters Alliance, the Society of Composers and Lyricists, Music Answers, and the Music Creators of North America.

Groups expressing support for freezing mechanicals believe that musicmakers should make less than what we make now. Given this, any claim they make to represent the interests artists is disingenuous. While these groups’ lobbying resources are formidable, both their agenda and actual membership represent a perilously slim minority of musicmakers.

I believe the technological democratization of tools and access for artists of all mediums could enable a new American renaissance. Let us support a regulatory model that fosters that goal, and gives a diverse group of artists the means to do great work that inspires us all.

Sincerely,

David Poe
Songwriter

Frozen Mechanicals CRB Comments: Anthony Garnier

[Anthony Garnier has the honor of being the first commenter in the frozen mechanicals hearing.]

July 18, 2021

Via Electronic Delivery

Copyright Royalty Judge David R. Strickler
Chief Copyright Royalty Judge Jesse M. Feder
Copyright Royalty Judge Steven Ruwe
US Copyright Royalty Board
101 Independence Ave SE
Washington, DC 20024

To Your Honors:

As an artist whose career depends on the sustainability of songwriters, I write with considerable concern for the proposed settlement agreement in Phonorecords IV which will affect ALL songwriters, including independents who are not party to the private, non­ transparent settlement agreement.

As your Honors are aware, the “willing buyer-willing seller” concept was established as a basis for fairness in the regulatory regime of the compulsory license when the Copyright Royalty Board (CRB) was established.  Vertical  integration  (ownership,  interlocking  boards) between the major labels and major publishers poses a serious conflict of interest and engenders self­ dealing among negotiators. Concurrent to the antitrust discussions in Congress concerning vertical integration between corporations, this important “willing  buyer-willing  seller” concept is an issue which songwriters who are not party to the private agreement wish to address as a matter of fairness.

Along with hundreds of thousands of songwriters and composers, I am strongly opposed to the proposed adoption by the CRB of a freeze on mechanical royalty rates for physical phonorecords and downloads, and against other non-transparent elements of the so-called agreement presented to the CRB for adoption by the National Music Publishers Association (NMPA), the Nashville Songwriters Association lnt’I (NSAI), and the major record labels.

NMPA and NSAI have not consulted with any other songwriter organizations despite claiming to represent the interests of songwriters for the entire world. No other songwriter or composer group, neither US or otherwise, joins NSAI in agreeing that adoption of the agreement would serve the interests of music creators rather than cause irreparable harm to their members.

Their secret agreement should be binding only on the parties who opt into the secret agreements, while everyone else should be subject to a different royalty rate determined by equitable and fair marketplace conditions and principles.

Respectfully,

Anthony Garnier

1121 Viewpoint Terrace

Peekskill, NY 10566

Letter from Congressman Lloyd Doggett about Frozen Mechanicals to Librarian of Congress and Register of Copyrights

[This is a letter from Austin Congressman Lloyd Doggett (D-TX) to the Librarian of Congress (who appoints and can sack the Copyright Royalty Judges) and the head of the Copyright Office about procedures in the Copyright Royalty Board’s proceeding on frozen mechanicals. Download the original letter here.]


Dr. Carla Hayden, Librarian of Congress
Shira Perlmutter, Register of Copyrights
The Library of Congress
101 Independence Ave SE Washington, DC 20540

Dear Dr. Hayden and Ms. Perlmutter,

As a Representative covering music communities from San Antonio to Austin, the “Live Music Capitol of the World,” some of my songwriter constituents[1] are concerned about some procedural and substantive issues arising in the ongoing “Determination of Royalty Rates and Terms for Making and Distributing Phonorecords (Phonorecords IV)” currently pending before the Copyright Royalty Board (CRB). I write to seek some clarity for them and for me. The statutory rates set by the CRB are binding on all songs ever written or that may ever be written by anyone in the world who exploits songs in copyright in the United States. While referred to as a “minimum” I am told that statutory rates in practice are a maximum and are, of course, compulsory. Naturally, I am concerned that we not misstep.

While I know the CRB has not rendered a decision in Phonorecords IV, I am trying to understand the process by which the CRB: (1) evaluates settlement agreements proffered by certain parties to a proceeding prior to publishing those settlements for public comment, (2) determines the application of the new “willing buyer/willing seller” standard for rate setting when buyer and seller are related parties, and (3) the degree of transparency that the CRB may require of participants in the proceeding particularly terms of private settlements that the parties voluntarily disclose related to the rates they have negotiated.

In particular, I draw your attention to the Motion To Adopt Settlement Of Statutory Royalty Rates And Terms For Subpart B Configurations, Docket No. 21-CRB-0001-PR (2023-2027) filed by the National Music Publishers Association (NMPA), Nashville Songwriters Association International, Sony Music Entertainment, UMG Recordings, Inc. and Warner Music Group Corp.[2]     This settlement has provoked concern because of its disclosed terms regarding an additional five-year freeze for “mechanical” royalty rates on phonorecords in the physical and permanent download configurations, and undisclosed terms if adopted by the CRB in its determination.

The settling parties apparently refer to both a settlement agreement relating to certain mechanical royalty rates and another agreement that refers to undisclosed “negotiated licensing processes and late fee waivers.” Those settling parties ask the CRB to adopt their settlement on an “industry-wide basis,” and I am trying to better understand what this request means.  I do not wish to interfere in the CRB’s adjudication of the matters before it, but I hope you can help me understand certain procedural matters relating to the CRB itself.

I would appreciate your answering the following questions at your earliest convenience due to the ongoing nature of both Phonorecords IV and other rate setting proceedings before the CRB and thank you in advance for your courtesy.

(1) There appear to be two settlements referenced in the Motion, being the rate setting settlement summarized in draft regulations attached and this other “memorandum of understanding” (“MOU”) between Sony Music Entertainment, UMG Recordings, Inc. and Warner Music Group Corp. (i.e., the same parties to the private rate settlement except the NSAI).

Question: May the CRB disclose (or compel the settlement participants to disclose) the unredacted actual settlement agreements referenced in the Motion, including the MOU?

(2) In the Music Modernization Act,[3]  Congress directed CRB Judges to set the statutory mechanical royalty rate by utilizing a “willing buyer/willing seller” rate standard designed to model the rates that would be reflected in a free market. In the case of the “industry-wide” settlements proposed by the Motion, it appears that there may be joint ownership of some of the members of the NMPA and the record companies proposing the settlement on rates.

Question: Are the Subpart B rates subject to the “willing buyer/willing seller” rate standard?

Question: If so, what is the rule when the “willing buyer” and “willing seller” are under the same corporate umbrella?

(3) It seems that the participants in the proceeding, and certainly the participants in the settlement, are dominated by major publishers and record companies seeking to impose their private settlement on all other songwriters. If other songwriter groups are not participating in the proceeding but object to the settlement (such as songwriters from more diverse communities) I am concerned that those songwriters may have no recourse.

Question: May the CRB limit the scope of a private party settlement to the parties, but determine a higher rate applies to others?

The Motion and the “frozen mechanicals” issue has prompted considerable public debate in the United States and Europe as reported in The Trichordist artist blog[,[4] Billboard, [5]   Complete Music Update[  [6]  and the Creative Industries Newsletter[7].   Three NSAI songwriters have published a defense[8] of their participation in the Motion. The Trichordist notes that the CRB produces considerable frustration and passion on all sides because the process is “inequitable, unwieldy and prohibitively expensive.”[9]

On page 4 of the Motion, the parties advise the CRB that this settlement represents the “consensus of buyers and sellers representing the vast majority of the market for “mechanical ” rights for [physical, permanent downloads]…” Setting aside the issue of the settlement participants representing “buyers” and “sellers” under the same corporate umbrellas, it seems appropriate that every songwriter who will be affected by the outcome of this proceeding, from San Antonio and Austin, Memphis, to Detroit and beyond, should have the opportunity to read and comment meaningfully on the actual settlement agreement posed for adoption, and the related MOU referenced.

I look forward to your response and to continuing to work with you on these matters of such critical importance to our culture and to songwriters everywhere. Please also let me know if you have any other insights to this which may be helpful for my constituents.

Sincerely,

Lloyd Doggett

[1] ATX Musicians Joins Opposition to Frozen Mechanicals, The Trichordist, https://thetrichordist.com/2021/05/28/atx-musicians-joins-opposition-to- frozen-mechanicals/

[2] Available at https://app.crb.gov/docwnent/download/25288

[3] 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(2)(A).

[4] https://thetrichordist.com/category /frozen-mechanicals/

[5] https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/9577976/songwriters-crb-royalty-rate-comments-letters

[6] https://completemusicupdate.com/article/songwriter-groups- urge-us-copyright-royalty-board-to-open­ submissions-on-proposed-new-mechanical-royalty-rate-on-discs-and-downloads/

[7]  http: //legrandnetwork.blogspot.com/2021/06/songwriters-organisations-object-to.html

[8] https://musicrow.com/2021/06/nsai-son gwriters-respond-to-criticism-of-decision-not-to-challenge-physical­ royalty-rates/

[9] https://thetrichordist.com/2021/06/03/three-nashville-songwriters-respond-on-frozen-mechanicals/

Press Release: House of Commons, Digital Culture Media and Sport Committee: New Report: Economics of music streaming

MPs call for a ‘complete reset’ of music streaming to fairly reward performers and creators 

Successful artists see ‘pitiful returns’ from streaming while some performers are frozen out of payments altogether 

Artists must be given a legal right to a fairer share of revenues from streaming, the DCMS Committee concludes, following a wide-ranging inquiry that calls for a complete reset of the market. 

The Report into the Economics of music streaming finds that comprehensive reform of legislation and further regulation is needed, not only to redress the balance for songwriters, performers and composers, but to tackle fundamental problems within the recorded music industry. 

Services that host user-generated content gain significant advantage on copyright say MPs, with YouTube emerging as a dominant player. The Report warns of ‘deep concerns’ about the unassailable position of the major music companies with a call for the Competition and Markets Authority to examine whether competition in the recorded music market is being distorted. 

Though consumers enjoy music that is historically cheap, more personalised and more readily available than ever before, streaming’s short-term pricing structure puts music at risk in the long-term, say MPs. 

Chair of the DCMS Committee Julian Knight MP said: 

“While streaming has brought significant profits to the recorded music industry, the talent behind it – performers, songwriters and composers – are losing out. 

“Only a complete reset of streaming that enshrines in law their rights to a fair share of the earnings will do. 

“However, the issues we’ve examined reflect much deeper and more fundamental problems within the structuring of the recorded music industry itself. 

“We have real concerns about the way the market is operating, with platforms like YouTube able to gain an unfair advantage over competitors and the independent music sector struggling to compete against the dominance of the major labels. 

“We’ve heard of witnesses being afraid to speak out in case they lose favour with record labels or streaming services. It’s time for the Government to order an investigation by the Competition and Markets Authority on the distortions and disparities we’ve uncovered.” 

ENDS 

Key findings and recommendations: 

Government to legislate so that performers enjoy the right to equitable remuneration for streaming income 

Government to refer case to the Competition and Markets Authority to undertake full market study into the economic impact of the major music groups’ dominance 

Government should introduce robust and legally enforceable obligations to normalise licensing arrangements for UGC-hosting services, to address the market distortions and the music streaming ‘value gap’ 

A full list of conclusions and recommendations can be found in the attached report 

‘Pitiful returns’ from streaming 

Performers, songwriters and composers receive only a small portion of streaming revenue due to poor royalty rates and because of the lower valuation of song-writing and composition, compared to the value of a song’s recording. Evidence from artists and songwriters who enjoy critical success described earnings from streaming as insufficient to ‘keep the wolf from the door’ or to live off, a position magnified by the loss of income from live performances. Such ‘pitiful returns’ from music streaming are found to impact the entire creative ecosystem with session musicians frozen out altogether. 

The Report notes that several performers who gave evidence claimed that they and many of their peers were afraid of speaking out against the status quo for fear of losing favour with major record labels and streaming services. 

Equitable remuneration 

MPs call on the Government to introduce a right to equitable digital music remuneration. Though performers have a right to equitable remuneration where a commercially published sound recording is rented (broadcast via the radio, or played in public), streaming exploits the ‘making available’ right for recordings under UK copyright law. The Report says the right to equitable remuneration should be applied to the ‘making available’ right, drawing on the precedent of how the right to equitable remuneration applies to rental, as a simple yet effective solution to the problems caused by poor remuneration as it is a right already established within UK law, and applied to streaming elsewhere in the world. It also argues that this would address the inconsistency whereby equitable remuneration already applies to songwriters and composers. The Government should also consider how to increase the value of a song to give parity with a recording to support songwriters and composers. 

Case for CMA to examine Universal, Sony and Warner market dominance’ 

The Report finds a case for a full study by the CMA into the economic impact of the dominance by major music companies Universal, Sony and Warner of the UK’s music recording industry, and to a lesser extent in publishing. Further, the Government must make sure that UK law is not enabling market dominance. It should support independent labels to challenge the majors’ dominance, with creators empowered to offset the disparity in negotiating power when signing with music companies. 

Further evidence to support a referral to the CMA comes from ongoing concerns about the majors’ position in direct licensing negotiations with streaming services which allows them to benefit at the expense of independent labels and self-releasing artists, particularly regarding playlisting. 

MPs question whether with the major record labels’ market dominance on song rights, a song would be fairly valued and urge consideration by the CMA of the majors’ dominance in recording and publishing on this point. 

‘Safe harbour’ 

‘Safe harbour’ gives services that host user-generated content (UGC) such as YouTube a competitive advantage over other services, exempting them from legal liability for copyright infringement unless and until they obtain “actual knowledge” of infringing activity, in which case they must remove or to disable access to it. The Report finds these exemptions, now transposed into UK law, have had a profound impact on the market, with UCG-hosting services gaining broad limitations of liability that undermine the music industry’s leverage in licensing negotiations. It recommends the CMA examine YouTube’s dominance of the music streaming market and take steps to encourage competition. To prevent market distortion, the Government should introduce obligations enforceable in law that would ‘normalise’ licensing arrangements for UCG-hosting services. 

Legacy contracts and recoupment 

To address a wider imbalance, the Report recommends a right to recapture the rights to works after a period of time from record labels, and a right to contract adjustment if an artist’s work was successful beyond the remuneration they received. 

Performers, signed to a record deal, are paid according to the terms of their contract with their record label from streaming revenue after production costs are recouped. Many labels do not write off debts meaning that deals signed decades ago can still recoup against initial production and distribution costs. Following an appearance before the Committee, Sony announced it would “pay through on existing unrecouped balances to increase the ability of those who qualify to receive more money from uses of their music” for deals before 2000. MPs call for Universal and Warner to look again at the issue of unrecouped balances with a view to enabling more of their legacy artists to receive payments when their music is streamed. 

User-centric model 

MPs heard evidence of different models to distribute streaming revenues, either the predominant pro-rata payment model or alternatives such as user-centric. They welcome the consideration by new services of ways to address fairness and transparency in remuneration. However, are concerned that current contractual agreements between the major music companies and streaming services could stifle further innovation if misused and recommend consideration by the CMA. 

The Report also make recommendations on licensing and royalty chains to increase transparency to creators. 

Further information: 

The inquiry into the Economics of music streaming was launched in October 2020. It received more than 300 pieces of written evidence. Among artists and performers who gave evidence, songwriter and producer Nile Rodgers, Radiohead’s Ed O’Brien, Elbow’s Guy Garvey and soloist Nadine Shah. It took evidence from the UK’s independent music sector, as well as major record labels Sony Music, Warner Music and Universal Music. Spotify, Amazon, Apple and YouTube also gave evidence. 

Committee membership: 

Julian Knight MP (Chair) (Conservative, Solihull); Kevin Brennan MP (Labour, Cardiff West); Steve Brine MP (Conservative, Winchester); Alex Davies-Jones MP (Labour, Pontypridd); Clive Efford MP (Labour, Eltham); Julie Elliott MP (Labour, Sunderland Central); Rt Hon Damian Green MP (Conservative, Ashford); Rt Hon Damian Hinds MP (Conservative, East Hampshire); John Nicolson MP (Scottish National Party, Ochil and South Perthshire); Giles Watling MP (Conservative, Clacton); Heather Wheeler (Conservative, South Derbyshire). 

Media queries to Anne Peacock peacocka@parliament.uk / 07753 101 017; Gina Degtyareva degtyarevae@parliament.uk / 07548 146 012. 

Visit the DCMS Committee website 

Committee Twitter: @CommonsDCMS 

Specific Committee Information: cmscom@parliament.uk / 020 7219 6188 

Data protection: The personal information you supply will be processed in accordance with the provisions of the General Data Protection Regulation and the Data Protection Act 2018. Full details of how your data will be used can be found here. You may unsubscribe from this mailing list at any time. 

The @ArtistRights Watch Podcast: Episode 1: The Frozen Mechanicals Crisis with Guest @CrispinHunt

Nik Patel, David Lowery, and Chris Castle feature in this podcast where they discuss the current issues of artists’ rights in the music industry. Find the Artist Rights Watch on your favorite podcast platform here https://linktr.ee/artistrightswatchpod Please subscribe, rate and share!

On the first episode of the Artist Rights Watch, Nik Patel, David Lowery, and Chris Castle sit down with Ivors Academy Chair, Crispin Hunt to talk about the frozen mechanical royalties crisis currently playing out in the United States and how it threatens UK songwriters and indeed songwriters around the world.

Crispin gives us his invaluable analysis of how the frozen mechanicals crisis affects songwriters around the world and the highly effective #brokenrecord and #fixstreaming campaigns that Ivors Academy supports in the UK that has lead to a parliamentary inquiry and legislation introduced in the UK Parliament.

The “frozen mechanicals” crisis is rooted in a private deal between big publishers and their big label affiliates to essentially continue the freeze on the already-frozen U.S. mechanical royalty rate paid by the record companies for CDs, vinyl and permanent downloads. The private deal freezes the rate for another five years but does not even account for inflation. Increasing the royalty rate for inflation, does not actually increase songwriter buying power.

The major publishers and labels have asked the Copyright Royalty Board in the US to make their private deal the law and apply that frozen rate to everyone.

In the past, the music industry has experienced a $0.02 mechanical royalty rate that lasted for 70 years, and with the current mechanical royalty rate of $0.091 being set in 2006, advocates hope it’s not a repeat of the past.

In this Artist Rights Watch episode, we cover its numerous implications and consequences such as controlled compositions clauses, the Copyright Royalty Board, CPI and fixed increases, how the UK compares, and potential resolutions.

Below are some links for further reading on frozen mechanicals and Crispin Hunt:

Take the Artist Rights Watch Survey on Mechanical Royalty Rates

How to file your comment with the Copyright Royalty Board on the frozen mechanicals crisis!

Controlled Compositions Clauses and Frozen Mechanicals. Chris Castle

https://musictechpolicy.com/2020/10/10/controlled-compositions-clauses-and-frozen-mechanicals/embed/#?secret=Rftsxg1vsl

What Would @TaylorSwift13 and Eddie @cue Do? One Solution to the Frozen Mechanical Problem. Chris Castle

https://musictech.solutions/2021/05/13/what-would-taylor-and-eddie-do-one-solution-to-the-frozen-mechanical-problem/embed/#?secret=N8n44nO4gn

The Trichordist posts on frozen mechanicals

https://thetrichordist.com/category/frozen-mechanicals/

The Ivors Academy Joins the No Frozen Mechanicals Campaign

Year-End 2020 RIAA Revenue Statistics

Click to access 2020-Year-End-Music-Industry-Revenue-Report.pdf

Below are our social links and terms of use:

Crispin: https://twitter.com/crispinhunt

Chris: http://www.christiancastle.com/chris-castle

David: https://twitter.com/davidclowery?s=20

https://www.instagram.com/davidclowery/

Nik: https://www.instagram.com/nikpatelmusic/

Website: https://artistrightswatch.com
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/artistrightswatch
Twitter: https://twitter.com/ArtistRights?s=20

Terms of Use: https://artistrightswatchdotcom.files.wordpress.com/2021/01/arw-podcast-terms-of-use-v-1-i-1.pdf

Guest Post by @SealeInTheDeal: A Foreseeable Result of the Phonorecords IV Private Settlement: Opening Pandora’s Box

By Gwendolyn Seale

Over the last six weeks, the Trichordist has chronicled the frozen mechanicals saga occurring at the Copyright Royalty Board in the government’s rate setting for the compulsory mechanical license commonly called “Phonorecords IV.” (Congress mandated that these government rate settings occur every five years and are numbered sequentially.) 

Songwriters, independent music publishers, music lawyers and advocates have penned articles and contacted their representatives in Congress to express their concerns about the private party settlement which would extend the existing freeze on the statutory mechanical rate with respect to physical products and permanent downloads for yet another five years.  That private party settlement among the Big Three record companies, the National Music Publishers Association and the Nashville Songwriters Association International is expected to be opened to public comment later today.  (Friday news dump?)  These entities then submitted that settlement to the Copyright Royalty Board asking the CRB to impose the terms of that private settlement on the rest of the world.  And it now appears that these secret deals may be backfiring.

The frozen rate most prominently applies to permanent downloads and physical sales like vinyl.  Why the Big Three want to freeze mechanical royalty rates on the booming vinyl business is anyone’s guess.

The sticking point for most people commenting in the Trichordist is that the terms of the private settlement are not disclosed to the CRB or to the public, especially a side deal between the Big Three and the NMPA.  Songwriters around the world have no way of knowing the terms of these deals unless the Copyright Royalty Board forces their disclosure.

These entities who are before the CRB in Phonorecords IV, along with those vocal in opposition against their private party settlement have been in this arena for far longer than I. When the Phonorecords I proceeding occurred in 2006, I was merely a freshman in high school — and I was completing my final year of law school as the Phonorecords III proceeding began. Needless to say, there has been a significant amount of information and procedure to digest.

Upon learning of the settlement by the Big Three labels, the NMPA and the NSAI, several thoughts came immediately to mind:

1) The settlement and side agreement referenced must be disclosed immediately.

 2) How can this freeze be rationalized, especially during the midst of a worldwide vinyl resurgence?

3) Why would an organization representing songwriters agree to such a freeze? (As an aside, as I was teaching a course on copyright and songwriter revenue streams to 30 older songwriters two weeks ago, they were shocked and moreover disheartened to learn this — as physical sales, not streaming revenue, pays their bills. One said: ”I can stand out on the street in Smithville, Texas, with my guitar and a tip jar and earn more in a couple hours than I will ever earn from streaming”).

 4) This is perfect ammunition for the streaming services to use to justify their already abysmally-low mechanical “rates.”  

While there is much to say on points 1-3, the focus here is on point 4. Chris Castle echoed the same sentiments on June 1:

“Streaming Royalty Backfire:   If you want to argue that there is an inherent value in songs as I do, I don’t think freezing any rates for 20 years gets you there.  Because there is no logical explanation for why the industry negotiators freeze the rates at 9.1¢ for another five years, the entire process for setting streaming mechanical rates starts to look transactional.  In the transactional model, increased streaming mechanicals is ultimately justified by who is paying.  When the labels are paying, they want the rate frozen, so why wouldn’t the services use the same argument on the streaming rates, gooses and ganders being what they are?  If a song has inherent value—which I firmly believe—it has that value for everyone. Given the billions that are being made from music, songwriters deserve a bigger piece of that cash and an equal say about how it is divided.” (link: https://thetrichordist.com/2021/06/01/healing-with-sunlight-a-rate-based-solution-for-the-frozen-mechanicals-dilemma/)

It did not take a soothsayer to foresee this result; the private settlement opened Pandora’s box – begetting misery for every songwriter. Since the CRB has been quiet for the last month with respect to this proceeding, yesterday, I began delving through some of the more recent Phonorecords III remand filings. And much to my unsurprise, I came across a statement from Pandora Media’s expert witness, Professor Michael Katz, who understandably used the proposed settlement as evidence that the streaming rates were fine as is. Katz’s statement was filed on April 4 – two months before songwriters became aware of the quiet filing of the private settlement and began speaking out.  Here’s the link to Professor Katz’s testimony and you’ll find the text below beginning on page 65:  https://app.crb.gov/document/download/23858 .

Pandora not only used the settlement to make the case that the streaming mechanicals rate in the 2012 settlement was a “good benchmark,” but also, even more disastrously, used this argument to rationalize the 2012 rate being TOO HIGH.

This is what happens when there are only a select few gatekeepers, privileged with endless resources and far removed from the plight of independent songwriters, making decisions that affect literally every songwriter’s future. This is why CRB proceedings must be more easily accessible for independent songwriters and their staunch advocates. This is the consequence of the “willing buyer” and “willing seller” appearing on different sides of the same corporate coin – (and if anyone wishes to challenge me on this point be ready for some “interlocking board” remarks based on extensive research into conflicts of interest).  Songwriters deserve better than to have this crucial revenue stream frozen – especially  immediately following an eighteen-month-long worldwide pandemic.

After the release of misery and misfortune with the private settlement, hope remained at the bottom of pandora’s box—hope that the CRB would allow the songwriters affected by the private settlement to at least have an opportunity to be heard in the exclusive and expensive environment of the Copyright Royalty Board. Once the CRB publishes their request for public comments (on the Friday before the July 4 weekend), songwriters may at last have their chance.

And I firmly believe that by the CRB providing every songwriter the opportunity to express how this settlement and the proposed regulations freezing mechanicals for another five years fails to represent her interest, it will exbibit to all the inherent value of songs and restore hope that every voice matters.