Category: Chris Castle

Should the Compulsory License be Re-Upped?

By Chris Castle

[This post first appeared on MusicTechPolicy]

The wisest of those among you learn to read your portents well
There’s no need to hurry, it’s all downhill to Hell…

Don’t Stand Still, written by The Original Snakeboy, performed by Guy Forsyth

Congress is considering whether to renew The MLC, Inc.‘s designation as the mechanical licensing collective. If that sentence seems contradictory, remember those are two different things: the mechanical licensing collective is the statutory body that administers the compulsory license under Section 115. The MLC, Inc. is the private company that was “designated” by Congress through its Copyright Office to do the work of the mechanical licensing collective. This is like the form of a body that performs a function (the mechanical licensing collective) and having to animate that form with actual humans (The MLC, Inc.), kind of like Plato’s allegory of the cave, shadows on the wall being what they are.

Congress reviews the work product of The MLC, Inc. every five years (17 USC §115(d)(3)(B)(ii)) to decide if The MLC, Inc. should be allowed to continue another five years. In its recent guidance to The MLC, Inc. about artificial intelligence, the Copyright Office correctly took pains to make that distinction in a footnote (footnote 2 to be precise. Remember–always read the footnotes, it’s often where the action is.). This is why it is important that we be clear that The MLC, Inc. does not “own” the data it collects (and that HFA as its vendor doesn’t own it either, a point I raised to Spotify’s lobbyist several years ago). Although it may be a blessing if Congress fired The MLC, Inc. and the new collective had to start from scratch.

But Congress likely would only re-up The MLC, Inc. if it had already decided to extend the statutory license and all its cumbersome and byzantine procedures, proceedings and prohibitions on the freedom of songwriters to collectively bargain. Not to mention an extraordinarily huge thumbs down on the scales in favor of the music user and against the interest of the songwriters. The compulsory license is so labyrinthine and Kafka-esque it is actually an insult to Byzantium, but that’s another story.

Rather than just deciding about who is going to get the job of administering the revenues for every songwriter in the world, maybe there should be a vote. Particularly because songwriters cannot be members of the mechanical licensing collective as currently operated. Congress did not ask songwriters what they thought when the whole mechanical licensing scheme was established, so how about now?

Before the Congress decides to continue The MLC, Inc. many believe strongly that the body should reconsider the compulsory license itself. It is the compulsory license that is the real issue that plagues songwriters and blocks a free market. The compulsory license really has passed its sell by date and it’s pretty easy to understand why its gone so sour. Eliminating the Section 115 license will have many implications and we should tread carefully, but purposefully.

Party Like it’s 1909

First of all, consider the actual history of the compulsory license. It’s over 100 years old, and it was established at a time, believe it or not, when the goal of Congress was to even the playing field between, music users and copyright owners. They were worried about music users being hard done by because of the anticompetitive efforts of songwriters and copyright owners. As the late Register Marybeth Peters told Congress, when Congress created the exclusive right to control reproduction and distribution in 1909, “…due to concerns about potential monopolistic behavior [by the copyright owners], Congress also created a compulsory license to allow anyone to make and distribute a mechanical reproduction of a nondramatic musical work without the consent of the copyright owner provided that the person adhered to the provisions of the license, most notably paying a statutorily established royalty to the copyright owner.”

Well, that ship has sailed, don’t you think? 

This is kind of incredible when you think about it today because the biggest users of the compulsory license are those who torture the bejesus out of songwriters by conducting lawfare at the Copyright Royalty Board–the richest corporations in commercial history that dominate practically every moment of American life. In fact, the statutory license was hardly used at all before these fictional persons arrived on the scene and have been on a decades-long crusade to hack the Copyright Act through lawfare ever since. This is particularly true since about 2007 when Big Tech discovered Section 115. (And they’re about to do it again with AI–first they send the missionaries.)

If the purpose of the statutory scheme was to create a win-win situation that floats all boats, you would have expected to see songwriters profiting like never before, right? If the compulsory was so great, what we really needed was for everyone to use Section 115, right? Actually, the opposite has happened, even with decades of price fixing at 2¢ by the federal government. When hardly anyone used the compulsory license, songwriters prospered. When its use became widespread, songwriters suffered, and suffered badly.

Songwriters have been relegated to the bottom of the pile in compensation, a sure sign of no leverage because whatever leverage songwriters may have is taken–there’s that word again–by the compulsory license. I don’t think Google, a revanchist Microsoft, Apple, Amazon or Spotify need any protection from the anticompetitive efforts of songwriters. Google, Amazon, Apple, Microsoft, Spotify are only worried about “monopolistic behavior” when one of them does it to one of the others. The Five Families would tell you its nothing personal, it’s just business. 

Yet these corporate neo-colonialists would have you believe that the first thing that happens when the writing room door closes is that songwriters collude against them. (Sounding very much like the Radio Music Licensing Committee–so similar it makes you wonder, speaking of collusion.) 

The Five Year Plan

Merck Mercuriadis makes the good point that there is no time like the present to evolve: “In the United States, we have a position of stability for the next five years – at the highest rates paid to songwriters to date – in the evolution of the streaming economy. We are now working towards improving the songwriters’ share of the streaming revenue ‘pie’ yet further and, eventually, getting to a free market.” The clock is ticking on the next five years, a reference to the rate period set by the Copyright Royalty Board in the Phonorecords IV proceeding. (And that five years is a different clock than the five years clock on the MLC which is itself an example of the unnecessary confusion in the compulsory license.)

What would happen if the compulsory license vanished? Very likely the industry would continue its easily documented history of voluntary catalog licenses. The evidence is readily apparent for how the industry and music users handled services that did not qualify for a compulsory license like YouTube or TikTok. However stupid the deals were doesn’t change the fact that they happened in the absence of a compulsory license. That Invisible Hand thing, dunno could be good. Seems to work out fine for other people.

Let’s also understand that there is a cottage industry complete with very nice offices, pensions and rich salaries that has grown up around the compulsory license (or consent decrees for that matter). A cottage industry where collecting the songwriters’ money results in dozens of jobs paying more in a year than probably 95% of songwriters will make, maybe ever. (The Trichordist published an excerpt from a recent MLC tax return showing the highest compensated MLC employees.) Generations of lawyers and lobbyists have put generations of children through college and law school from legal fees charged in the pursuit of something that has never existed in the contemporary music business–a willing buyer and a willing seller. Those people will not want to abandon the very government policy that puts food on their tables, but both sides are very, very good at manufacturing excuses why the compulsory license really must be continued to further humanity.

The even sadder reality is that as much as we would like to simply terminate the compulsory license, there is a certain legitimacy to being clear-eyed about a transition. (An example is the proposals for transitioning from PRO consent decrees–ASCAP’s consent decree has been around a long time, too.) There would likely need to be a certain grandfathering in of services that were pre or post the elimination of the compulsory, but that’s easily done, albeit not without a last hurrah of legal fees and lobbyist invoices. Register Pallante noted in the well-received 2015 Copyright Office study (Copyright and the Music Marketplace at 5) “The Office thus believes that, rather than eliminating section 115 altogether, section 115 should instead become the basis of a more flexible collective licensing system that will presumptively cover all mechanical uses except to the extent individual music publishers choose to opt out.”  An opt out is another acceptable stop along the way to liberation, or even perhaps a destination itself. David Lowery had a very well thought-out idea along these lines in the pre-MLC era that should be revisited.

X Day

However, while there is a certain attractiveness to having a plan that the dreaded “stakeholders” and their legions of lobbyists and lawyers agree with, it is crucially important for Congress to fix a date certain by which the compulsory license will expire. Rain or shine, plan or no plan, it goes away on the X Day, say five years from now as Merck suggests. So wakey, wakey. 

That transparency drives a wedge into the process because otherwise millions will be spent in fees for profiting from moral hazard and surely the praetorians protecting the cottage industry wouldn’t want that. If you doubt that asking for a plan before establishing X Day would fail as a plan, just look at the Copyright Royalty Board and in particular the Phonorecords III remand. Years and years, multiple court rulings, and the rates still are not in effect.  Perseveration is not perseverance, it’s compulsive repetition when you know the same unacceptable result will occur.

But don’t let people tell you that the sky will fall if Congress liberates songwriters from the government mandate. The sky will not fall and songwriters will have a generational opportunity to organize a collective bargaining unit with the right to say no to a deal. 

The closest that Congress has come to a meaningful “vote” in the songwriting world is inviting public comments through interventions, rule makings, roundtables and the like–information gathering that is not controlled by the lobbyists. Indeed, it was this very process at the Copyright Royalty Board that resulted in many articulate comments by songwriters and publishers themselves that were clearly quite at odds with what the CRB was being fed by the lobbyists and lawyers. So much so that the Copyright Royalty Judges rejected not only the “Subpart B” settlement reached by the insiders but the very premise of that settlement. Imagine what might happen if the issue of the compulsory license itself was placed upon the table?

Now that songwriters have had a taste of how The MLC, Inc. has been handling their money, maybe this would be a good time to ask them what they think about how things are going. And whether they want to be liberated from the entire sinking ship that is designed to help Big Tech. And you can start by asking how they feel about the $500 million in black box money that is still sitting in the bank account of The MLC, Inc. and has not been paid–with an infuriating lack of transparency. Yet is being “invested” by The MLC, Inc. with less transparency than many banks with smaller net assets.

This “investment” is another result of the compulsory license which has no transparency requirements for such “investments” of other peoples’ money, perhaps “invested” in the very Big Tech companies that fund the The MLC, Inc. That wasn’t a question that was on the minds of Congress in 1909 but it should be today.

Attention Must Be Paid

Let’s face facts. The compulsory license has coexisted in the decimation of songwriting as a profession. That destruction has increased at an increasing rate roughly coincident with the time the Big Tech discovered Section 115 and sent their legions of lawyers to the Copyright Royalty Board to grind down publishers, and very successfully. That success is in large part due to the very mismatch that the compulsory license was designed to prevent back in 1909 except stood on its head waiting for loophole seekers to notice the potential arbitrage opportunity. 

The Phonorecords III and IV proceedings at the Copyright Royalty Board tell Congress all they need to know about how the game is played today and how it has changed since 1909, or the 1976 revision of the Copyright Act for that matter. The compulsory license is no longer fit for purpose and songwriters should have a say in whether it is to be continued or abandoned.

We see the Writers Guild striking and SAG-AFTRA taking a strike authorization vote. When was the last time any songwriters voted on their compensation? Maybe never? Voting, hmm. There’s a concept. Now where have I heard that before?

by thetrichordist

@justinebateman wants to see AI contract terms in actor agreements and music folk should be checking, too

Chris Castle says: If you are seeing contract language that allows the other side to use your name, image, likeness, voice, etc., take a close look at the rights granted. It may not be that obvious. Like all other configuration changes in the past, artists, producers and songwriters need to look at their existing agreements and see how old language will be interpreted to cover AI.

Example: Label will have (i) exclusive record artwork merchandising rights; and (ii) exclusive rights to sell merchandise embodying three (3) exclusive designs per contract period, alone and in conjunction with Artist’s names and approved pictures, likenesses and other identifications, subject to Artist’s approval with respect to such matters as product design and manufacturing.

“in conjunction with”, “other identifications” and “approval with respect to such matters as” each take on new meaning.

Example: Artist acknowledges that Label is the exclusive owner of all rights of copyright in Masters and Records embodying the results and proceeds of Artist’s recording services made pursuant to the Recording Agreement or during its term, including the exclusive right to copyright same as “sound recordings” in the name of Label, to renew and extend such copyrights (and all rights in and thereto are hereby assigned to Label), and to exercise all rights of the copyright proprietor thereunder as provided in the Recording Agreement.

Recordings “made pursuant to the Recording Agreement or during its term” could mean AI works.

Example: As used in this agreement, “Other Entertainment Services” shall mean any and all entertainment industry activity that are not otherwise provided for in this recording agreement, including, without limitation, the following: (a) the exploitation in any and all media of the name(s) likeness(es), visual representations, biographical material and/or logo(s) of or relating to Artist or any member of Artist (all of the intellectual properties relating to Artist referred to above are sometimes referred to herein collectively and individually as “Artist Properties”), either alone or in conjunction with other elements, including without limitation merchandise for sale at the site(s) of any and all live concert engagements performed by Artist or any member of Artist, premiums such as products which bear a third party’s trademarks or logos together with Artist Properties, tie-ins, “bounceback” merchandising, and fan club merchandise, whether or not in connection with Master Recordings, including, without limitation, exploitation by any Person other than Label of any rights granted in this recording agreement; (b) endorsements, special marketing arrangements, sponsorships (including tour sponsorships), strategic partnerships or other business relationships with third parties; (c) live performance engagements as a musician, vocalist and/or performer by the Artist or any member of Artist in all media, including but not limited to musical performances on tour, in concerts, on television broadcast or cable casts (including pay-per-view telecasts), radio, “webcast” and all other means.

by Trichordist Editor

Record Producer Agreements, a practical guide

By Chris Castle

[Editor Charlie sez this post first appeared on MusicTechPolicy]

Over the years I have had a number of posts about negotiating record producer agreements. These posts were based on topics, so one would be on royalties, another on recording costs, recoupment, credits, and so on. Readers have asked that I combine these into one topic and I finally did it for the Copyright Alliance and now am posting the combined article here–all 30 pages of it. The last page is a sample producer agreement check list which could be converted into a deal memo.

I’d encourage you to see if there’s anything important to you that I’ve left out, because when you write these things there’s almost always something you leave out. Since the business is changing rapidly, as soon as you sit down to write one of these things there’s some new configuration that becomes all the rage, so there will be some topics not included because you have to draw the line somewhere.

Feel free to post any comments. You can download the article here.

record-producer-agreements-v-3Download

record-producer-agreements-v-3Download
by thetrichordist

@musicbizworld: Spotify’s Mission Statement is Preposterous. Its latest announcements prove it.

[Chris sez: It is not enough for a Silicon Valley company to have a good idea or a compelling product or service. No, no–like Elizabeth Holmes the convicted felon, or Google, who probably should be convicted felons, these people have to convince themselves that they are saving the world. Literally. This is true no matter how ordinary their accomplishments. 

Like the self-hypnotist, they convince themselves that their powers of commerce are transcendent and otherworldly. History begins with them. Never should their revelatory accomplishments be compared to building a better mousetrap.

Spotify is no different, and they will damn well prove that their mission statement has no less than the predictive power of the oracle of Balaam. But of course they fail, flesh and blood being what it is in this time before the Singularity. 

Tim Ingham fries up Spotify’s “mission statement” in this must read expose. (Read the post on Music Business Worldwide.) But realize this–you can rest assured that if Daniel Ek didn’t write this claptrap himself, he definitely must have approved it. So if you ever wondered whether Ek had a grip on reality, it appears that his grip is weak. But you know, in the beginning was the word, et cetera, et cetera.]

In Spotify’s words, Loud & Clear exists for one reason above any other: “[To] provide a valuable foundation for a constructive conversation”.

Thing is, it’s not the surface-level data on Loud & Clear – the data that Spotify wants you to pay attention to – that makes for the most “constructive conversation” about the music industry and where it’s headed.

To get to the good stuff, you’ve got to dig a little deeper than that….

Taken at face value, these figures point to the ever-widening base of artists earning decent payouts from the world’s largest subscription streaming platform.

Spotify obviously likes that narrative a lot. As its Loud & Clear site boasts: “More artists are sharing in today’s thriving music economy compared to the peak of the CD era.”

Thing is, any half-credible analysis of these numbers has to take into account how they’ve changed over time.

And when we start treading this path, these figures begin to take on a different nature – one that flies in the face of Spotify’s wonderfully earnest, but laughably silly, mission statement.

Read the post on Music Business Worldwide

by trichordist

Fans and Trust and Trust by Fans Are Essential for AI to Succeed

By Chris Castle

[This post first appeared on MusicTechPolicy]

We are told that artificial intelligence is a powerful tool that may end up being either the end of humanity through automated super soldiers making autonomous decisions regarding their own AI devised rules of engagement, or life saving medical procedures and diagnostic tools like House meets HAL. As usual–both outcomes are probably equally likely if humanity doesn’t keep the deus in the machina. We really don’t want them thinking “Hell is other machines.”

The question I have is how will we keep humanity around when companies like Google are hell-bent on achieving the Singularity ASAP. This is particularly true of creators–let’s not kid ourselves that the Google Books project was some altruistic motivation to build the digital library of Alexandria rather than a massive digitization project to build a large language model to train artificial intelligence through corpus machine translation.  And still is. As Kurt Sutter (show runner for Sons of Anarchy) taught us about Google, “[t]he truth is, they don’t give a shit about free speech, and are the antithesis of their own mantra, ‘Don’t be evil.’” That was 2014 and boy was he right. And he still is. It’s not just Google, but Google is emblematic of Silicon Valley.

One of the lessons we learned from the 1990s is the calvary is not coming. We have to take our own steps to work both cooperatively and defensively against a tech threat. The Human Artistry Campaign and its AI Principles effort is a hopeful indicator that the creative community and its partners are coming together to get ahead of both the threat and the promise of AI.

Let’s not forget that it’s not just about us, it’s also about the fan, our “consumers” if you will. The biggest threat to creators in my view is destroying the relationship of trust that exists between fans and creators. If AI can allow a machine to impersonate a creator, that deception harms the creator, surely. But it also harms the fan. 

One of the AI principles from the Human Artistry Campaign jumped out at me as addressing this vital issue:

  • Trustworthiness and transparency are essential to the success of AI and protection of creators. 

Complete recordkeeping of copyrighted works, performances, and likenesses, including the way in which they were used to develop and train any AI system, is essential. Algorithmic transparency and clear identification of a work’s provenance are foundational to AI trustworthiness. Stakeholders should work collaboratively to develop standards for technologies that identify the input used to create AI-generated output. In addition to obtaining appropriate licenses, content generated solely by AI should be labeled describing all inputs and methodology used to create it — informing consumer choices, and protecting creators and rightsholders. 

Informing consumer choices. For a moment forget the artistic integrity, forget the human intervention, forget the free riding, just for a moment because these are all vital issues, too. At the core of the AI problem is deception and that issue is as old as time. You can’t essentially deceive fans about the origin of a work and you certainly can’t build a machine that does this all the livelong day and pretend you didn’t.

In Book 2 of Plato’s Republic, he uses the legend of a magic ring that turns the bearer invisible to illustrate a dialog on the nature of justice. The ring turns the wearer invisible so that they are capable of doing all manner of things while invisible–or anonymous–that would clearly be both unjust and punishable without the ring. Plato asks if an act is unjust solely because you get caught or is it unjust regardless of whether you are hidden from sight or apprehension. Yep, those Greeks were onto this early.

Deception is not genius. At the core of our concerns about AI is keeping them honest to protect our fans and the bedrock of the creator-fan relationship. Consumers should be able to rely on the reality of what appears to be an artist’s work that it actually does come from that artist. 

We do this with almost any other product or service that is placed into commerce, so why not with creative works? After all, artist rights are human rights.

We were happy to endorse the AI principles and encourage you to find out more about it at the Human Artistry Campaign or Artist Rights Watch and sign the petition.

by Trichordist Editor

Save the Date: Artist Rights: The Future of the Copyright Royalty Board for Songwriters Webcast 4/7/23 at 1:45pm CT

More information here https://utcle.org/studio/ZAQ23/ and register here https://utcle.org/conferences/ZAQ23/order-form/

We are excited announce that Chris Castle will be moderating a panel on the future of the Copyright Royalty Board for songwriters (the “Phonorecords” proceedings) as part of the University of Texas School of Law Continuing Legal Education Artist Rights series.

The panelists are Mitch Glazier, RIAA, Clark Miller, Clark Miller Consulting, and Abby North of North Music Group.

The panel will be assessing both voluntary and statutory changes to make the Phonorecords process more representative and efficient and reprises the topic that David and Chris spoke on for the “Smartest People in the Room” series.

by theinvisiblestagehand

The Attack of the StubHub Future Bots: @davidclowery asks the Georgia Legislature when is a Georgia concert ticket a “security”?

By Chris Castle

Silicon Valley’s answer to Charles Ponzi may be called StubHub or its parent company Viagogo. I’m sure you’ve run into the StubHub grift. A band releases tickets for a show, the bots descend and having grabbed the best seats turns to StubHub and its ilk to resell the ill-gotten tickets at ever higher prices. Everyone denies they did anything wrong, they had no idea where their tickets were coming from. Instead of being prosecuted for wire fraud and other bad juju, these ticket scalpers allow reselling of botted tickets on a grand scale. All the while decrying bots as an illegal practice while leaving out the “but we make money together” part. See Better Online Ticket Sales Act (“the BOTS Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 45c.

However vile is this grift, it’s kind of an old story. The only thing that’s breaking news about a Ponzi scheme is not the ghost of Charles Ponzi. Rather, its when smart people–you know, your betters–fall for it yet again. But StubHub revealed yesterday in the Georgia Legislature that they actually thought they would put one over on a wiley old committee chairman who just didn’t buy the huge helping of Smarm by the Bay when the Silicon Valley lobbyists oiled their way into the Georgia House of Representatives Regulated Industries Committee. You have to get up pretty early in the morning to fool and old fox and Valley Boys are not early risers.

The Chairman caught onto the con very quickly, and David Lowery helped to highlight the scalper scam. But the thing you always have to remember about our brilliant friend David is that he’s been known to pick up his pen and write the song that struggled to be written or the song that was not well received, but five years later be promoted as his best work. That’s why he’s got so many loyal fans. David takes know your customer to a whole new level, so was the perfect subject matter witness for the committee. 

So here’s the new twist. What if you didn’t have a ticket but thought that you could get one, no problem once they went on sale–thanks to your friendly neighborhood ticket bot farmer. But what if StubHub made a market for people to buy the opportunity to buy a ticket at some point in the future. That’s right–selling the botted ticket itself isn’t enough for these people. 

Now they want to sell bot futures.

The seller could not sell the ticket yet because there was no ticket available. But why leave money on the table? 

The seller of these future contracts was confident enough to make a contract with someone of unknown business acumen or sophistication who they convince that the seller would have a ticket available by the time the underlying tickets went on sale. As a market maker, StubHub would bring buyers and sellers together in a supposedly arms length transaction–I guess, I mean how would you really know how arms length it was–and the seller sold the buyer a contract to deliver a future ticket. Let’s call these contracts “futures” or “naked call options”. Or perhaps we should call them “securities.”

So just like short sellers have to cover their shorts, when the tickets get released somebody has to come up with the real tickets. Somebody would have to be confident they could get the very ticket described in the option contract–like you would be if you were the beneficiary of botting. Which, as StubHub will tell you, is illegal. So I’m probably just being cynical.

Technically, “botting” is circumventing “a security measure, access control system, or other technological control or measure on an Internet website or online service that is used by the ticket issuer to enforce posted event ticket purchasing limits or to maintain the integrity of posted online ticket purchasing order rules.”

Personally I think it’s worth asking if the act of selling the futures contract is itself a violation of the BOTS Act as a circumvention of various elements. StubHub may have a legal opinion telling them this is outside the BOTS Act, but let’s ask the FTC, shall we?

On the other hand, if StubHub is selling securities, there’s a whole different regulatory agency that should be examining their business, or it could just be Silicon Valley’s answer to hawala.

So when is a ticket a security? One way we can determine this is through a U.S. Supreme Court case that gives us a pretty clear test. One way—and it’s just one way–that an option on a ticket might be regulated as a security is if it is determined to be an “investment contract” under the test in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.[1]   

The Howey test asks if:

1. there is an investment of money or some other consideration,  [Yes]

2. in a common enterprise, [yes]

3. with a reasonable expectation of profits, [oh, yes]

4. to be derived from the efforts of others. [Mos Def]

So that’s pretty inclusive criteria.  Before anyone brushes aside the possibility that the SEC could determine a futures contract to buy tickets to be a security, take a close look at those criteria because how the basic question is answered is one to discuss thoroughly with your securities litigation lawyer (or engage one). That advice may be a good idea whether you are either an issuer or an endorser of at the ticket or ticketing platform..

One might say that a one-off sale of a unique product—which is truly “nonfungible” in the sense that there is only one of the product in existence—may be less likely to be determined a “security” under the Howey test. But while any one ticket is a one-off, there are many tickets available to many shows as a general rule, so tickets probably are pretty fungible.

You really do have to get up early in the morning to put one over on a wiley old Georgia committee chairman. You can tell just by looking at the body language that he believes what another wise old bird told me as a youngster. If something feels illegal, it probably is.

[1] SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).

by Trichordist

National Association of Voice Actors: AI/Synthetic Voice Rider–Don’t lose your voice forever

[Chris Castle says: It’s like the antichrist without the morals. Voice over actors are being attacked by purveyors of artificial intelligence so that the actor’s voices can be re-used without consent or compensation even if they didn’t consent or at least didn’t object. Not only that, but voices can be used to train AI to speak in a completely different context. This is way worse that Netflix composer buyouts.

Check your name/image/likeness clauses folks–voice actors will not be the only ones caught up in the AI hellscape.]

AN OPEN LETTER FROM NAVA AND THE VOCAL VARIANTS TO THE VOICE OVER COMMUNITY

AI or Synthetic Voices are on the rise. We’re a group of concerned voiceactors working with union and non-union performers alike to make sure we don’t lose our voices forever by signing away our rights to various companies. Long story short, any contract that allows a producer to use your voice forever in all known media (and any new media developed in the future) across the universe is one we want to avoid. 

So we have put together some things we can all do to avoid the decimation of our industry.

Read the post on NAVA Voices site and stay in touch with your unions.

by Trichordist Editor

Comment to Copyright Office on Termination, the Black Box and Lawlessness at MLC

MLC 2021 US Federal Tax Return 990 https://www.themlc.com/hubfs/Marketing/Website/MLC-Finance_Form990-2021_CEOSigned.pdf


January 5, 2023

By Regulations.gov

Suzanne Wilson
General Counsel and Associate Register of Copyrights
U.S. Copyright Office
101 Independence Avenue S.E.
Washington D.C. 20559

Re:   Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Termination Rights and the Music Modernization Act’s Blanket License 
         Docket No. 2022-5 Comment

Dear General Counsel Wilson:

Thank you for the opportunity to make this comment on the docket referenced above.[i]    

I am a music lawyer in Austin, Texas and write this comment on my own behalf only and not on behalf of anyone else.  

Others will address the substantive termination issues that are well-described and assayed in the Notice, so I will focus on the procedural tension between The Mechanical Licensing Collective, Inc. (“The MLC, Inc.”) currently designated as the mechanical licensing collective (“MLC”), its officers and directors, and the law as described in the Notice.  

I argue that the need for this Notice is symptomatic of a larger problem in the relationship between Congress and The MLC, Inc. I hope the Office will consider resolving this tension as it has been authorized to do under the Music Modernization Act[ii] such as through regulations establishing the type of code of conduct that is common for other federal contractors.  

This tension is alarming.  The Notice states the MLC “does not follow the Office’s rulemaking guidance”[iii] regarding terminations, and that The MLC, Inc. “declin[es] to heed the Office’s warning….”[iv]  These disclosures are diametrically at odds with the clear intent of Congress in crafting the MLC’s role.[v]

The disclosures confirm clearly that there are governance and oversight controversies at The MLC, Inc. that in my view need to be conclusively disposed of, and quickly.[vi]  These governance issues are symptomatic of what may be much greater problems with the administrative capabilities of The MLC, Inc. that may be metastasizing but have not yet risen to the level of a public inquiry.

The recklessness that gives rise to the Notice also highlights The MLC, Inc.’s general lack of accountability and suggests a conscious disregard for the Copyright Office’s oversight role on a significant matter of law that is not capable of proper resolution through any “business rules.”[vii]  

I also note this troubling statement in the Notice:

But, having reviewed the MLC’s policy, the Office is concerned that it conflicts with the MMA, which requires that the MLC’s dispute policies ‘‘shall not affect any legal or equitable rights or remedies available to any copyright owner or songwriter concerning ownership of, and entitlement to royalties for, a musical work.’’[viii]

It seems clear that The MLC, Inc.’s conscious failure to comply with Congressional intent as well as the Office’s guidance is, or ought to be, a decision of some import that surely must have been taken by someone—that is, one or more persons—employed or appointed by the MLC.  It seems likely to be a subject that would have been reviewed both by its General Counsel and as part of the millions in outside counsel fees[ix] spent by The MLC, Inc.  

The fact that the decision-making process is not readily known is itself of concern and leads one to further consider developing a code of conduct for The MLC, Inc. to assure the Office, the Congress and the public of its administrative capabilities.

Respectfully, I request that you determine how this decision was arrived at and what internal controls The MLC, Inc. has put in place to assure the Congress, the Office and interested parties that these mistakes will not happen again.  This should not be an “oh well” moment and should be taken seriously by The MLC, Inc.

If The MLC, Inc. fails to disclose what it is doing by establishing opaque “business rules”, it is essentially creating de facto regulations that have the practical effect of law or regulations made behind closed doors unless the Office or other oversight agency happens to catch them out.  The public will never know that the business rule was established, how the “business rule” was arrived at, or have a meaningful opportunity to comment such as in response to this Notice.

For example, do the minutes of The MLC, Inc.’s board of directors or statutory committees reflect a discussion or vote on the adoption of the MLC’s policies on termination treatment? Did such a vote implicate any conflicts of interest?  Who determined that there was or was not a conflict of interest in the MLC’s decision to adopt the termination policy, however it was taken?  Were there any dissenting votes recorded?  Did an officer or director of The MLC, Inc. certify the completeness of the record in these findings in the corporate minute book?

This leads to other concerns under public discussion regarding the hundreds of millions of “black box” monies being held by The MLC, Inc. Given that the public has very little information available to it regarding the results and implications of the MLC’s operational decisions, I respectfully request that you determine what, if any, financial implications have arisen as a result of The MLC, Inc.’s reckless failure to comply with the law and the guidance of the Office in implementing its termination policy.  Such determination should likely include any funds[x] that The MLC, Inc. is apparently trading in the market for its own account.[xi]  Any curative action required by the Office should, of course, be retroactive in scope which will require considerable before-and-after accounting disclosures.

It must be asked whether the “business rule” established for terminations increases or decreases the enormous black box which was of considerable interest to Chairman Leahy at the recent Copyright Office oversight hearing at which the Register testified.[xii]  This is particularly true if the implementation of the business rule results in financial harm to interested parties who rely on The MLC, Inc. to get it right.  

The subject of black box came up in the Questions for the Record from Chairman Leahy.  The Copyright Office’s response to Chairman Leahy’s inquiry about the hundreds of millions in black box held by the MLC directed the Chairman to the MLC’s annual report for answers.  

Respectfully, I find this odd.  Chairman Leahy did not ask what the MLC told the world in its annual report; rather he asked, “What can the Copyright Office do to help ensure that the MLC is working to make sure that rightful owners of music works are identified and paid?”[xiii]The question is transitive:  We have oversight of you, you have oversight of The MLC, Inc., therefore we have oversight of the MLC.  

Surely no one is surprised by this.  The question many have is why The MLC, Inc. itself—a quasigovernmental organization operated by inferior officers[xiv] of the United States–is not the subject of an oversight hearing at Senate Judiciary regarding the hundreds of millions it is sitting on.  Maybe next time.

It must also be said that the answer to Chairman Leahy goes on:

Notably, the MLC plans to wait to process historical unmatched royalties from the Phonorecords III rate period [2018-2022] until the Copyright Royalty Judges finalize those rates in the ongoing remand proceeding and digital music providers provide adjusted reports of usage and royalty payments. It is the Office’s understanding that the bulk of historical unmatched royalties come from that period.[xv]

Without getting into the timeline of what came when, how is it exactly that The MLC, Inc. took the decision in February 2021—nearly two years ago–to sit on top of hundreds of millions of other peoples’ money that they were somehow investing under their undisclosed “Investment Policy”?  Was anyone asked?  Who gave the MLC the permission to do this?  Do they not hold the black box corpus in trust for songwriters and copyright owners yet to be identified?  Does this not compound the already painful series of failures that resulted in the black box in the first place, the delay in accounting to songwriters (or their families) under Phonorecords III remand, and still more delay while legions of lobbyists and lawyers argue over the post-remand true up accountings?

The MLC reported $2,529,910 investment income on its 2021 US Federal tax return 990

Respectfully, there is also, of course, a larger question that the Office may consider answering:  If The MLC, Inc. adopts a policy or takes some action outside of the law or its remit, is that policy binding on any future entities designated by the Office as the MLC?  

These are all questions that I would expect to have answers that are readily available to the public given that The MLC, Inc. is in a position of public trust administering a compulsory license on behalf of the United States and has been given great privileges under the MMA.[xvi]

Thank you again for the opportunity to comment.

Very truly yours,

Christian L. Castle

CLC/ko

[i] U.S. Copyright Office, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Termination Rights and the Music Modernization Act’s Blanket License 87 FR 64405 (Oct. 25, 2022) (Doc. No. 2022-5) (hereafter “Notice”).

[ii] Orrin G. Hatch-Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act, Public Law 115–264, 132 Stat. 3676 (2018) (“MMA”) and specifically Title I thereof.

[iii] Notice at 64407.

[iv] Id.

[v] See S. Rep. 115-339 (115th Cong. 2nd Sess. Sept. 17, 2018) at 7 (“Senate Report”).  (“The collective is expected to operate in a transparent and accountable manner.”) 

[vi] I would hope that this failure will be weighed and measured by the Copyright Office as part of The MLC, Inc.’s quinquennial review as is required under the legislative history.  See, e.g., Senate Report at 5 (“[E]vidence of fraud, waste, or abuse, including the failure to follow the relevant regulations adopted by the Copyright Office, over the prior five years should raise serious concerns within the Copyright Office as to whether that same entity has the administrative capabilities necessary to perform the required functions of the collective.”)(emphasis added).

[vii] It must be said that the MLC’s disregard for this particular matter may present a moral hazard (at best) for the publishers represented by at least some of its board members.

[viii] Notice at 64407 (emphasis added).

[ix] Annual Report at 16.

[x] See the MLC’s annual report stating that the MLC invests the black box according to its internal “Investment Policy” established by its board of directors but not made public.  MLC 2021 Annual Report at p. 4 available at https://www.themlc.com/hubfs/Marketing/23856%20The%20MLC%20AR2021%206-30%20REFRESH%20COMBINED.pdf(“Annual Report”) (“Investment Policy: This policy covers the investment of royalty and assessment funds, respectively, and sets forth The MLC’s goals and objectives in establishing policies to implement The MLC’s investment strategy. The anti-comingling policy required by 17 U.S.C. § 115(d)(3)(D)(ix)(I)(cc) is contained in [The MLC, Inc.’s] Investment Policy. The Investment Policy was approved by the Board in January 2021.”) (emphasis added).

[xi] Realize that every CMO is confronted with the decision about what to do with the royalty float and black box, but not every CMO decides to invest these funds in the market. If they do invest the funds, it is generally the case that any trading profits, dividends or interest goes to offset the CMO’s administrative costs that otherwise would be deducted from collected royalties.  However, the MLC, Inc.’s administrative costs are paid by the users of the blanket license (making the United States, I believe, the only country in history or the world that charges for the use of a statutory license). Therefore, the return on the MLC’s investment of the songwriters’ money would not be used for the same purpose as all the world’s CMOs that follow a similar practice.  The continuity in ownership for profits derived from The MLC, Inc.’s trading is also unclear;  if The MLC, Inc.’s existing designation is not continued but securities are being held or profits generated, what happens? 

[xii] Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, Oversight of the U.S. Copyright Office, Responses to Questions for the Record by Shira Perlmutter, Register of Copyrights and Director of the Copyright Office (Sept. 7, 2022), available at https://artistrightswatchdotcom.files.wordpress.com/2022/10/qfr-responses-perlmutter-2022-09-07.pdf. (“Questions for the Record”) (“With respect to the historical, pre-2021, unmatched royalties, which were reported to be about $426 million, the annual report says that the MLC recently started distributing those that it has been able to match. It also says that the MLC has begun making associated usage data for historical unmatched royalties available to copyright owners, which will facilitate further claiming and matching.”) 

[xiii] Id. at 4.

[xiv] President Donald J. Trump, Statement on Signing the Orrin G. Hatch-Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act (October 11, 2018) available athttps://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-201800692/pdf/DCPD-201800692.pdf (“Because the directors are inferior officers under the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, the Librarian must approve each subsequent selection of a new director.”)

[xv] Questions for the Record at 4.

[xvi] See, e.g., Senate Report at 5 (emphasis added).  “For the responsibilities described in subparagraphs (J) [distribution of unclaimed royalties] and (K) [dispute resolution] of paragraph (3), the collective is only liable to a party for its actions if the collective is grossly negligent in carrying out the policies and procedures adopted by the Board of Directors pursuant to section 115(d)(11)(D). Since the Register has broad regulatory authority under paragraph (12) of subsection (d), it is expected that such policies and procedures will be thoroughly reviewed by the Register to ensure the fair treatment of interested parties in such proceedings given the high bar in seeking redress.” 

by Trichordist

Are Songwriters and Artists Financing Inflation With Their Credit Cards? — Music Tech Solutions

If streaming mechanicals are the most important income for songwriters, why doesn’t streaming get inflation protection?

Are Songwriters and Artists Financing Inflation With Their Credit Cards? — Music Tech Solutions

By Chris Castle

Recent data suggests that songwriters and artists are financing the necessities in the face of persistent inflation the same way as everyone else–with their credit cards. This can lead to a very deep hole, particularly if it turns out that this inflation is actually the leading edge of stagflation (that I predicted in October of 2021).

According to the first data release for the US Census Bureau’s recent Household Plus survey, over 1/3 of Americans are using credit cards to finance necessities at an average interest rate of 19%. Credit card balances show an increase that maps the spike in inflation CPI over the same time period. This spike results in a current debt balance of $16.51 trillion (including credit cards). There’s nothing “transitory” about credit card debt no matter the helping of word salad from the Treasury Department. Going into the Christmas season (a bit after this chart) U.S. credit card debt increased to the highest rate in 20 years

According to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York:

These balance increases, being practically across the board, are not surprising given the strong levels of nominal consumption we have seen. With prices more than 8 percent higher than they were a year ago, it is perhaps unsurprising that balances are increasing. Notably, credit card balances have grown at nearly double that rate since last year. The real test, of course, will be to follow whether these borrowers will be able to continue to make the payments on their credit cards. Below, we show the flow into delinquency (30+ days late) grouped by zip code-income. Here, it’s clear—delinquency rates have begun increasing, albeit from the unusually low levels that we saw through the pandemic recession. But they remain low in comparison to the levels we saw through the Great Recession and even through the period of economic growth in the ten years preceding the pandemic. For borrowers in the highest-income areas, delinquency rates remain well below historical trends. It will be important to monitor the path of these delinquency rates going forward: Is this simply a reversion to earlier levels, with forbearances ending and stimulus savings drying up, or is this a sign of trouble ahead?

What does it mean for artists and songwriters? It is more important than ever that creators work is valued and compensated. When it comes to government-mandated royalty rates like webcasting for artists and streaming for songwriters, due to the long-term nature of these government rates, it is crucial that creators be protected by a cost of living adjustment. (Remember, a cost of living adjustment or “COLA” is simply an increase in a government rate based on the rise of the Consumer Price Index, also set by the government.)

Of course, songwriters are in the position that the MLC could issue low to no interest credit cards to help them through hard times at least until the MLC was able to distribute the $500 million in black box they are sitting on.

Thankfully, the webcasting rates (set in “Web V”) are protected by the benchmark cost of living adjustment, as are the mechanical royalty rates paid to songwriters for physical and download. 

The odd man out, though, is the streaming mechanical rate which has no cost of living adjustment protection. This is troubling and exposes songwriters to the ravages and rot of inflation in what we continue to be told is the most important income stream for songwriters. If it’s the most important royalty, why shouldn’t it also have the most protection from inflation?

by Trichordist Editor