The Artist Rights Institute takes on the pressing public policy issue of The MLC, Inc.’s investment of “hundreds of millions of dollars” of the black box and asks the Copyright Office to decide the legality of the MLC’s “Investment Policy.”
Tag: Kris Ahrend
Bridgeport Music Files Notice of The MLC’s First Royalty Audit
[Editor Charlie sez: a royalty “audit” is a right of the song owner to look inside the books and records of the party paying royalties to confirm that all royalties were paid and that all royalties were paid correctly, usually during a specified period of time. This usually results in the song owner discovering an underpayment that would have gone unpaid without the audit.]
By Chris Castle
It is commonplace for artists to conduct a royalty examination of their record company, sometimes called an “audit.” Until the Music Modernization Act, the statutory license did not permit songwriters to audit users of the statutory license. The Harry Fox Agency “standard” license for physical records had two principal features that differed from the straight statutory license: quarterly accounting and an audit right. When streaming became popular, the services both refused to comply with the statutory regulations and also refused to allow anyone to audit because the statutory regulations they failed to comply with did not permit an audit. I brought this absurdity to the attention of the Copyright Office in 2011.
After much hoopla, the lobbyists wrote an audit right for copyright owners into the Music Modernization Act. However, rather than permitting copyright owners to audit music users as is long standing common practice on the record side, the lobbyists decided to allow copyright owners to audit the Mechanical Licensing Collective. At the expense of the copyright owner, of course, no matter how many mistakes the copyright owner discovered or how big the underpayment. This is consistent with the desire of services to distance themselves from those pesky songwriters by inserting the MLC in between the services and their ultimate vendors, the songwriters and copyright owners. The services can be audited by the MLC (whose salaries are paid by the services), but that hasn’t happened yet to my knowledge.
But the MLC has received what I believe is its first audit notice that was just published by the Copyright Office after receiving it on November 9. First up is Bridgeport Music, Inc. for the period January 1, 2021, through December 31, 2023. January 1, 2021 was the “license availability date” or the date that the MLC began accounting for royalties under the MMA’s blanket license.
Why Audit Now?
Bridgeport’s audit is wise. There are no doubt millions if not billions of streams to be verified. The MLC’s systems are largely untested, compared to other music users such as record companies that have been audited hundreds, if not thousands of times depending on how long they are operating. Competent royalty examiners will look under the hood and find out whether it’s even possible to render reasonably accurate accounting statements given the MLC’s systems. Maybe it’s all fine, but maybe it’s not. The wisdom of Bridgeport’s two year audit window is that two years is long enough to have a chance at a recovery but it’s not so long that you are drowned in data and susceptible to taking shortcuts.
In other words, why wait around?
Auditing the Black Box
A big difference between the audit rules the lobbyists wrote into the MMA and other audits is that the MLC audit is based on payments, not statements. The relevant language in the statute makes this very clear (17 USC §115(d)(3)(L):
A copyright owner entitled to receive payments of royalties for covered activities from the mechanical licensing collective may, individually or with other copyright owners, conduct an audit of the mechanical licensing collective to verify the accuracy of royalty payments by the mechanical licensing collective to such copyright owner…The qualified auditor shall determine the accuracy of royalty payments, including whether an underpayment or overpayment of royalties was made by the mechanical licensing collective to each auditing copyright owner.
Royalty payments would include a share of black box royalties distributed to copyright owners. It seems reasonable that on audit a copyright owner could verify how this share was arrived at and whatever calculations would be necessary to calculate those payments, or maybe the absence of such payments that should have been made. Determining what is not paid that should have been paid is an important part of any royalty verification examination.
Systems Transparency
Information too confidential to be detected cannot be corrected. It is important to remember that copyright owner audits of the MLC will be the first time an independent third party has had a look at the accounting systems and functional technology of The MLC. If those audits reveal functional defects in the MLC’s systems or technology that affects any output of The MLC, i.e., not just the royalties being audited, it seems to me that those defects should be disclosed to the public. Audit settlements should not be used as hush money payments to keep embarrassing revelations from being publicly disclosed.
Unsurprisingly, The MLC lobbied to have broadly confidential treatment of all audits. Realize that there may well be confidential financial information disclosed as part of any audit that both copyright owners and The MLC will want to keep secret. There is no reason to keep secrets about The MLC’s systems. To take an extreme example, if on audit the auditors discovered that The MLC’s systems added 2 plus 2 and got 5, that is a fact that others have a legitimate interest in having disclosed to include the Copyright Office itself that is about to launch a 5 year review of The MLC for redesignation. Indeed, auditors may discover systemic flaws that could arguably require The MLC to recalculate many if not all statements or at least explain why they should not. (Note that a royalty auditor is required to deliver a copy of the auditor’s final report to The MLC for review even before giving it to their client. This puts The MLC on notice of any systemic flaws in The MLC’s systems found by the auditor and gives it the opportunity to correct any factual errors.)
I think that systemic flaws found by an auditor should be disclosed publicly after taking care to redact any confidential financial information. This will allow both the Copyright Office and MLC members to fix any discovered flaws.
The “Qualified Auditor” Typo
It is important to realize that there is no good reason why a C.P.A. must conduct the audit; this is another drafting glitch in the MMA that requires both The MLC’s audited financial statements and royalty compliance examinations be conducted by a C.P.A, defined as a “qualified auditor” (17 USC § 115(e)(25)). It’s easy to understand why audited financials prepared according to GAAP should be opined by a C.P.A. but it is ludicrous that a C.P.A. should be required to conduct a royalty exam for royalties that have nothing to do with GAAP and never have.
To be frank, I doubt seriously whether anyone involved in drafting the MMA had ever personally conducted or managed a royalty verification examination. That assessment is based on the fact that royalty verification examinations are one of the most critical parts of the royalty payment process and is the least discussed subject in the lengthy MMA; at the time, the lobbyists did not represent songwriters and tried very hard to keep songwriters inside the writer room and outside of the drafting room as you can tell from The MLC, Inc.’s board composition; and that the legislative history (at 20) has one tautological statement about copyright owner audits: ”Subparagraph L sets forth the verification and audit process for copyright owners to audit the collective, although parties may agree on alternate procedures.” Well no kidding, smart people. We’ll take some context if you got it.
As Warner Music Group’s Ron Wilcox testified to the Copyright Royalty Judges, “Because royalty audits require extensive technical and industry-specific expertise, in WMG’s experience a CPA certification is not generally a requirement for conducting such audits. To my knowledge, some of the. most experienced and knowledgeable royalty auditors in the music industry are not CPAs.” (Testimony of Ron Wilcox, In re Determination of Royalty Rates and Terms for Ephemeral Recording and Digital Performance of Sound Recordings (Web IV), Copyright Royalty Judges, Docket No. 14-CRB-0001-WR (Oct. 6, 2014) at 15.).
I would add to Ron’s assessment that the need for “extensive technical and industry-specific expertise” has grown exponentially since he made the statement in 2014 due to the complexity and numerosity of streaming. I’m sure Ron would agree if he had a chance to revisit his remarks. But inside the beltway of the Imperial City, it ain’t that way and you can tell by reading their laws handed down by the descendants of Marcus Licinius Crassus. All accountants are CPAs, all accounting is according to GAAP, all the women are strong, all the men are good-looking, and all the children are above average and go to Sidwell Friends. In the words of London jazzman and club owner Ronnie Scott to an unresponsive audience, “And now, back to sleep.”
The “qualified auditor” defined term should be limited to the MLC’s financials and removed from the audit clauses. This was a point I made to Senate staff during the drafting of MMA, but was told that while they, too, agreed it was stupid, it’s what the parties wanted (i.e., what the lobbyists wanted). And you know how that can be. So now we sweep up behind the elephants in the circus of life. But then, I’m just a country lawyer from Texas, what do I know.
All praise to Bridgeport for stepping up.
This post first appeared on MusicTech.Solutions
@RepDarrellIssa Holds a Hearing on the Mechanical Licensing Collective
By Chris Castle
U.S. Representative Darrell Issa and the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet that he chairs will hold a field hearing on Tuesday, June 27, 2023, at 10:00 a.m. CT at Belmont University, Gabhart Student Center, in Nashville, Tennessee. The hearing, entitled “Five Years Later – The Music Modernization Act,” will focus on the entire blanket licensing regime added to the Copyright Act by the MMA to (1) administer blanket mechanical licenses for “covered activities” (largely streaming) and (2) to collect and distribute compulsory mechanical licensing royalties.
Most importantly, the IP Subcommittee website tells us that “[t]he hearing will also explore whether the legislation is operating as intended by Congress and consider reforms.” So why is this happening and why is it happening right now given everything else that Congress is dealing with.
Congress considers whether to renew The MLC, Inc.‘s designation as the mechanical licensing collective. If that sentence seems contradictory, remember those are two different things: the mechanical licensing collective is the statutory body that administers most of the compulsory license under Section 115 of the Copyright Act that was the entirety of Title I of the Music Modernization Act (aka the Harry Fox Preservation Act). The MLC, Inc. is the private company that was “designated” by Congress through its Copyright Office to do the work of the mechanical licensing collective. This is like the form of a body that performs a function (the mechanical licensing collective) and having to animate that form with actual humans (The MLC, Inc.). The MLC, Inc. was designated by the Copyright Office in 2019.
Congress reviews the work product of The MLC, Inc. every five years (17 USC §115(d)(3)(B)(ii)) to decide if Congress should allow The MLC, Inc. to continue another five years. That is, Congress has the right to fire The MLC, Inc. and find someone else if they fail to perform. Hence, “Five Years Later” in the title of the field hearing. This process is called “designation” or “redesignation” and is performed for Congress by the U.S. Copyright Office in their soft oversight role.
That five year period is actually up next year, so Congress may be getting an early start to identify performance benchmarks for The MLC, Inc. so that the Copyright Office doesn’t have to wing it. If you have some thoughts about what The MLC, Inc. could be doing better or is doing well, you have a chance to write to your representative or even members of the subcommittee before (or after) the June 27 hearing and let them know.
The witness list is well-chosen and seems unlikely to produce the usual propaganda from the controlled opposition that the lobbyists usually try to spoon feed to lawmakers:
I have a few concerns myself.
- Investment Policy: According to its 2021 tax return, the MLC, Inc. was at that time holding more than $650 million in publicly traded securities. According to the MLC, Inc.’s annual report (at p. 4), this sum seems to include the $424 million of black box monies that the MLC, Inc. received in 2021. Congress is entitled to know exactly how this money is handled, where it resides and who is responsible for making investment decisions.
Congress should consider whether all black box sums and unspent operating costs advanced by blanket licensees should be held in a bank account controlled by the US government so that there is no confusion if Congress fires The MLC, Inc. or any successor.
Congress should also consider whether the same fiduciary duties apply to The MLC, Inc.’s management of the black box as would apply to a pension fund (under ERISA) or comparable duty. (There’s lots of pension funds and even banks with less than $600 million in assets and they are all regulated.) At least with a pension fund the fund trustees know who they owe money to; The MLC, Inc. seems like it should have an even higher responsibility to be good stewards of money it owes to the very unknown songwriters Congress tasked it with finding, thus cementing the moral hazard.
It goes without saying that the infamous “Hoffa Clause” in the MMA should be repealed (17 U.S.C. § 115 (d)(7)(C)). The Hoffa Clause allows the collective to dip into the black box to pay its expenses if the millions of the administrative assessment paid by the blanket licensees just isn’t quite enough. - Succession Plan: What if Congress did fire The MLC, Inc.? Is there a succession plan in place that would allow the seamless transfer to a new collective of databases, operating software, cash on hand, and of course the black box? If there is a succession plan in place, then perhaps Mr. Ahrend should bring it with him to Chairman Issa’s hearing for the records. If not, perhaps he could draft one. In any event, Mr. Ahrend should have ready answers to at least some questions about a succession plan should the Subcommittee ask him. After all, the lobbyists wrote the bill and the five year review language was written into the earliest drafts so he should expect a few questions about what happens. Particularly since the Subcommittee has announced that they want to know “…whether the legislation is operating as intended by Congress and consider reforms.”
- Nondisclosure Agreements: I am struck by the fact that there have been no leaks of information about the black box, investment policy, or even life at The MLC, Inc. This usually means that there are nondisclosure agreements in place that scare people into silence–along with a healthy dose of intimidation in a small and incestuous industry when it’s likely that your employer is on the board of directors. Maybe not, but Congress may want to find out what these people are up to so it can decide if it wants to let them keep doing it. This may seem like a small issue, but either people aren’t talking because they have nothing to say or people are talking but nobody will print the story.
- Songwriter Directors and Geographical Diversity: The hearing may provide a good opportunity for the Subcommittee to look into how the collective’s controversial board composition is working out, not to mention the membership levels in the confusing by laws of The MLC, Inc. For example, I for one really see no reason to continue the concept of non-voting directors on the board, and Congress could just eliminate that role. One need only look to other collectives and PROs in the US and around the world for examples. A non-voting board member is a close analog to a “board observer” which is usually someone appointed by an investor to essentially spy on the board.
Similarly, it must be said that all the board members are either from New York, Nashville, Los Angeles or are lobbyists from the Imperial City. There are songwriters all over the country and internationally. Since the collective is really a quasi governmental organization, it is entirely in the remit of Congress to increase transparency and fairness as well as diversity. This could be accomplished by requiring an equal number of songwriter and publisher directors and having them come from states or regions with a big music contribution to America such as one of the reservations ,Atlanta, Chicago, Houston, Miami, New Orleans, Tulsa or Appalachia. - Revisit the Compulsory License: There is, of course, the threshold question of whether the compulsory license should be continued at all. This five year examination really should include this fundamental review rather than just blindly pushing forward with the compulsory license. (I discussed this in some detail in a separate post.) One songwriter has suggested that the Copyright Office reprise another study on the continued viability of the entire compulsory license system and I think he’s got a point there. Perhaps the Subcommittee could task the Copyright Office with conducting such a study as a finding of the field hearing. Those studies allow the public to comment without fear or favor which would be a breath of fresh air. Congress could then hear from more people whose jobs depend on the system working well resulting in the payments to songwriters that Congress wanted rather than the system just stumbling on resulting in high salaries to the operators and little to no transparency.
Let’s see what happens at the field hearing. You can watch it here courtesy of the YouTube monopoly.
This post first appeared in MusicTechPolicy
Copyright Office Authorized a Star Chamber at the MLC to Hold Your Money
We knew this would happen. The Copyright Office has empowered the Mechanical Licensing Collective to decide whether a song (or a sound recording) can be copyrighted all under the guise of AI. If the MLC–not the Copyright Office–decides that your song is not capable of being registered for copyright, the MLC can hold your money essentially forever.
Where’s the regulation on this important subject? Did you get a chance to comment on these crucial regulations and precedent?
Ah…no. You didn’t miss any notices in the Federal Register. No, we know this because of this cozy “guidance letter” to MLC CEO Kris Ahrend from the general counsel of the Copyright Office. That’s right, a letter that we just happened to run across. That letter states:
More specifically, the Office advises that a work that appears to lack sufficient human authorship is appropriately treated by The MLC as an “anomal[y],” consistent with its Guidelines for Adjustments, and The MLC should “place [associated] Royalties in Suspense while it researches and analyzes the issue.” Such research could include corresponding with the individual or entity claiming ownership of the work or [could include] inquiring whether the Office has registered the work and whether there are any disclaimers or notes in the registration record.
If The MLC subsequently concludes that the work qualifies for copyright protection and the section 115 license, it should distribute any royalties and interest in suspense to the copyright owner. Alternatively, if The MLC believes that the work does not qualify for copyright protection following its research and analysis, it should notify the individual or entity claiming ownership of the work of its determination and that associated royalties will be subject to an adjustment. This conclusion and adjustment may be challenged by initiating an “Adjustment Dispute” consistent with The MLC’s policies. If legal proceedings are initiated to challenge The MLC’s actions, the disputed royalties and interest should remain suspended until those proceedings are resolved.
So just in one paragraph, the Copyright Office has effectively delegated its role in the U.S. government to a private corporation controlled by the largest music publishers and financed by the largest tech companies in the world (actually the largest corporations in the history of commerce). If the MLC decides that your song “appears to lack sufficient human authorship” The MLC can hold your money while they research the issue.
Note this doesn’t say who makes that decision, it doesn’t say when they have to notify you, it doesn’t say they have to give you an opportunity to be heard, it places no timeline on how long all this may take. “The MLC” (whoever that is) could sit on your money for years without ever telling you they are doing it and also keep invoicing the DSPs for your royalties while they “research and analyze the issue”.
The only time they have to give you notice if they “believe” (whatever that means) “that the work does not qualify for copyright protection” then “it should” (not the mandatory “shall”, but the permissive “should”) notify you of that determination. You can then file an “adjustment dispute” based on the MLC’s own guidelines which you will not be surprised to learn places no disclosure obligations on them, imposes no timeline and cannot be appealed.
Note that this guidance from the Copyright Office pretty expressly contemplates that the MLC may dispute a work that has already been registered for copyright without qualification–which raises the question of what a copyright registration actually means, and where is it written that the MLC has the authority to challenge a conformed Copyright Office registration.
It also places the MLC in a superior position to the Copyright Office because it allows the MLC to initiate a dispute resolution system outside of the Copyright Office channels. Is this written somewhere besides a burning bush on Mount Horeb?
The letter does seem to suggest that you can always sue the MLC or that the MLC could be prosecuted for state law crimes, perhaps, like conversion, but it would help to know who at the MLC is actually responsible.
This also raises the question of why the MLC is invoicing the DSPs in the first place and what happens to the money every step along the path. Because of the idiotic streaming mechanical royalty calculation, it seems inevitable that the royalty pool will be overstated or understated if the MLC is claiming works that are not subject to copyright (like it would for public domain works it invoiced).
Ever wonder what prompts letters like this to get written?
Play your part, dude. Go back to sleep.
The Trichordist 
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