StubHub’s FIFA Ticket Debacle Is Different This Time

For years, critics of the secondary ticketing industry (including us) have warned about the dangers of speculative ticket sales, hidden fees, and platforms that profit whether fans ultimately get through the gate or not. Those warnings were often dismissed as the complaints of disgruntled consumers.

The FIFA World Cup ticket controversy suggests those critics may have been right all along. As reported in Business Insider:

Countless World Cup fans are discovering that their tickets have gone poof, and they’re left scrambling to decide whether to buy new, pricier ones or simply give up on their World Cup dreams. They’re asking themselves how this could happen, since many people don’t realize it’s even a possibility.

The answer lies in the peculiar structure of secondary ticket marketplaces. Sites such as StubHub don’t actually sell tickets, much like eBay or Facebook Marketplace, they just connect buyers and sellers. This setup relies on sellers to come through with the tickets they say they have, essentially rendering it an honor system. Companies often don’t require sellers to upload their tickets immediately or provide proof of purchase. Many platforms give sellers until the day of the event to hand over the tickets.

It’s impossible to know the explanation for each individual situation, but one potential culprit is speculative ticketing, which I coined “ghost ticketing” last year. In these scenarios, resellers list tickets on StubHub or SeatGeek that they don’t yet have, hoping they’ll eventually secure them (for a lower price than they offered) and send them along.

FIFA warns fans about such practices:

You can transfer your tickets using the Ticket Transfer feature on the FIFA Resale/Exchange Marketplace. The marketplace is accessible via FIFA.com/tickets.

Please note: Transferring tickets to third-party platforms or accounts is discouraged as it may result in issues, including the inability to cancel or accept transfers. To ensure a secure and valid transfer process, please use the Ticket Transfer feature between FIFA accounts.

Fans reportedly purchased World Cup tickets through StubHub, booked flights, hotels, and vacations around those purchases, only to discover that tickets never arrived, could not be transferred, or could not be honored. In many cases, the offered remedy was a refund.

Business Insider reports that:

A SeatGeek spokesperson said in an email that [a fan’s] letdown “fell short” of the experience the company aims to provide and said they’d apologized to him and were working on a resolution. “We continue to invest significant resources in monitoring World Cup orders and supporting fans attending matches,” they said.

But a refund is not a remedy when the one-time event is over. An “apology” maybe very Internet (“we said we were sorry [for fill in the blank obvious scummy and shady behavior]”) but it ain’t going to cut it.

A World Cup match is not a toaster. Consumers are not merely purchasing a product; they are purchasing an experience tied to a specific place and time. Once the match is over, no amount of reimbursement can recreate the opportunity, no apologies will make the fan whole.

The deeper problem is that these incidents expose the fundamental flaw in speculative ticketing. In many cases, tickets appear—to be more fair than they deserve— to have been offered for sale before sellers possessed transferable inventory or before they could demonstrate a present ability to deliver what they were selling. Consumers were effectively asked to assume the risk that the ticket would eventually materialize. This kind of thing is often called “fraud” in the trade.

Imagine a securities market where brokers could freely sell commodities they did not possess and buyers discovered on settlement day that the shares or options never existed. Regulators would never tolerate such a system. Yet in secondary ticketing markets, similar concerns have persisted for years and nobody has gone to jail.

Longtime critics of the speculative ticketing industry may experience a sense of déjà vu.

As recently as 2024, plaintiffs in Kaiser v. StubHub advanced allegations that sound remarkably familiar: tickets to Hotspurs game allegedly offered for sale that sellers did not possess, consumers induced to purchase based on representations about availability, and a platform collecting fees while bearing relatively little delivery risk. The complaint included civil RICO allegations before being referred to arbitration, meaning many of the underlying claims were ruled on in private (secret) arbitration and never tested through a public merits determination.

The significance of Kaiser is not whether every allegation was ultimately proven. The significance is that the core complaints sound strikingly similar to those now emerging from the FIFA World Cup controversy. If the allegations prove accurate, critics will understandably ask why the same concerns appear to be resurfacing only two years later on a much larger stage.

Another uncomfortable question concerns StubHub’s longstanding reliance on mandatory arbitration clauses and class-action waivers contained in its consumer terms of service. Historically, those provisions have helped channel disputes into private proceedings, limiting public discovery and reducing the risk of large-scale class litigation. Indeed, in Kaiser, the court referred even the plaintiffs’ civil RICO claims to arbitration—a result that many consumer advocates viewed as troubling public policy because allegations involving potentially systemic marketplace practices were removed from public judicial scrutiny.

It must be said that StubHub is hardly alone in trying to stretch consumer arbitration provisions beyond what most consumers would reasonably expect. Disney drew national criticism when it initially sought to invoke a Disney+ arbitration clause in a wrongful-death case arising from an allergic-reaction death at Disney Springs. The Happiest Place on Earth later backed down, but the episode illustrates the same broader problem: companies increasingly treat arbitration clauses as all-purpose liability shields, even when the dispute bears little resemblance to the ordinary consumer transaction that supposedly created consent.

The FIFA controversy may test the limits of that strategy. When alleged consumer harm spans multiple countries, major sporting events, and potentially thousands of affected purchasers, the practical, political, and regulatory pressures become much harder to contain through private arbitration. More importantly, arbitration clauses do not bind government regulators. A consumer may be forced into arbitration, but the FTC is not. Nor are state attorneys general, foreign regulators, or other enforcement authorities. In that sense, arbitration may reduce private litigation exposure, but it provides little protection against the type of regulatory scrutiny that often follows high-profile consumer failures.

The larger the FIFA controversy becomes, the less likely it is that StubHub can resolve it behind closed doors. Plus, it makes America look bad and we can think of at least one person who might get really pissed about that.

The FIFA controversy is also notable because the underlying conduct is not universally accepted as a legitimate market practice. In the United Kingdom, the unauthorized resale of football tickets is heavily restricted and, in many circumstances, prohibited outside approved channels established by clubs and governing bodies. That issue surfaced in Kaiser, where plaintiffs alleged sales occurring outside authorized distribution systems and when the plaintiff showed up at Hotspurs World, it became apparent that the plaintiff was the only one not in on the joke. In other words, at least some jurisdictions have already concluded that unrestricted secondary-market sales of football tickets create risks significant enough to warrant legal restrictions.

The timing could hardly be worse for StubHub.

The company recently resolved an FTC enforcement action involving allegedly deceptive pricing practices and so-called “junk fees.” The FTC accused StubHub of using drip-pricing tactics that advertised one price while revealing mandatory fees later in the purchasing process. The resulting settlement required changes to pricing disclosures and a $10 million payment.

But hidden fees were only part of the story.

The FTC’s broader rulemaking record also discussed speculative ticketing as a potentially deceptive practice under the same rule. In fact, commenters specifically raised concerns that platforms were facilitating the sale of tickets that sellers did not actually possess or could not yet transfer. The Commission cited those concerns in its rulemaking discussion, recognizing that speculative ticketing may present consumer-protection issues distinct from hidden fees alone. Numerous states have outlawed speculative ticketing outright, concluding that selling tickets you do not possess is not innovation—it’s such serious consumer harm they outlaw the practice.

That point deserves emphasis. Critics of speculative ticketing were not simply complaining on social media or filing isolated lawsuits. They participated in the federal rulemaking process itself. The concerns raised in litigation such as Kaiser and in comments submitted to the FTC were sufficiently significant that the Commission expressly addressed them when adopting its junk-fee framework. The FIFA controversy therefore does not emerge from nowhere. It arrives against a backdrop of years of consumer complaints, litigation, regulatory comments, and public warnings that the industry has largely resisted.

If a platform represents inventory as available when the seller lacks the present ability to transfer or deliver it, the issue extends beyond pricing disclosures and into the integrity of the marketplace itself. That distinction is significant because it supports expansion of available legal prosecutions.

A civil RICO plaintiff would likely argue that repeated electronic communications marketing unavailable or non-transferable tickets constitute a pattern of wire fraud. And that puts you squarely in racketeering land. Whether such a claim could succeed would depend heavily on evidence of knowledge, intent, and the scale of the conduct. But the FIFA controversy inevitably invites the question raised in Kaiser: at what point does a recurring business practice stop looking like isolated misconduct and start looking systemic?

No one should assume that a criminal RICO case is around the corner. Federal prosecutors would need far stronger evidence and proof of knowing participation in criminal conduct. Yet once allegations involve recurring speculative inventory, consumer deception, electronic communications, and a potentially nationwide pattern of conduct, the discussion inevitably broadens from customer service to compliance and governance. The FTC has been partway down this path before with StubHub—while FTC can’t bring a criminal prosecution, it’s a short stop to a Department of Justice referral, Especially if you know who gets involved.

And that is what makes this episode different.

For years, StubHub could treat these controversies as disputes with unhappy customers. Today, StubHub is a public company. It has benefited from access to public capital markets and the confidence of public investors. With that status comes heightened expectations regarding compliance systems, risk management, internal controls, and regulatory oversight.

Angry fans are one thing. Invited guests in our country are another thing entirely, as are regulators, institutional investors, securities lawyers, and the SEC.

The problem for StubHub is not merely that critics predicted these issues. The problem is that critics raised them in court, raised them before federal regulators, and saw those concerns acknowledged in the FTC’s own rulemaking record—yet the complaints continue to surface.

The problem for StubHub is not that critics are saying something new. The problem is that critics appear to be saying the same thing they were saying in Kaiser—only now the whole world is watching.

If the FIFA complaints ultimately prove as widespread as it appears, investors may begin asking uncomfortable questions that go well beyond customer service. Is speculative ticketing a disclosed business risk? Is it primarily a compliance problem? Or is it so deeply embedded in the economics of the marketplace that meaningful reform would materially affect revenue and growth? And, as they say, “have a materially adverse affect on StubHub’s business.”

Those are not questions typically asked by disappointed fans on social media. They are the kinds of questions asked by regulators, analysts, institutional investors, auditors, and securities lawyers.

The secondary ticketing industry has spent years arguing that it provides efficiency and liquidity. Governor Polis defended the practices as an “innovative online ticket waiting service” (yes, he really said that). The FIFA fiasco suggests something different: a system that privatizes gains, socializes risk, and too often leaves consumers holding the bag.

For a public company operating under the gaze of both the FTC and the SEC, that should no longer be good enough.

Because the real risk for StubHub may not be the next user lawsuit, the next consumer arbitration demand, or even the next FTC inquiry. The real risk is that investors begin to conclude that what defenders have long described as isolated incidents are, in fact, permanent features of the unsavory business model itself.

Are Pandora’s Disclosures Deficient Regarding pre-72 Exposure to a Music Genome Shut Off?

Some readers noticed that we spotted an interesting defect in Pandora’s most recent quarterly filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission and asked how big a deal is this defect.  Our understanding is that Pandora has been paying royalties on pre-72 recordings since its inception, but recently stopped, following which they were sued in NY state court by a group of record companies.  (Remember The Turtles are suing Sirius for much the same reasons.)

The pre-72 lawsuit challenges Pandora’s use of pre-72 recordings without compensation or a license.  (If you are unfamiliar with the “pre-72” issue, it is essentially that federal copyright protection only covers sound recordings released after 1972.  Based on Pandora’s use of these recordings in its service without a license or compensation, you might get the impression that the pre-72 recordings had fallen into the pubic domain.  Nothing is further from the truth as the recordings are protected by common law copyright and a variety of state unfair competition statutes.)

Not only is Pandora using these recordings as part of its service in violation of the copyright owners’ exclusive reproduction right and public performance right, there is a question as to whether the music genome itself misappropriates each featured artist’s right of publicity by marketing the Pandora service based on channels created using the artist’s name, an issue that recently came up in the lawsuit brought by Goldieblox against the Beastie Boys and by the Ministry of Sound against Spotify in the UK.  Not unlike a fingerprint, the music genome is a copy of the underlying sound recording in a mathematical expression as we understand it, and to our knowledge no aspect of the music genome has ever been licensed.  It certainly is not covered by the compulsory license in 17 USC Sec. 114 (the webcasting compulsory license).

So the pre-72 litigation against Pandora is important not only because of the alleged violations of state law, common law copyright and unfair competition statutes, but also because it could draw attention to potential artist-related violations may go to the heart of Pandora’s business for both pre 72 and post 72 recordings.

What Are Pandora’s Disclosure Obligations under SEC Regulations?

A public company such as Pandora is required to make a variety of filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission so that the Commission, the company’s stockholders and the public (including the financial press) can have an idea of how the company is doing and how to assess the risk of owning the company’s shares.  The way that this assessment is communicated to the company, at least in part, is in the company’s share price.  If stockholders rely on the company to properly disclose risk, especially downside risk, then they may not look beyond these disclosures such as finding a copy of the copyright owners’ complaint.

Relying solely on these disclosures instead of doing your own research is not something we would recommend for reasons that will become apparent.  Pandora is a good example of why it’s good to drill down on the company’s disclosures (and in the case of the SEC, we’re a bit surprised that the examiners at the Commission didn’t catch this).

One of the risk factors that the SEC requires public companies to disclose is pending litigation brought against the company.  This should come as no surprise, as litigation can be an existential threat to a company and to the value of stockholder’s investment.  The SEC has very specific requirements about what is to be disclosed about litigation, and those requirements can be found in Regulation S-K (17 CFR Sec. 229.103):

§ 229.103 (Item 103) Legal proceedings.

Describe briefly any material pending legal proceedings, other than ordinary routine litigation incidental to the business, to which the registrant or any of its subsidiaries is a party or of which any of their property is the subject. Include the name of the court or agency in which the proceedings are pending, the date instituted, the principal parties thereto, a description of the factual basis alleged to underlie the proceeding and the relief sought. Include similar information as to any such proceedings known to be contemplated by governmental authorities.

The “Instructions” for Item 103 provide guidance for materiality regarding legal disclosures:

2. No information need be given with respect to any proceeding that involves primarily a claim for damages if the amount involved, exclusive of interest and costs, does not exceed 10 percent of the current assets of the registrant and its subsidiaries on a consolidated basis. However, if any proceeding presents in large degree the same legal and factual issues as other proceedings pending or known to be contemplated, the amount involved in such other proceedings shall be included in computing such percentage.

Given the scope of the pre-72 litigation, it is easy to understand why Pandora would have an obligation to disclose the claim based on materiality alone.  Then the question is did they?

Did Pandora’s Disclosure Comply With Its SEC Disclosure Obligations?

Here’s Pandora’s disclosure in its 10Q:

On April 17, 2014, UMG Recordings, Inc., Sony Music Entertainment, Capitol Records, LLC, Warner Music Group Corp., and ABKCO Music and Records, Inc. filed suit against Pandora Media Inc. in the Supreme Court of the State of New York. The complaint claims common law copyright infringement and unfair competition arising from allegations that Pandora owes royalties for the performance of sound recordings recorded prior to February 15, 1972.

Pandora’s disclosure does not seem to comply with the requirements of Regulation S-K because the company does not disclose, or does not disclose fully, “the relief sought” in the lawsuit.  There is a claim for money–“allegations that Pandora owes royalties”–and also a request for injunctive relief–not addressed in Pandora’s disclosure at all.  The injunction would order Pandora to stop using the pre-72 recordings.  The claim for money relates to both the public performance of sound recordings–“for the public performance of sound recordings recorded prior to February 15, 1972”–and also to the reproduction of those sound recordings as part of Pandora’s operations–not addressed in Pandora’s disclosure at all.

Pandora makes only a minimal disclosure of “the factual basis alleged to underlie the proceeding,” some might say a flimsy and self consciously limited disclosure.  Given the historic nature of this litigation, one would think that Pandora would spend time getting a little closer to the requirements of Regulation S-K and erring on the side of more disclosure than less.

So–Pandora seems to be treading in the grey area of its disclosure requirements at a minimum.  One can be ambivalent about whether Pandora met its obligations for discussion of the facts.  But what is clear is that Pandora did not disclose the copyright owners’ request for injunctive relief and a court order blocking Pandora’s use of the recordings.  One could read the disclosure and come away thinking that it’s just a dispute about money.  It certainly is that, but it’s not only that.

Maybe Pandora’s senior management team (including their CFO as CFOs are very involved with SEC filings) didn’t think there was anything material about the injunctive relief.  If successful, an injunction could have some obvious and not so obvious effects on Pandora’s business.  We view the injunction as the relief that is most likely to succeed because of Pandora’s untenable position that it does not have to pay royalties but gets to keep reproducing and performing the pre-72 recordings.  Even if you believe that there’s no performance right in pre-72 sound recordings, there’s a serious question of whether Pandora is reselling unauthorized reproductions.

Shutting off pre-72 recordings would have the obvious result of blocking Pandora’s use of the recordings. Given that Pandora’s music genome relies on looking up music that sounds like other music to build their barely compliant channels, if Pandora suddenly lost the ability to use all music genomes for pre-72 recordings that might seriously affect its business.  No mention of that, either.

Why Didn’t Pandora Fully Disclose?

You can attribute any manner of motives to Pandora for treating their filing obligations like a press release that they can shade and spin the way they do so many other communications.  You can also wonder about what the senior management team was thinking when they approved the risk factor.  One thing seems clear though–they wrote it they way they wrote because they thought they would get away with it.