What would Lars say? Artificial Intelligence: Nobel or RICO?

All the true promise of AI does not require violating writers, artists, photographers, voice actors etc copyrights and rights of publicity. You know, stuff like reading MRIs and X-rays, developing pharmaceuticals, advanced compounds, new industrial processes, etc.

All the shitty aspects of AI DO require intentional mass copyright infringement (a RICO predicate BTW). You know stuff like bots, deep fakes, autogenerated “yoga mat” music, SEO manipulation, autogenerated sports coverage, commercial chat bots, fake student papers, graphic artist knockoffs, robot voice actors etc. But that’s where the no-value-add-parasitic-free-rider-easy-money is to be made. That’s why the parasitic free-riding VCs and private equity want to get a “fair use” copyright exemption.

Policy makers should understand that if they want to reduce the potential harms of AI they need to protect and reinforce intellectual property rights of individuals. It is a natural (and already existing) brake on harmful AI. What we don’t need is legislative intervention that makes it easier to infringe IP rights and then try to mitigate (the easily predictable and obvious) harms with additional regulation.

This is what happened with Napster and internet 1.0. The DMCA copyright infringement safe harbor for platforms unleashed all sorts of negative externalities that were never fairly mitigated by subsequent regulation.

Why do songwriters get 0.0009 a stream on streaming platforms? Because the platforms used the threat of the DMCA copyright safe harbor by “bad actors” (often connected to the “good actors” via shared board members and investors*) to create a market failure that destroyed the value of songs. To “fix” the problem federal legislation tasks the Copyright Royalty Board in LOC to set royalty rates and forced songwriters to license to the digital platforms (songwriters can not opt out). The royalty setting process was inevitably captured by the tech companies and that’s how you end up with 0.0009 per stream.

TBF the DMCA safe harbor requires the platforms to set up “technical measures” to prevent unlicensed use of copyrights, but this part of the DMCA safe harbor were never implemented and the federal government never bothered to enforce this part of the law. This is the Napster playbook all over again.

1. Unleash a technology that you know will be exploited by bad actors**.

2. Ask for federal intervention that essentially legalizes the infringing behavior.

3. The federal legislation effectively creates private monopoly or duopoly.

4. Trillions of dollars in wealth transferred from creators to a tiny cabal of no-value-add-parasitic-free-rider-easy-money VCs in silicon valley.

5. Lots of handwringing about the plight of creators.

6. Bullshit legislation that claims to help creators but actually mandates a below market rate for creators.

The funny thing is Lars Ulrich was right about Napster. [See our 2012 post Lars Was First and Lars Was Right.] At the time he was vilified by what in reality was a coordinated DC communication firm (working for Silicon Valley VCs) that masqueraded as grassroots operation.

But go back and watch the Charlie Rose debate between Lars Ulrich and Chuck D, everything Lars Ulrich said was gonna happen happened.

If Lars Ulrich hadn’t been cowed by a coordinated campaign by no-value-add-parasitic-free-rider-easy-money Silicon Valley VCs, he’d probably say the same thing about AI.

And he’d be right again.

I Grift Therefore I Am: Jared Polis Supports Silicon Valley’s “Speculative Tickets” Grift in Colorado

If you had a chance to watch the CLE panel that David Lowery, Mala Sharma and Chris Castle did for the University of Texas School of Law CLE last week, you’ll remember that the panel spent a good deal of time talking about “speculative tickets”. In fact, the title of the panel was “When is Ticketing Like Pork Bellies?” which was a direct reference to the similarities between speculative tickets and commodities futures contracts (like pork bellies).

The way this grift works is that somebody (or some thing in the case of bots) offers to sell a promise to sell a ticket in the future. The trick is that the ticket is not yet on sale anywhere but certain dates have been announced so it will be on sale. This could be any ticket, like a concert tour or a sporting event like the Super Bowl, the Rose Bowl, the World Series, and so on.

This is actually worse than a pork belly contract, because you know that the pork bellies exist when you buy the contract, you just don’t know the price. Market events could cause the price to fluctuate, but there will be some pork belly available somewhere. So to even call it a ticket is a misnomer. It’s a promise to sell something that may exist to get all Cartesian about it.

The grifter prices the speculative ticket promise at a premium, naturally. Some of them actually promise an actual seat, some promise a certain section or block of seats. They then list that ticket on a ticket reseller market place like Stubhub which was most definitely lobbying in force for the nonsensical Georgia ticketing bill that failed and which we assume is behind all these bills that keep popping up like syphilitic warts.

After the ticket is listed, a fan buys the speculative ticket promise and waits to get their actual tickets. And this is the really insidious part. As David noted on our panel, the grifter’s transaction is like covering on a naked short in short selling. Naked shorts are a very risky thing because unlike with speculative tickets, the market enforces the trade. You will pay on that bet unlike speculative tickets where there is no market enforcement except the occasional prosecution by a state attorney general or the FTC.

It seems impossible for the speculative ticket short seller to obtain the actual tickets without using bots. Plausible, perhaps, but seems very unlikely. Thanks to Senator Marsha Blackburn and Richard Blumenthal and their BOTS Act, federal law prohibits using bots, but again, it’s a science of getting caught. Senator Blackburn recently complained quite rightly that the FTC is not sufficiently enforcing the BOTS Act.

If the grifter cannot come up with the tickets, it is apparently very rare that the fan gets their money back. The fan will be offered all manner of things other than cash or maybe the grifter just slithers off into the night. Awful stuff, right?

The grifter is preying on the buyer’s love of the artist or the team (or the family member of the buyer) which is so great that they are willing to spend the money because they are made to believe they have a sure bet that will pay off with a real ticket. What kind of a heartless dickweed would do that to someone?

And here’s where Jared Polis comes in. If you’ve never heard of him, Jared Polis is the governor of Colorado. The Colorado legislature recently passed SB60 that would have joined other states in banning speculative tickets. But–on June 6, 2023 Jared Polis vetoed the bill.

So how did StubHub get to Jared Polis? Remember, Jared Polis is a 99er who made a fortune on the Internet before the Internet repriced itself. He also founded TechStars, so he’s a VC, too. So he knows all about grifters and could not give a rip about artists–as he has demonstrated many times. But his veto letter is worth reading because of its complete head up the ass approach to speculative tickets.

Polis goes through the “if you only had a brain” analysis saying there are some good things in SB60 which he could support but then there are the bad things which he, Polis the Lawmaker, simply cannot abide–like a prohibition on speculative tickets. Except he doesn’t call them speculative tickets like the Federal Trade Commission does, or the Attorney General of New York. Oh, no. In his veto letter, he calls them “innovative products that address existing market failures, such as online ticket waiting services“.

Wait a minute–are we talking about the same thing here?

The bill prohibits anyone that “Advertises, offers for sale, or contracts for the resale of a ticket unless the person has possession or constructive possession of the ticket and the person has an agreement with the rights holder.”

Somehow the bill language got transformed from protecting consumers against speculative ticketing to a whole new thing, an innovative product that a VC might invest in and even take that company public. Or could have in 1999.

Sure seems like Polis is in on the grift, don’t it? You can’t call it a conspiracy theory because there’s nothing theoretical about it.



Should the Compulsory License be Re-Upped?

By Chris Castle

[This post first appeared on MusicTechPolicy]

The wisest of those among you learn to read your portents well
There’s no need to hurry, it’s all downhill to Hell…

Don’t Stand Still, written by The Original Snakeboy, performed by Guy Forsyth

Congress is considering whether to renew The MLC, Inc.‘s designation as the mechanical licensing collective. If that sentence seems contradictory, remember those are two different things: the mechanical licensing collective is the statutory body that administers the compulsory license under Section 115. The MLC, Inc. is the private company that was “designated” by Congress through its Copyright Office to do the work of the mechanical licensing collective. This is like the form of a body that performs a function (the mechanical licensing collective) and having to animate that form with actual humans (The MLC, Inc.), kind of like Plato’s allegory of the cave, shadows on the wall being what they are.

Congress reviews the work product of The MLC, Inc. every five years (17 USC §115(d)(3)(B)(ii)) to decide if The MLC, Inc. should be allowed to continue another five years. In its recent guidance to The MLC, Inc. about artificial intelligence, the Copyright Office correctly took pains to make that distinction in a footnote (footnote 2 to be precise. Remember–always read the footnotes, it’s often where the action is.). This is why it is important that we be clear that The MLC, Inc. does not “own” the data it collects (and that HFA as its vendor doesn’t own it either, a point I raised to Spotify’s lobbyist several years ago). Although it may be a blessing if Congress fired The MLC, Inc. and the new collective had to start from scratch.

But Congress likely would only re-up The MLC, Inc. if it had already decided to extend the statutory license and all its cumbersome and byzantine procedures, proceedings and prohibitions on the freedom of songwriters to collectively bargain. Not to mention an extraordinarily huge thumbs down on the scales in favor of the music user and against the interest of the songwriters. The compulsory license is so labyrinthine and Kafka-esque it is actually an insult to Byzantium, but that’s another story.

Rather than just deciding about who is going to get the job of administering the revenues for every songwriter in the world, maybe there should be a vote. Particularly because songwriters cannot be members of the mechanical licensing collective as currently operated. Congress did not ask songwriters what they thought when the whole mechanical licensing scheme was established, so how about now?

Before the Congress decides to continue The MLC, Inc. many believe strongly that the body should reconsider the compulsory license itself. It is the compulsory license that is the real issue that plagues songwriters and blocks a free market. The compulsory license really has passed its sell by date and it’s pretty easy to understand why its gone so sour. Eliminating the Section 115 license will have many implications and we should tread carefully, but purposefully.

Party Like it’s 1909

First of all, consider the actual history of the compulsory license. It’s over 100 years old, and it was established at a time, believe it or not, when the goal of Congress was to even the playing field between, music users and copyright owners. They were worried about music users being hard done by because of the anticompetitive efforts of songwriters and copyright owners. As the late Register Marybeth Peters told Congress, when Congress created the exclusive right to control reproduction and distribution in 1909, “…due to concerns about potential monopolistic behavior [by the copyright owners], Congress also created a compulsory license to allow anyone to make and distribute a mechanical reproduction of a nondramatic musical work without the consent of the copyright owner provided that the person adhered to the provisions of the license, most notably paying a statutorily established royalty to the copyright owner.”

Well, that ship has sailed, don’t you think? 

This is kind of incredible when you think about it today because the biggest users of the compulsory license are those who torture the bejesus out of songwriters by conducting lawfare at the Copyright Royalty Board–the richest corporations in commercial history that dominate practically every moment of American life. In fact, the statutory license was hardly used at all before these fictional persons arrived on the scene and have been on a decades-long crusade to hack the Copyright Act through lawfare ever since. This is particularly true since about 2007 when Big Tech discovered Section 115. (And they’re about to do it again with AI–first they send the missionaries.)

If the purpose of the statutory scheme was to create a win-win situation that floats all boats, you would have expected to see songwriters profiting like never before, right? If the compulsory was so great, what we really needed was for everyone to use Section 115, right? Actually, the opposite has happened, even with decades of price fixing at 2¢ by the federal government. When hardly anyone used the compulsory license, songwriters prospered. When its use became widespread, songwriters suffered, and suffered badly.

Songwriters have been relegated to the bottom of the pile in compensation, a sure sign of no leverage because whatever leverage songwriters may have is taken–there’s that word again–by the compulsory license. I don’t think Google, a revanchist Microsoft, Apple, Amazon or Spotify need any protection from the anticompetitive efforts of songwriters. Google, Amazon, Apple, Microsoft, Spotify are only worried about “monopolistic behavior” when one of them does it to one of the others. The Five Families would tell you its nothing personal, it’s just business. 

Yet these corporate neo-colonialists would have you believe that the first thing that happens when the writing room door closes is that songwriters collude against them. (Sounding very much like the Radio Music Licensing Committee–so similar it makes you wonder, speaking of collusion.) 

The Five Year Plan

Merck Mercuriadis makes the good point that there is no time like the present to evolve: “In the United States, we have a position of stability for the next five years – at the highest rates paid to songwriters to date – in the evolution of the streaming economy. We are now working towards improving the songwriters’ share of the streaming revenue ‘pie’ yet further and, eventually, getting to a free market.” The clock is ticking on the next five years, a reference to the rate period set by the Copyright Royalty Board in the Phonorecords IV proceeding. (And that five years is a different clock than the five years clock on the MLC which is itself an example of the unnecessary confusion in the compulsory license.)

What would happen if the compulsory license vanished? Very likely the industry would continue its easily documented history of voluntary catalog licenses. The evidence is readily apparent for how the industry and music users handled services that did not qualify for a compulsory license like YouTube or TikTok. However stupid the deals were doesn’t change the fact that they happened in the absence of a compulsory license. That Invisible Hand thing, dunno could be good. Seems to work out fine for other people.

Let’s also understand that there is a cottage industry complete with very nice offices, pensions and rich salaries that has grown up around the compulsory license (or consent decrees for that matter). A cottage industry where collecting the songwriters’ money results in dozens of jobs paying more in a year than probably 95% of songwriters will make, maybe ever. (The Trichordist published an excerpt from a recent MLC tax return showing the highest compensated MLC employees.) Generations of lawyers and lobbyists have put generations of children through college and law school from legal fees charged in the pursuit of something that has never existed in the contemporary music business–a willing buyer and a willing seller. Those people will not want to abandon the very government policy that puts food on their tables, but both sides are very, very good at manufacturing excuses why the compulsory license really must be continued to further humanity.

The even sadder reality is that as much as we would like to simply terminate the compulsory license, there is a certain legitimacy to being clear-eyed about a transition. (An example is the proposals for transitioning from PRO consent decrees–ASCAP’s consent decree has been around a long time, too.) There would likely need to be a certain grandfathering in of services that were pre or post the elimination of the compulsory, but that’s easily done, albeit not without a last hurrah of legal fees and lobbyist invoices. Register Pallante noted in the well-received 2015 Copyright Office study (Copyright and the Music Marketplace at 5) “The Office thus believes that, rather than eliminating section 115 altogether, section 115 should instead become the basis of a more flexible collective licensing system that will presumptively cover all mechanical uses except to the extent individual music publishers choose to opt out.”  An opt out is another acceptable stop along the way to liberation, or even perhaps a destination itself. David Lowery had a very well thought-out idea along these lines in the pre-MLC era that should be revisited.

X Day

However, while there is a certain attractiveness to having a plan that the dreaded “stakeholders” and their legions of lobbyists and lawyers agree with, it is crucially important for Congress to fix a date certain by which the compulsory license will expire. Rain or shine, plan or no plan, it goes away on the X Day, say five years from now as Merck suggests. So wakey, wakey. 

That transparency drives a wedge into the process because otherwise millions will be spent in fees for profiting from moral hazard and surely the praetorians protecting the cottage industry wouldn’t want that. If you doubt that asking for a plan before establishing X Day would fail as a plan, just look at the Copyright Royalty Board and in particular the Phonorecords III remand. Years and years, multiple court rulings, and the rates still are not in effect.  Perseveration is not perseverance, it’s compulsive repetition when you know the same unacceptable result will occur.

But don’t let people tell you that the sky will fall if Congress liberates songwriters from the government mandate. The sky will not fall and songwriters will have a generational opportunity to organize a collective bargaining unit with the right to say no to a deal. 

Who can forget Sally Fields in Norma Rae?

The closest that Congress has come to a meaningful “vote” in the songwriting world is inviting public comments through interventions, rule makings, roundtables and the like–information gathering that is not controlled by the lobbyists. Indeed, it was this very process at the Copyright Royalty Board that resulted in many articulate comments by songwriters and publishers themselves that were clearly quite at odds with what the CRB was being fed by the lobbyists and lawyers. So much so that the Copyright Royalty Judges rejected not only the “Subpart B” settlement reached by the insiders but the very premise of that settlement. Imagine what might happen if the issue of the compulsory license itself was placed upon the table?

Now that songwriters have had a taste of how The MLC, Inc. has been handling their money, maybe this would be a good time to ask them what they think about how things are going. And whether they want to be liberated from the entire sinking ship that is designed to help Big Tech. And you can start by asking how they feel about the $500 million in black box money that is still sitting in the bank account of The MLC, Inc. and has not been paid–with an infuriating lack of transparency. Yet is being “invested” by The MLC, Inc. with less transparency than many banks with smaller net assets.

This “investment” is another result of the compulsory license which has no transparency requirements for such “investments” of other peoples’ money, perhaps “invested” in the very Big Tech companies that fund the The MLC, Inc. That wasn’t a question that was on the minds of Congress in 1909 but it should be today.

Attention Must Be Paid

Let’s face facts. The compulsory license has coexisted in the decimation of songwriting as a profession. That destruction has increased at an increasing rate roughly coincident with the time the Big Tech discovered Section 115 and sent their legions of lawyers to the Copyright Royalty Board to grind down publishers, and very successfully. That success is in large part due to the very mismatch that the compulsory license was designed to prevent back in 1909 except stood on its head waiting for loophole seekers to notice the potential arbitrage opportunity. 

The Phonorecords III and IV proceedings at the Copyright Royalty Board tell Congress all they need to know about how the game is played today and how it has changed since 1909, or the 1976 revision of the Copyright Act for that matter. The compulsory license is no longer fit for purpose and songwriters should have a say in whether it is to be continued or abandoned.

We see the Writers Guild striking and SAG-AFTRA taking a strike authorization vote. When was the last time any songwriters voted on their compensation? Maybe never? Voting, hmm. There’s a concept. Now where have I heard that before?

Artist Rights Symposium III at @TerryCollege at UGA, Keynote by @MMercuriadis of @HipgnosisSongs

We’re back! David Lowery hosted the third annual Artist Rights Symposium at the University of Georgia’s Terry College in Athens on November 15 as an in-person event. The Symposium is an all-day event that allows students in the Music Business program to participate and interact with panelists as part of the music business program.

Our keynote speaker was the inspiring Merck Mercuriadis, long time songwriter advocate, manager and music industry veteran who founded and runs the Hipgnosis Songs Fund. Merck is an active songwriter advocate around the world, particularly with the recent inquiry into the music streaming economy by the UK Parliament’s Digital Culture Media & Sport Committee and the UK Competition and Markets Authority. As Kristin Robinson reported on Billboard

Merck explained why he feels the industry is in the “age of the songwriter.” “There has been a massive paradigm shift,” he said. “Forty years ago, the power was in the artist brand,” but now, most songs that top the Billboard charts are written by a larger number of songwriters than ever, meaning the demand has never been higher for good hitmakers. “But songwriters have to have a place at the negotiating table now,” he said, citing that in the United States, rates for mechanicals are set by the government’s Copyright Royalty Board, barring “free market” negotiations. “Let’s face it, [the government controlling rates] is insulting to songwriters.”

This year’s symposium topic was “The Future of Authorship and the US Copyright Office” and Merck and the stellar panelists had a lot to say about the many advocacy issues facing contemporary songwriters.

Fortunately, thanks to Terry College the symposium is available on YouTube at no charge and you can watch it in its entirety.

Welcome/Opening remarks

9:00 AM -9:10 AM David Barbe, Director, Terry College Music Business Program

Georgia Legislative Overview and Agenda 9:10 AM- 9:30 AM

Panel 1: Libraries vs Authors: The Internet Archive’s “Controlled Digital Lending” and Fair Renumeration for Authors. 9:35 AM- 10:50 AM

Panelists

Janice Pilch.  Rutgers University
John Degen:  Writer, Head of Writers Union Canada.
Stephen Carlisle: Copyright Officer Nova Southeastern University,Florida
Mary Rasenberger, CEO, Authors Guild and Authors Guild Foundation.

Panel 2 Managing a longer Table at the Copyright Royalty Board 11:10 AM to 12:25 PM

Dr. David C. Lowery Moderator
Rick Carnes, Songwriters Guild of America
David Turner, Penny Fractions, SoundCloud
Crispin Hunt, Songwriter, Ivors Academy, #BrokenRecord

Lunch and Fireside Chat with Merck Mercuriadis 12:45– 2:00 PM

Panel 3 #DoubleStat: The Future of Compulsory Rates 2:20 PM – 03:35 PM

Chris Castle Moderator, Founder Christian L. Castle, Attorneys, Austin and MusicTechPolicy blog
Richard Burgess, CEO of the American Association of Independent Music (A2IM)
Helienne Lindvall, President, European Composers and Songwriters Association
Samantha Schilling, Songtradr, IAFAR

Metadata, Matching and Claiming at the MLC 3:55 – 5:10 PM

Moderator Abby North, North Music Group
Erin McAnally, Artist Rights Alliance
Helienne Lindvall President, European Composers and Songwriters Association
Melanie Santa Rosa, Word Collections, The MLC

Please leave a comment if you have any questions!

@DavidCLowery: Address on Acceptance of the American Eagle Award from the National Music Council

June 2nd 2022 Anaheim California

Hello and thank you. Thanks to the board for this award. President James Weaver. Chair Charlie Sanders. Thanks to David Sanders for help with logistics.

And while I have him here, special thanks to Rick Carnes for his help a few years ago with the University of Georgia Artists Rights Symposium.

I wanted to start out today, by saying it is a great honor to receive this award.

When I look at past recipients and see names like Odetta, Dizzy Gillespie, Quincy Jones, Lena Horne, Hal David, Phil Ramon and Kris Kristofferson, I feel like the protagonist in the Talking Heads song:

“How did I get here?”

You see, my original claim to fame is the song Take The Skinheads Bowling. How did the guy that wrote that song end up amongst such musical luminaries?

By way of introduction and explanation:

The song Take the Skinheads Bowling is the first single from a band I started in 1983 in Santa Cruz California.

The band is called Camper Van Beethoven. And it’s still around after 39 years.

I would describe that band as a psychedelic folk-rock garage band but we didn’t have a garage. We actually rehearsed in an attic.

Three flights of stairs… SVT.

Go figure.

Around the same time I started an indie record label to promote and distribute the records of Camper Van Beethoven. We later signed to Virgin Records.

I then started another band called Cracker. This band went on to have platinum hits. You’ve probably heard a few.

I produced albums by groups like Counting Crows.

I ran a recording studio complex for many years.

And in 2012 I began to speak out on behalf of artists at various technology conferences.

In particular I wrote a rather long essay, quite controversial at the time, “Meet the New Boss, Worse Than the Old Boss?”

In this essay I argued that the emerging digital landscape for music was one in which the new bosses (mostly tech companies) would pay nothing up front for our work, and very little on the back-end. I predicted this would shift most of the financial burden and risk onto those who could least afford it, the working class artist.

Unfortunately, my predictions were correct.

Now, It is important to note I am not hostile to technology and technology companies per se. Indeed I graduated with a degree in mathematics from UC Santa Cruz, and before Camper Van Beethoven became my full time job I worked as a computer programmer.

In addition I have had some success as a seed investor in technology startups. Since we are at NAMM I assume you all have heard of Reverb.com?

Technology is important in my life. It’s important to how I make music. Most other artists I know feel the same way. I don’t think technology companies and artists should always be at odds.

So let’s rewind for a second…

“I started a band in my attic (not garage) and later a record label.”

The foundational myth of Silicon Valley is the garage startup that becomes a global brand.
(Think Apple).

Look at my own startup: Camper Van Beethoven. A few kids in a faded beach town start a band. With a small personal loan from a singing cowboy-true story- we made a record and went from the attic to competing on a global scale in a few short years.

In the 80’s and 90s, this story was replicated, to different degrees, by hundreds of indie rock bands all across The United States.

And this story is not unique to the US or rock music. In1990 while traveling around Morocco I met many musicians who sold their recordings on cassettes in souks all across North Africa, the Middle East and southern Europe.

In 2014 I toured China as a cultural and Intellectual property ambassador for the US State Department. I met a Mongolian folk-rock ensemble that was doing essentially the same thing across central Asia.

If Silicon Valley is widely hailed for its entrepreneurial energy and innovation shouldn’t artists and bands also be praised and seen in the same light? We are certainly as creative.

We generate jobs and substantial economic activity. Some political scientists even think it was really American Pop Music that ended the cold war.

It has always seemed like something worth protecting to me.

Turning our attention back to this room, I see a similar entrepreneurial spirit in the boutique amp, instrument, and music software makers represented here by the National Music Council.

Conversely the big manufacturers and major rights holders represented here have problems that will feel familiar to artists:

The unlicensed use of their intellectual property and designs.

We have a lot in common.

Now this award is ostensibly given to me for my work as an artists rights activist. But I want to put that in a bigger context.

Many of you may have first heard of my efforts on behalf of artists when I filed a class action lawsuit against Spotify for failing to pay self published songwriters.

This, indeed, was a milestone as it gave songwriters the first opportunity in the digital age to extract some concessions from digital services.

Also the 2018 Music Modernization Act may be understood as an unintended consequence of this lawsuit.

But in the big picture, this lawsuit was a minor skirmish in what I call “the long war” to protect the rights of the creators.

And In this long war, I submit, I am just a foot soldier.

I look at the members of the National Music Council, whether music creators, unions, manufacturers, music associations, labels, educators or performing rights organizations and I can think of many many times when I have been aided in my efforts by the good folks from these organizations.

Because ultimately, we have this in common:

We are all fighting to protect our intellectual property

our copyrights,
our neighboring rights,
our patents,
our trademarks
and our designs

We fight to protect them from freeloaders that too often convince policymakers and courts that in the name of “innovation” they should have access to our Intellectual Property without permission or payment.

Sadly this is nothing new. There have always been and there will always be unscrupulous schemers that claim their exploitative business model is somehow “the future.”

The problem is, that in their vision of “the future” they get rich while little of that money trickles down to us. Those that create the intellectual property.

To paraphrase Led Zeppelin: The scam remains the same.

But it is here that the National Music Council has always been helpful. The council and its members provide the long lasting intellectual infrastructure that allows individual artists like myself, to fight.

To fight Today.

To fight 5 years from now

and to fight into the foreseeable future.

I humbly accept this award as someone who has simply followed in the footsteps of other council members and award recipients.

Keep up the good fight my friends,

You are truly on the right side of history.

@DavidCLowery to Receive American Eagle Award at NAMM 6/2/22

[Big thank you to the National Music Council for recognizing David with their American Eagle Award.]

Dear Mr. Lowery,

I am writing on behalf of the Board of Directors of the National Music Council, which is well aware of your inspiring and longstanding work in both music education and the championing of music creator rights (especially in regard to ensuring fair remuneration to composers, songwriters and artists). In that regard, I am pleased to inform you that the opportunity arose today (as we sat in our board meeting at the BMI Offices in New York) for NMC to honor with you with its American Eagle Award for 2022.

Unfortunately, due to the exigencies of the pandemic, we are on an incredibly short timeline regarding the presentation of the Award at the NAMM Conference Dinner just two weeks from now (the NAMM Dinner on June 2 at 7pm in the Los Angeles area). It was unclear until today
that the Dinner Event would actually take place. Your transportation and lodging would be paid for by NMC, and the presentation would be made by your colleagues SGA President Rick Carnes and NMC Chair Charlie Sanders.

As you may know, the prestigious American Eagle Award is given each year to individuals who have made a truly significant contribution to the support, development and teaching of music in this country. Past winners have included Kris Kristofferson, Lionel Hampton, Dizzy Gillespie, Van
Cliburn, Benny Goodman, Morton Gould, Dave Brubeck, Marian Anderson, Lena Horne, Roberta Peters, Clive Davis, Hal David, Tom Chapin, Sesame Street Productions, Herbie Hancock, Quincy Jones, Roberta Guaspari and many other musical and educational luminaries.

The awards presentation will be the evening of Thursday, June 2nd. The ceremony will take place in Anaheim, CA. The ceremony will coincide with the NAMM show.

Frozen Mechanicals Crisis: 2nd Comment of @helienne @davidclowery @theblakemorgan Opposing Conflict of Interest in Frozen Mechanicals–‘Let the future have a vote’

SECOND REOPENING PERIOD COMMENTS OF HELIENNE LINDVALL, DAVID LOWERY AND BLAKE MORGAN 

            Helienne Lindvall, David Lowery and Blake Morgan (collectively, the “Writers”) thank the Judges for the opportunity and respectfully submit the following comments responding to the Copyright Royalty Judges’ notice (“Second Notice”) soliciting comments on additional materials (“Reply”) received by the Judges[1] from the National Music Publishers Association, Nashville Songwriters Association International, Sony Music Entertainment, UMG Recordings, Inc. and Warner Music Group Corp. (collectively, the “Majors”)[2] regarding the so-called [frozen] “Subpart B” statutory rates and terms[3] relating to the making and distribution of physical or digital phonorecords of nondramatic musical works in the docket referenced above (“Proceeding”). 

The Writers previously submitted comments[4] (“Prior Comment”) responding to the Judges’ notice[5] (“First Notice”) soliciting comments on the Major’s proposed purported settlement (the “Proposed Settlement”)[6] of the Subpart B rates.  The Writers along with attorney Gwendolyn Seale[7] attempted to submit additional comments in response to the Majors’ filing but were not able to timely file that response.[8]  The Writers appreciate the Judges’ decision to reopen the comment period in order to afford the public, and those that would be bound by the rates and terms set by the Proposed Settlement,[9] an opportunity to comment on those additional materials filed by the Majors and to further participate in the rulemaking.[10]

I.  SUMMARY
            As a general comment on the record to date in Phonorecords IV, the Writers are mystified by the histrionics that have become associated with this Proceeding both on the record and in the press. A voluntary negotiation is just a deal, often made by people who are paid to always be closing. The Writers believe that Congress intended that voluntary negotiation produce a fair result on a reasonable timetable.  

 While not directly at issue in the reopened comment period, what is clearly the case is that the settlement of the Subpart B rates has unnecessarily become a major gating item for the streaming side of this Proceeding, geese and ganders being what they are.  Despite the extensive voluntary negotiation period for the Subpart B rates by the Majors, the Judges—and, frankly, songwriters around the world–are presented instead with a cornucopia of chaos across the board; the cherry on top is the frozen mechanicals crisis.  However, in this season of hope the Writers are confident that the Judges will lead us all out of this daunting situation.

The Writers are not interested in the personalities, the arm-waving or the finger-pointing.  They are interested in the results, particularly because neither they nor anyone they authorized had input into the negotiation that produced either the Proposed Settlement or the impasse.

There is at least one easy way to fix this and recognize the intrinsic value of songs:  Raise the statutory rate proposal for Subpart B configurations in at least some relation to the streaming rate increase.  A song is no less valuable because of the medium in which it is exploited.[11] 

As the Writers will argue, just like the voluntary agreement on Subpart B that led to this impasse was reached by the Majors, those same parties can go back to the drawing board to reach an appropriate conclusion with a higher Subpart B rate.  

Neither the public nor the songwriters are well served (and frankly neither are the Judges) by thrashing about and waiving arms. This may serve well the people who are paid by the hour but it hasn’t served people who are paid by the song.  At all.  “Victory” without winning may pass for success in Washington, but it does not in the writer room or at a songwriter’s kitchen table.

            The Proposed Settlement is a crystallization of everything that is wrong with the licensing and payment practices that have arisen under the compulsory license regime where no is yes, more is less and the Kool-Aid whispers “Drink Me.”  

While the Writers will focus in this comment on the frozen mechanicals issue that has become emblematic of the current crisis, it must be said that the decade-plus MOU [black box] agreements are a backward looking and inequitable insider arrangement that permits a mindset of sloppiness and a “kick the can down the road” mentality that debilitates the entire music publishing business.[12]  It’s no accident that the Mechanical Licensing Collective—run by largely the same cast of characters under a jaw-dropping Congressional governance mandate—has been sitting on $424,000,000 of other peoples’ money for nine months during a pandemic with no visible compliance with another Congressional mandate of paying songwriters correctly in Title I of the Music Modernization Act.[13]  

            The MLC and the sequence of MOUs are both descended from the same ancestors a generation ago.  Each have essentially the same business model and each are somehow inexplicably viewed as a “win” for the songwriters.  The irony of splicing the genetic code of the ancien régime MOU [black box insider settlements] to the future is not lost on anyone.  If the failure to match money and songs in the MOU process is still a problem after fifteen years as well as the much-trumpeted Title I of the Music Modernization Act, it’s not the horse’s fault.  It’s the rider’s.

            It would be a real pity for the CRB to perpetuate this unfairness by adopting the Proposed Settlement.  With respect, it is bad law, bad policy, and a failure to even try to bend the arc of the moral universe.  Conversely, rejecting the Proposed Settlement would provide the kind of steely oversight tragically lacking in the current regime.  Please let the future have a vote, just once.

            The Writers object to the Proposed Settlement for the following reasons and respectfully suggest constructive alternatives.  The gravamen of our objection is that (1) the Subpart B rates have already been frozen since 2006 and extending the freeze another five years is unjust; (2) no evidence has been publicly produced in the Proceeding that justifies or even explains extending the proposed freeze aside from the connection to the memorandum of understanding in the MOU4 late fee waiver (“MOU”), a document that the Majors only recently disclosed in their Reply; (3) very large numbers of songwriters and copyright owners of various domiciles around the world and national origins are unlikely to even know this Proceeding is happening and there still is no evidence that the unrepresented have appointed any of the participants to act on their behalf or were asked to consent to the purported settlement before the fact even if they were members of these organizations aside from the respective board of directors; (4) physical sales are still a vital part of songwriter revenue (which the Writers documented in the Prior Comment[14]); and (5) there are many just alternatives available to the Judges without applying an unjust settlement to the world’s songwriters who are strangers to the Proposed Settlement and in particular the MOU component (as the MOU will likely require membership in the NMPA to benefit consistent with prior MOUs).

[Read the full-length original filing here.]


[1] 86 FR 58626.

            [2] NMPA, NSAI, Sony Music Entertainment, UMG Recordings, Inc. and Warner Music Group Comments in Further Support of the Settlement of Statutory Royalty Rates and Terms for Subpart B Configurations, Determination of Royalty Rates and Terms for Making and Distributing Phonorecords (Phonorecords IV), Copyright Royalty Board (Aug. 10, 2021).

            [3] 37 C.F.R. §385.11(a).

            [4] Comments of Helienne Lindvall, David Lowery and Blake Morgan, Determination of Rates and Terms for Making and Distributing Phonorecords (Phonorecords IV) (July 26, 2021) available at https://app.crb.gov/document/download/25533.

[5] 86 FR 33601.

            [6] Motion To Adopt Settlement of Statutory Royalty Rates and Terms for Subpart B Configurations, Docket No. 21-CRB-0001-PR (2023-2027).

            [7]  Ms. Seale does not otherwise join in this comment.  We understand she is filing a separate comment regarding the additional materials.

            [8] The Writers’ reply was posted on The Trichordist website available at https://thetrichordist.com/2021/08/16/frozenmechanicals-crisis-unfiled-supplemental-comments-of-helienne-lindvall-davidclowery-theblakemorgan-and-sealeinthedeal/.  Parts of that unfiled comment are included in this comment.

[9] See 17 USC 801(b)(7)(a)(i).

                  [10]  As with the Writers prior submission in response to the First Notice, the Writers focus in this comment almost entirely on the Subpart B rates applicable to physical carriers under 37 C.F.R. §385.11(a).  

            [11] The Judges no doubt will be told many stories about how Subpart B configurations are not meaningful sales compared to streaming so rates deserve to be frozen.  This is a novel copyright argument without a statutory basis.  The theory is also not based on accurate facts as the Writers discuss extensively in the Prior Comment at paragraph 5 and will not repeat here.

            [12] There is a growing backlash to decades of delaying definitive action on song metadata and songwriter payments such as Credits Due campaign of the Ivors Academy and Abba’s Björn Ulvaeus.  See generally Chris Cooke, PPL Backs Björn Ulvaeus’s Credits Due Campaign, Complete Music Update (Oct. 4, 2021) available at https://completemusicupdate.com/article/ppl-backs-bjorn-ulvaeuss-credits-due-campaign/

            [13] See, e.g., H. Rep. 115-651 (115th Cong. 2nd Sess. April 25, 2018) at 5; S. Rep. 115-339 (115th Cong. 2nd Sess. Sept. 17, 2018) at 5 (“The Committee welcomes the creation of a new musical works database that is mandated by the legislation….Music metadata has more often been seen as a competitive advantage for the party that controls the database, rather than as a resource for building an industry on.” (emphasis added)).

            [14] See Prior Comment at 16.

#FrozenMechanicals Crisis: Unfiled Supplemental Comments of @helienne Lindvall, @davidclowery, @theblakemorgan and @sealeinthedeal

[Chris Castle says: Here’s the context of this post. As it turns out, the CRB extended the filing deadline for comments due to what they said was a technical difficulty, although we have yet to meet anyone who couldn’t file their comment on time. This extension seems contrary to the CRB’s February revised rules for filings by participants. The CRB procedures presciently have an email filing procedure in the case of technical problems arising out of their “eCRB” document filing system. It will not surprise you to know that the NMPA, NSAI, and major labels filed what is essentially a reply comment after the close of business on the last day of the extension, after at least our if not all commenter accounts were disabled, the practical effect of which was that no one could respond to their comments through the eCRB, i.e., on the record.

We tried, and drafted a reply to the most important points raised in the majors’ comment. We emailed our comment to the CRB during business hours on the next day in line with the CRB’s own “Procedural Regulations of the Copyright Royalty Board Regarding Electronic Filing System” (see 37 CFR §303.5(m)) or so we thought. But not so fast–we were told by an email from a nameless person at the CRB that we would need to file a motion in order to get approval to file the comment less than 24 hours late for good cause–which of course, we are not able to do since we are not “participants” in the proceeding. See how that works? According to this person’s email, we’d also need to contact CRB technical support to get our accounts reopened which would make the comment later still even if we were able to file a motion. Instead, we decided to just post our reply comment on the Internet. A wider audience. Unfortunately not part of the record, but we’ll see what happens.]

SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTS OF HELIENNE LINDVALL, DAVID LOWERY, BLAKE MORGAN  AND GWENDOLYN SEALE OBJECTING TO PROPOSED SETTLEMENT OF SUBPART B RATES

            This comment is in reply to the comment[1] filed by the Copyright Owners and the Joint Record Company Participants (the “Majors”) time-stamped after the close of business on August 10, 2021 and made available on the CRB docket the morning of August 11, 2021, i.e., after the deadline established by the Judges in the Proposed Rule published at 86 FR 33601 that would codify the Proposed Settlement.[2] 

            We ask the Judges’ leniency in permitting our late-filed supplemental comment to be made a part of the record in hopes that our responsive discussion will be helpful to the Copyright Royalty Board in resolving the frozen mechanicals crisis.

            This comment is filed on behalf of Helienne Lindvall, David Lowery and Blake Morgan who timely filed their comment on July 26, 2021[3] in accordance with the proposed rule.  This comment is also filed by Gwendolyn Seale who timely filed her own comment[4] in accordance with the proposed rule.  Their respective biographical information may be found in their previously filed comments.

            We will briefly discuss what we think are the essential points the Judges should consider that the Majors have raised in their comment.

I. Discussion

            A.  Authority:  As multiple commenters have stated, it is unclear whether the NMPA and NSAI have been authorized by their respective memberships of over 300 music publishers and over 4,000 songwriters to propose and/or accept a settlement freezing the statutory rate for Subpart B configurations through 2027. Thus, we ask the Judges to seek out evidence demonstrating that self-published songwriters and independent publishers have authorized the NSAI and NMPA to accept this Proposed Settlement.  We do not question the integrity of the Majors, but we do have questions about the negotiation process that have yet to be answered. 

            References to a broad “consensus” must be questioned because there is both a lack of evidence of consensus and also evidence in the record that at least 12 international songwriter groups object to the Proposed Settlement.  Independent songwriters, including Ms. Lindvall, Mr. Lowery and Mr. Morgan, also object.  It seems simple enough for the Judges to require some evidence of consent to the Proposed Settlement given the awesome power of the government that the Judges are essentially asked by Congress to delegate to the Majors through a voluntary negotiation.  This seems to us to be good cause for further verification of authority to make the deal in the first place.

            B.  The Judges Predicted the Current Opposition in their Phonorecords III Determination

The Majors rely on a citation that both demonstrates the foresight of the CRB and on balance tends to support our position that the NMPA and the NSAI likely lack the requisite authority to negotiate on behalf of all the world’s songwriters.  The Majors invite the Judges to participate in a thought experiment[5] that actually serves quite well to highlight the issues we have raised in the respective comments regarding both the authority of the NMPA and NSAI and the implied below-statutory rates bootstrapped indirectly by means of the freeze:

As the Judges have noted, “NMPA and NSAI represent individual songwriters and publishers,” and would not “engage[] in anti-competitive price-fixing at below-market rates,” since they must “act[] in the interest of their constituents” lest their constituents “seek representation elsewhere.” [Phonorecords III] at 15298.[6]

Respectfully, the problem is way beyond seeking representation elsewhere—the problem is that there was likely no “representation” in the first place if you take “representation” in the legal sense (such as that of a common agent) which we gather is how the Judges intended the use of the word.  Likewise, there is a difference between an agent’s principal and a “constituent”, i.e., a difference between one who expressly authorizes an agent to represent them in certain circumstances and one who is allowed to vote on who that representative is to be.  Neither is the case for many songwriters who have commented in the record for the current proceeding.  We will leave their record to speak for themselves as to why they have sought “representation elsewhere” but it appears that it is for the same reason that they are not participants in the proceeding—they can’t afford the justice and this is why they ask the Judges to give special weight to their comments in the CRB’s deliberations.

            But the Major’s thought experiment and speculation continues in an interesting coda regarding below statutory licensing (generally not permitted as a matter of contract in likely tens of thousands of co-publishing and administration agreements):

And certainly it would not be in the interest of any major publisher to agree to extend a below-market mechanical royalty rate to the competitors of its sister record company.[7]

While the thought experiment and speculation sound innocuous, consider what is being said here.  First, the Majors identify their interest as that of “major publishers”; not all publishers, not all songwriters, but “major publishers.”  Then the Majors go on to say that it would not be in the interest of the major publishers to give a “below market” rate to their sister record company’s competitors

            Of course, there is no market rate in the U.S. and essentially never has been; the Judges have the unenviable task of divining a market rate to be made statutory.  We would therefore modify the thought experiment to include “below statutory”.  Now we are left with the assertion that major publishers use the statutory rate to protect their record company affiliates from competition—not that they fulfill their role as true blue fiduciaries for their songwriters by refusing to grant below-statutory rates (either directly or indirectly), but rather being hard on the competitors of their affiliates.   And they are using their market power to impose a rate on the world that they seem to say protects their affiliates.  Extending the frozen mechanical rate certainly doesn’t protect their songwriters—the Judges have ample evidence that many songwriters object to the extension.  But in the Majors’ own words we now know cui bono, and the benefit goes back to Phonorecords III and likely earlier.

            But let us extend the thought experiment a little bit further.  Who is an unrelated “competitor” of the three major labels and all their distributed labels, DIY operations like The Orchard, joint ventures and so on and on and on?  That must be a pretty small group of true independents who have cobbled together a distribution network for the Subpart B configurations to deal with the logistics of manufacturing, warehousing, shipments, returns, and the like—branch distribution is what makes a major label a major.  Perhaps the Majors could provide some examples of these “competitors”?  Clearly though, the citation demonstrates that the Judges sensed many years ago the very situation now unfolding on the record in the frozen mechanicals crisis.

            C.  Comparisons to Largely Unopposed Prior Rulemakings Compare Apples to Oranges:  We understand that the Majors claim to have proposed a similar settlement in Phonorecords III resulting in a freeze of the statutory rate for Subpart B configurations, and that the Judges then-adopted that settlement.  We also understand that there was little if any formal objection to that freeze in Phonorecords III at least by comparison to the number of objecting commenters in Phonorecords IV.  The Judges are now presented with a significant number of objectors who entirely reject the application of the Proposed Settlement to the world in a kind of bootstrapping move.  Respectfully, comparing the field in Phonorecords III to Phonorecords IV is comparing apples to oranges and creating a pomegranate.

            We also acknowledge the millions of dollars that the NMPA asserts that it spent litigating these rates some fifteen years ago, but this assertion perhaps proves too much.  The cost of participating in any of these proceedings is exactly the reason why objecting songwriters understandably rely entirely on the Judges to seek fairness and justice.  They cannot afford to participate in these proceedings themselves and trust the Judges to balance all the facts not just the arguments of rich people and corporations. 

Not only do the Majors gloss over the songwriters’ objections, but their reasoning is actually fallacious. Because both proceedings are called “Phonorecords” does not make them similar in regard to the frozen mechanicals crisis.  The facts on the ground are wildly different between III and IV.  Moreover, we hear a subtext in the Major’s argument that if a configuration experiences declining sales, that is a reason for the government to reduce the royalty rate.  Aside from a lack of statutory authority, this is also fallacious reasoning because the Majors have produced no evidence that the per-unit price for Subpart B configurations has declined, and if anything, we are informed that the dealer price has increased in the case of vinyl.[8] 

We respectfully ask that the Judges consider these flaws in the Majors’ positions and give them their due weight. 

            D.  The Elusive MOU:  The Majors tell the Judges that: 

The MOU entered into contemporaneously with the Settlement is irrelevant to the Judges’ consideration of the Settlement, and does not call into question the reasonableness of the Settlement.[9]

            Respectfully, if the MOU is “irrelevant” to the settlement, why did they bring it up at all?  Recall that we previously asked the Judges to question whether the MOU was additional consideration for extending the frozen mechanical rates.  While others may have, we did not concern ourselves with whether the MOU was a “sweetheart deal” as we knew nothing about it.  Rather our issue was whether the MOU was a quid pro quo of additional consideration for the frozen rates that was enjoyed by a limited group of participants in the settlement but was not enjoyed by strangers to the deal who were still subject to the frozen rate.  Indeed, it appears that this is exactly the case.  While we appreciate that the Majors have now disclosed the MOU as part of their Reply, nothing in the Majors’ comment ameliorates this fundamental concern.

            A significant reason why the concern still exists is language in the now-disclosed MOU that certainly has the ring of a quid pro quo directly related to extending the frozen Subpart B rates in Phonorecords IV:

This MOU4 is a separate, conditional agreement [the quid] that shall not go into effect until [the quo] NMPA, SME, WMG’s affiliate Warner Music Group Corp., and UMG submit a motion to adopt a proposed settlement of the Phonorecords IV Proceeding as to statutory royalty rates and terms for physical phonorecords, permanent downloads, ringtones and music bundles presently addressed in 37 C.F.R. Part 385 Subpart B (the “Subpart B Configurations”), together with (1) certain definitions applicable to Subpart B Configurations presently addressed in 37 C.F.R. § 385.2 and (2) late payment fees under Section 115 for Subpart B Configurations presently addressed in 37 C.F.R. § 385.3, together with certain definitions applicable to such late payment fees presently addressed in 37 C.F.R. § 385.2, for the rate period covered by the Phonorecords IV Proceeding, which the Parties anticipate happening promptly after this MOU4 has been signed by SME, UMG, WMG, RIAA, NMPA, Sony Music Publishing, Universal Music Publishing Group, and Warner Chappell Music, Inc. (the “Initial Signatories”).[10]

            To the contrary, a fair reading of the MOU suggests, and may even require, that the consideration for the MOU is tied directly to extending the frozen rates in the Proposed Settlement.

            Moreover, we can revisit the authority issue raised above given language in the MOU.  Consider the following post-closing condition imposed on the NMPA by the plain terms of the MOU:

It is understood that only the Initial Signatories will sign this MOU4 at the outset, and that NMPA shall use its best efforts to obtain the signatures to this MOU4 by all of the remaining Parties within two (2) weeks thereafter.[11]

            If the NMPA had the authority to bind these many publisher “Parties” to the MOU, why would there be a need to impose such a post-closing condition on the NMPA?  There may be an explanation for this structure, but it is not obvious to us.

            We also find it somewhat unusual that neither the Reply of the Majors nor the now-disclosed MOU reference a dollar figure that is changing hands as far as we can tell.  This could be a lot of cash.  In the 2009 Billboard article cited by the Majors, the MOU that was the subject of that reporting was valued at “up to $264 million.” [12] However “routine” the MOU process is, a $264 million payment in a “pennies business” is not routine.  We would appreciate a further disclosure of the amount at issue in the current MOU.  As they say, it is evidently not a secret.

            Respectfully, it does not appear that one can completely exclude the relevance of the MOU as consideration for extending the freeze on Subpart B royalties at least on the face of the documents provided.  As strangers to the deal do not have the opportunity to subject these assertions to the crucible of cross-examination, we hope the Judges can welcome the reliance on them of those who cannot afford to participate in this proceeding.

II.  Conclusion

            In conclusion, we respectfully ask the Judges to consider the foregoing comments along with the many heartfelt and well-reasoned comments by others in Phonorecords IV.  Unfortunately, as is too often the case in the music business, we think that the sum and substance of the Majors’ argument is that “we are the wealthy and therefore we win.”

            We do not have to remind the Judges that this is the antithesis of our Constitutional system of government.

                                                                         Respectfully submitted.

Christian L. Castle

Gwendolyn Seale


[1] Comments in Further Support of the Settlement of Statutory Royalty Rates and Terms for Subpart B Configurations,  Docket No. 21–CRB– 0001–PR (2023–2027) (August 10, 2021)(Reply).

[2] Motion to Adopt Settlement of Statutory Royalty Rates and Terms for Subpart B Configurations, Docket No. 21–CRB– 0001–PR (2023–2027) (May 25, 2021) (Proposed Settlement).

[3] Comment of Helienne Lindvall, David Lowery and Blake Morgan, Docket No. 21–CRB– 0001–PR (2023–2027) (July 26, 2021) available at https://app.crb.gov/document/download/25533

[4] Comment of Gwendolyn Seale, Docket No. 21–CRB– 0001–PR (2023–2027) (July 26, 2021) available at https://app.crb.gov/document/download/25534

[5] Reply at 5.

[6] Id. (emphasis added).

[7] Id.

[8] See, e.g., Samantha Handler, Copyright Panel Rethinking Song Royalties Streamers Pay, Bloomberg Law (Aug. 12, 2021) (“Royalties from downloads and CDs haven’t increased since 2006, but still make up a significant portion of income for independent songwriters.”) available at https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/copyright-panel-rethinking-song-royalties-streamers-pay

[9] Reply at 6 (emphasis added).

[10] Reply at 19, MOU-4 at 2 (emphasis added).

[11] Id. at 20, MOU-4 at 3.

[12] Ed Christman, NMPA, Major Labels Sign Terms of Agreement, Billboard (Oct. 7, 2009) available at https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/1264471/nmpa-major-%20labels-sign-on-terms-of-agreement.

#FrozenMechanicals Crisis: Comments of @helienne Lindvall, @DavidCLowery and @TheBlakeMorgan to the Copyright Royalty Board

Before the

United States Copyright Royalty Judges
Copyright Royalty Board

Library of Congress

Docket No. 21–CRB–0001–PR
               (2023–2027)

COMMENTS OF HELIENNE LINDVALL, DAVID LOWERY AND BLAKE MORGAN

            Helienne Lindvall, David Lowery and Blake Morgan submit these comments responding to the Copyright Royalty Judges’ notice soliciting comments on whether the Judges should adopt the regulations proposed by the National Music Publishers Association, Nashville Songwriters Association International, Sony Music Entertainment, UMG Recordings, Inc. and Warner Music Group Corp. as the so-called “Subpart B” statutory rates and terms relating to the making and distribution of physical or digital phonorecords of nondramatic musical works that, if adopted by the Judges, would apply to every songwriter in the world whose works are exploited under the U.S. compulsory mechanical license (86 FR 33601).[1]

            We object to the proposed rates and terms for the following reasons and respectfully suggest constructive alternatives.  The gravamen of our objection is that (1) the Subpart B rates have already been frozen since 2006; (2) no evidence has been publicly produced in the Proceeding that justifies or even explains extending the proposed freeze; (3) very large numbers of songwriters of various domiciles around the world do not even know this proceeding is happening and have not appointed any of the parties to act on their behalf or been asked to consent to the purported settlement; (4) physical sales are still a vital part of songwriter revenue; and (5) there are many just alternatives available to the Judges without applying an unjust settlement to the world’s songwriters.

 A.  Statement of Interests.

By way of background, following are short summaries of the commenters’ respective biographies demonstrating their respective significant interests in the subject matter of this proceeding.

            Helienne Lindvall:  Ms. Lindvall is an award-winning professional songwriter, musician and columnist based in London, England. She is Chair of the Songwriter Committee & Board Director, Ivors Academy of Music Creators (formerly British Academy of Songwriters, Composers & Authors BASCA) and chairs the esteemed Ivor Novello Awards. She also is the writer behind  the Guardian music industry columns Behind the Music and Plugged In and has contributed to a variety of publications and broadcasts discussing songwriters’ rights, copyright, and other music industry issues.

            David Lowery:  Mr. Lowery is the founder of the musical groups Cracker and Camper Van Beethoven and a lecturer at the University of Georgia Terry College of Business and is based in Athens, Georgia.  He has testified before Congress on the topic of fair use policy[2]  and is a frequent commentator on copyright policy and artist rights in a variety of outlets, including his blog at TheTrichordist.com.   He has been a class representative in two successful class actions by songwriters against music streaming services.

            Blake Morgan:  Mr. Morgan is a New York-based artist, songwriter, label owner, music publisher, and the leader of the #IRespectMusic campaign[3] which focuses on supporting fair payment for creators across all mediums and platforms including supporting the American Music Fairness Act sponsored by Representatives Deutch and Issa.[4]  Mr. Morgan also lectures on artists’ rights at music, business, and law schools across the United States. 

Helienne Lindvall, David Lowery and Blake Morgan (collectively, the “Writers”) are independent songwriters who own the copyrights to many of their songs. They previously were amici in Google v. Oracle[5] together with the Songwriters Guild of America.  In some instances, they have written songs whose copyrights they have transferred in limited parts and in some cases for limited periods of time to major music publishers.  In other cases, their songs are not owned by major music publishers but are administered by one or more of them, in many cases also for limited periods of time.  In some instances, these transfers were in perpetuity subject to certain statutory or contractual termination rights.  They also have retained the copyrights to many of their songs and are self-administered songwriters with respect to those nondramatic musical works. 

            We thank the Copyright Royalty Judges for inviting the public to comment on the proposed regulations in the docket referenced above (“Proceeding”) and the purported “settlement”[6] that in large part resulted in the Copyright Royalty Board’s proposed regulations.

B.  Objections, Discussion and Solutions

            We appreciate this opportunity to make our views known and hope that our suggestions are helpful to the Judges in trying to solve the frozen mechanicals crisis.  We also appreciate that the Judges seek to do justice and find a fair result given their appointed role of administering the awesome power of the government to compel songwriters to accept all rates and terms of the statutory license.

1.  Lack of Authority to Negotiate for Non-Participants

            As a threshold matter, we think it is important to clarify the source of authority for the purported settlement as set forth in the Motion.  Some play a bit fast and loose with who represents whom in a parade of glittering generalities and hasty generalizations.  The Writers are not members of the Nashville Songwriters Association International and have not authorized NSAI to negotiate any agreement on their behalf, nor would the Writers ever authorize any lobby shop to do so. 

            Neither are the Writers members of the National Music Publishers Association, nor have Writers authorized the NMPA to negotiate any agreement on their behalf.  The NMPA has many members but we seriously doubt that the NMPA has expressly obtained authority from any of its members to negotiate the purported settlement on their behalf, outside of its board of directors.  That authority may give the NMPA employees cover, but is pretty weak sauce as authority for the negotiation of frozen rates to be applied to all the songwriters in the world. 

            We doubt that any other songwriter (outside of the insiders) or that any copyright owner gave consent either, aside from members of the NMPA Board of Directors authorizing employees of the NMPA to accept (or perhaps even propose) frozen rates on behalf of the board.  Neither do we see any evidence that the NMPA or NSAI were appointed a “common agent” by copyright owners to set prices and otherwise negotiate and agree upon the terms and rates under Subpart B.[7]  Therefore, we encourage the Judges to inquire further to determine if an appointment was a necessary condition for settlement or if the majority are claiming a kind of misconstrued authority, perhaps with the best of intentions.  One person’s negotiation strategy is another’s catastrophe.

            We anticipate that the Judges will take that position that the Writers will be “bound” by the purported “settlement” in the Motion among the NMPA (which owns no copyrights), the NSAI (which owns no copyrights), and the major labels (which in theory own no musical work copyrights).  We find it astonishing that entities that do not appear to represent, or to have been appointed a common agent of, all the persons to be bound by the settlement, are still able to use the Copyright Royalty Board to bind nonparties to a settlement.  This seems at best contrary to American constitutional jurisprudence requiring the consent of the governed and at worst destructive of the ends of government. 

            If anyone contests our position that the parties to the settlement had no authority to bind strangers to the deal, let them come forward with a common agent appointment, board minutes, board votes, membership votes, court ruling or other evidence of due process to disclose how this purported settlement described in the Motion was actually approved and which copyright owners authorized the NMPA and NSAI to conclude the agreement on their behalf (and, therefore, which did not). 

            We think that what such disclosure will demonstrate at most is that the respective boards of directors of the two organizations[8] authorized the settlement.  Since neither the organizations nor their respective boards were likely authorized to accept a frozen rate by strangers to that deal, the board members may have merely indicated their own company’s intention to be bound by the settlement.  They likely had no actual authority to do more. 

Even this seems odd.  Each NMPA board member who represents a publisher presumably would be agreeing on their own behalf.  It is unclear what the NSAI board actually approved, since NSAI owns no copyrights and at least some of the songwriter board members are likely signed to publishers, perhaps some or all of the same publishers who were voting on the NMPA board.[9]  Murkiness abounds.  So, if anyone says that their board approval resulted in some kind of “consensus” binding on strangers, that may be something of a misdirection that does not consider the obvious and customary limitations of a board’s authority.  We respectfully ask the Judges to get to the bottom of exactly how this happened by asking for supplemental briefs or such other means as the Judges deem appropriate.

The Writers are in two different groups that fairly are not represented in the Proceeding.  First, Writers are in the very large and global group of songwriters and copyright owners who cannot afford to participate in the Proceeding.  As the Judges are likely aware, yours is very rarified air where only the very rich drive the process but all songwriters must bear the burden of the result.  Songwriters and copyright owners living outside the United States (and even those living outside of Washington, DC)  are essentially prevented from participating at hearings in a far-away capitol although the Judges’ rulings directly affect their works when exploited in America.  This is how process becomes punishment.[10]

            Second, the Writers are in another bucket with some songs still co-published or administered by publishers that may be represented by the NMPA in the settlement—we do not know because individual publishers did not sign the Motion in their own names.  None of those publishers have consulted with the Writers about freezing the statutory royalty rates for yet another five years and essentially granting a reduced rate license without our permission.  Many co-publishing or administration agreements include a restriction on the publisher that prohibits them from granting licenses at less than the statutory rates—songwriters did not consider negotiating an additional restriction that would prohibit the publisher from lobbying to indirectly reduce the rate through freezing the statutory rate and then bootstrapping that agreement to apply to the world through the CRB. Perhaps the CRB will give songwriters a reason to start negotiating a “no frozen rate lobbying” marketing restriction in future deals.

            Respectfully, the Judges should not enable these publishers to do indirectly that which they cannot do directly.  We would ask the Judges to inquire further and opine as to whether such marketing restrictions are at work in the purported settlement as to songwriters or publishers administered by any of the settling publishers.  Since those publishers are not individually parties to the settlement, we have no way of confirming who is in and who is not.

            Regardless, Writers did not authorize anyone to negotiate the frozen rates on their behalf and never would.  If the Judges adopt the proposed settlement without a mechanism to obtain consent of those they govern, such a ruling seems to us to fly in the face of all the fundamental building blocks of democracy and in particular American Constitutional democracy.  Accordingly, Writers reserve the right to challenge any such decision to freeze mechanicals on a number of grounds[11] including due process, equal protection and 5th Amendment takings.

            The parties to the purported settlement would have the Judges believe that because they claim that ‘‘the settlement represents the consensus of buyers and sellers representing the vast majority of the market for ‘mechanical’ rights for Subpart B Configurations”[12] and seem to ask the CRB to accept without question the lack of evidence of the authority to negotiate the settlement in the first place which belies the unelected “consensus.”  It must be said that on the one hand, songwriters are not polled to determine what they want in the way of rates, but on the other hand their number or the number of their works are used to justify frozen rates to argue for a “majority” view (when songwriters were never asked if they want the freeze).  Such “consensus” is chimerical and is, frankly, an equivocation that defies a common definition[13] of the word “consensus” that we find inapt given the current facts and is closer to Kings X.

            The settling parties (presumably the NMPA in this case) would have the Judges apply their private deal to all songwriters throughout the world.  It’s easy to get a faux consensus from “the majority” if you do not invite—and even attack or threaten[14]–those with opposing views.  It illustrates the “tyranny of the majority” that every American high school civics class discusses in the context of governance[15]–even assuming there was a vote of the affected songwriters which there apparently was not.[16] 

Therefore, from the outset the proposed rule is simply not a reasonable basis for setting statutory rates or terms for those not party to the voluntary agreement set forth in the Motion.

            But on a more practical note, we think songwriters will ask what can be done to try to fix the mess the parties have created?  We offer several concrete solutions.

2.  Limit the Settlement to Named Parties to the Agreement or Let Sunlight Shine on the Settlement if Settlement Applies to All Songwriters in the World: 

            We call the Judges’ attention to the record company parties to the settlement.  Note that each of the major labels signed in their own organization names, yet for some reason the publishers did not.  Had they signed in their own names, the symmetry between the two might be obvious due to common ownership at the group level.[17]

The Judges could require that the voluntary settlement apply only to those parties who actually agreed it, rather than trade associations that own no copyrights and likely have limited agency at best.  The Judges could cabin the rates and terms to those parties who are actually signatories to the settlement, directly or indirectly.  The publishers involved could be ordered to step forward for the rationally related purpose of determining who the settlement rate should apply to.  This approach would treat the purported settlement more in the nature of a voluntary license among the parties as is permitted under the Copyright Act.  This cabined approach seems to be consistent with the Act and the proper role of regulatory agencies like the CRB, not to mention the Constitution. 

            If the Judges do not wish to take this approach, the Judges may wish to assure that all songwriters who are affected by their ruling are provided with the full picture of what the deal was that induced the purported settlement.  This approach recognizes that the proposed regulations do nothing to disclose all consideration that was paid in connection with the settlement.  This question has been raised by many interested persons, including Representative Lloyd Doggett in a July 13, 2021 letter[18] to the Librarian of Congress and the Register of Copyrights regarding CRB procedures.

            The settlement expressly refers to undisclosed terms that sound very much like other consideration exchanged and also expressly refers[19] to a side deal or “MOU” between the NMPA and the major labels.[20]  How can the Judges determine, or expect anyone outside the insider group to agree, that the rates and terms set forth in the proposed regulations are fair and reasonable without knowing the full extent of the consideration exchanged?  Therefore, the proposed rule as drafted is simply not a reasonable basis for setting statutory terms or rates for those not party to the voluntary agreement as set forth in the Motion and who are not “in the know” regarding its terms including the terms of the MOU.

3.  Opt In for Independents and Co-Published Songwriters

            We perceive the obvious lack of authority to bind non-parties is a fatal flaw of the proposed settlement.  If true, lack of authority is likely sufficient good cause for the Judges to reject the settlement without even addressing whether the rates and terms meet the willing buyer-willing seller standard required by Congress. 

            We recognize that the Judges may wish to avoid an outright rejection of the purported settlement.  An agreement among the parties is consistent with the goals of a voluntary negotiation.  One remedy might be for the Judges to require the parties to construct an opt-in structure that would only apply to those who affirmatively agree to accept the frozen rate.  There clearly are precedents for implementing an opt-in structure that would allow songwriters and copyright owners to accept the settlement or reject it and negotiate their own arms-length rate as true and unrelated willing sellers to a willing buyer.[21]  If there really is a “consensus,” an opt-in process would simply confirm it in a legally cognizable manner.

            For example, if copyright owner A was party to a co-publishing agreement with publisher X who is represented on the NMPA board, it would be a simple thing to require publisher X to proffer an authorization document permitting the negotiation of the settlement on behalf of copyright owner A.  Failing that proffer, publisher X could put the settlement out for opt-in consent by copyright owner A and those in the same class as copyright owner A.  An opt-in process seems efficient.  Common questions would predominate, the publishers concerned would not be prohibitively numerous, the copyright owners could easily be located based on the billing relationship between them and publisher X and an opt-in structure would no doubt be preferable and less costly than other remedies.

            Alternatively, songwriters or copyright owners could be allowed to opt-out of the settlement by a simple notice by their publisher to them requesting an opt-in, or from them to their publisher opting in or out.  The Judges would, of course, do well to specify the rules for this process and supervise the administration.

            Absent this or similar evidence of authority, there will always be an open question of whether the purported settlement provides a reasonable basis for setting statutory terms or rates which may be answered later down the line in the CRB or other fora.

4.  When the Willing Buyer and Willing Seller Are Effectively the Same Legal Person

            It must be said that we sympathize with the position that the Judges are in of trying to divine a free market rate in America where songwriters have not been free in over 100 years.  In fact, songwriters in America have not been free for so long we could safely say they have never been free in stark contrast to the U.S. economy generally.  Generations of songwriters are held guilty of some long-forgotten and Kafka-esque original sin requiring a degree of government regulation as though songs were hazardous materials.  Regulation that protects monopolists like Google and iHeartMedia from the supposed anticompetitive urges of songwriters who we are asked to believe seek out the closed door of the writer room for one reason–collusion.

            While this willing buyer-willing seller standard makes good sense in the case of webcasting rates[22] or streaming mechanicals where the parties typically are not and are not likely to be related, it is extraordinarily difficult for the Writers to swallow in the case of the parties to the purported settlement—an ancient conflict of interest that was easily predictable on the face of the “Music Modernization Act.”[23]  There is nothing modern about this unitary buyer/seller problem. 

            The major publishers are, of course, owned at the group level by the same companies that own the major labels.  That’s what makes them “major” but that is also what makes them unitary.  Assuming arguendo that the major publishers have obtained the consent of their co-publishers or their administration principals, they would be free to enter into any permitted settlement even with their affiliated record company music users.  But the Motion is hardly a willing buyer-willing seller scenario—the two are essentially the same legal person, or are “unitary.”  Congressman Doggett raised a question about this very issue in his Letter, and we raise it here to the CRB.  We think it deserves a detailed reply from the CRB and will be a key legal precedent going forward under the “new” MMA standard.[24]  All the more reason why the settlement is more suited to a voluntary license among the parties than a rule that applies to all the world.

            The Judges may find the recent report[25] by the UK Parliament’s Digital Culture Media and Sport Committee to be helpful on this point; Ms. Lindvall and the Ivors Academy campaigned for the DCMS Committee’s inquiry. 

            The DCMS Committee called upon the Government to have the UK’s Competition and Markets Authority investigate competition in the recorded music market, particularly the tied song and sound recording markets,[26]  noting that: 

 “With [independent] music publishers…unanimously calling for the value of the song to have parity with the value of the recording [citation omitted], it is conspicuous that the MPA [the UK counterpart to the NMPA] refused to give a definitive perspective on the debate, particularly given that the publishing arms of the three major music groups are counted amongst their members….Whilst the major music groups dominate music publishing, there is little incentive for their music publishing interests to redress the devaluation of the song relative to the recording.[27]

            Accordingly, we do not believe, as discussed more fully below, that the purported settlement agreement in any way approximates fair or reasonable royalty rates and terms, or rates and terms that would have been negotiated in the marketplace between an arms-length willing buyer and a willing seller, i.e., a non-unitary buyer/seller.  Given the position expressed by the DCMS Committee, it’s entirely possible that at least the UK Parliament may wish to resolve the issue in another forum. 

We are open to being persuaded otherwise by the Judges, but it appears that the unitary willing buyer-willing seller will establish a critical precedent going forward.  Therefore, the proposed rule is simply not a reasonable basis in this great moment for setting statutory terms or rates until the application of this standard to related parties is clearly spelled out by the CRB and reviewed.

5.  Vinyl Is a Booming Business

            We ask that the Judges take notice of the multitude of news reports on vinyl sales.[28]  Contrary to the vague assertions by NSAI members outside of the Proceeding about unnamed and undisclosed “industry revenue analysis” when defending their decision to “accept” a frozen rate because they believe that physical is a declining configuration,[29] vinyl sales are, if anything, understated due to the severe inability of supply to keep up with demand.  (Why a rational commercial actor would allow that mismatch to continue to such an egregious extent and to the detriment of artists and songwriters is a whole other question.[30]

            These supply chain problems started well before the pandemic,[31] so please do not allow yourselves to be “gaslighted” into the belief that the problems are caused by the pandemic.  Since the whole point of capitalism is for supply to meet demand, we must assume that this situation will be remedied eventually considering the incredibly strong and nearly vertical demand for vinyl, yet that remedy is slow in coming. 

            While the 2008 coming of Spotify is taken by the press (and Spotify itself) as some sort of celestial arrival of a savior straight out of the Book of Revelation,[32] the data tell a different story about vinyl sales.  For whatever reason of consumer taste, the coming of Spotify was also roughly the beginning of the vinyl boom.  Respectfully, it does not take an economist to read the newspaper—stories of vinyl’s resilience to cannibalization by streaming abound. 

            This upward sales trend is reflected in new survey data as well.  According to a small survey conducted by Artist Rights Watch[33] of self-selected songwriters during the period June-July 2021, approximately 26% of respondents said that, roughly speaking, their songwriting income from physical sales had increased over the last two years, and 32% said they expect their income from physical sales to increase over the next two years.[34]

           

These survey results are consistent with the views expressed by Jeff Gold[35], a music industry veteran, historian and author who has operated the Record Mecca collectibles site for many years.  Rolling Stone profiled Mr. Gold as one of the five “top collectors of high-end music memorabilia.” Mr. Gold told us in an interview[36]:

            “I think the vinyl boom is being driven by a number of factors. First, nostalgia: people like me love the experience of looking at an album cover, putting a vinyl record on the turntable, and traveling back in time. The Record Collector world I live in has expanded as well, with highly collectible records [selling] for much more than ever.

            Second, for younger people I think there is a collectible factor – – they are trying something from a different era, it’s trendy to have a turntable and play vinyl records, and they think maybe this is something they can buy that’ll be worth more later. And that is often the case.

Also, there’s the Record Store Day[37] phenomenon, under pressing records to make instant collectibles.  And to some [vinyl records] are merch[andise] for fans of artists who want to own everything connected to that act.

The market for vinyl has dramatically expanded, and the rare vinyl I sell is more desirable than ever. If I had to guess I would think that the collectible record world will continue to expand, but at some point the fad vinyl buying will begin to ebb. Though I’ve been saying that for a long time and there’s no sign of it.”

            The Artist Rights Watch small survey and recent commentary[38] supports a phenomenon that we respectfully suggest the Judges should explore further before accepting the alleged “consensus” for the purported settlement as fact—a significant number of songwriters appear to find mechanical royalty income from physical sales to be important to them and likely would not accept the terms of the voluntary agreement.  Again, we are not trying to dictate rates and terms to those who find the voluntary agreement to suit their needs; they should have their rates and terms.  But we respectfully ask the Judges not to impose those frozen rates on everyone else without their participation and consent as well as evidence.  What is good for the goose may be anathema to the gander.

            Even if every single one of the current vinyl trends are wrong, even if vinyl stops being a resurgent business and abruptly crashes and burns at some point in the next five years due to supply chain problems or reversals in consumption patterns not currently measurable, even if the NSAI songwriters’ undisclosed sources turn out to be 100% correct, what remains even in the industry-wide and world-wide 1% of revenue projected by the NSAI songwriters is still a significant revenue stream to a large portion of songwriters[39] and even music users.  We will believe the users do not care about physical and digital downloads when the first record company president comes forward and declines 15% of annual billing.

            These assertions and speculations about the future are a fine example of a judgement based on conditional probabilities that does not consider the effect of prior probabilities.  If this sudden crash theory really is part of the majority’s thinking, it does seem that the least they could do is provide the Judges and the public with supporting evidence on the record for their projection (or their guesswork) that so far is entirely absent from the record.

            We do not make an emotional appeal, however.  Sales levels do not change the fact that songs have value that deserves greater economic analysis and justification than a finger in the wind.  As the DCMS Committee observed in their referral to the UK’s competition authorities, there are some unusual forces at work here.  The Motion may well provide greater evidence for such a review albeit inadvertently.

            In the absence of an economic case put on by any party to the voluntary agreement regarding freezing Subpart B rates, we ask that the Judges take notice of the overwhelming amount of public information available to document the importance of vinyl and the error of the fundamental assumptions of the NSAI songwriters which we assume gave voice to certain NMPA members.  We have provided the Judges with a handful of representative articles above.
            While the CRB may have other reasons for continuing to impose the existing frozen mechanical rate on the world’s songwriters for another five years, relying on an unnamed “industry revenue analysis” of imaginary dwindling physical sales without inquiring further when there is ample public evidence to the contrary seems to be an unreasonable and arbitrary basis for setting statutory terms or rates.  In fact, putting your finger in the air and guessing that vinyl sales will reverse course into a nose-dive in the face of overwhelming facts and data to the contrary seems the very definition of arbitrary.

6.  Disclosure Should be Mandatory

            Respectfully, we believe there is a compelling need for the Judges to require the disclosure of both the settlement agreement that established the frozen rates as well as the MOU referenced in the Motion.[40]  It appears from the Motion that there was additional consideration beyond putting a finger in the air and deciding to freeze the rates another five years; yet, that additional consideration is described but not disclosed.  It seems that no copyright owner (other than insiders) can rationally evaluate the purported settlement without knowing all the facts.

            We respectfully call the Judges’ attention to analogous facts in Pandora’s ASCAP and BMI rate court proceedings from 2007.  While dated, the story is good background for understanding the problems that can be unleashed from bootstrapping secret deals into law—in the Pandora case, one could say that it led directly to the Music Modernization Act’s provisions requiring random assignment of rate court judges.  This quote from Billboard[41] is a succinct description of the problem:

Back in 2007-2010, when ASCAP and BMI rate court judges were involved in litigation between DMX and performance rights societies, the judges examined the direct licensing deals DMX cut with publishers. During that process, judges did not review the advances or any of the other aspects of the deal, and only looked at the reduced per-store royalty rate. Consequently, in the case of BMI, this resulted in the per-store negotiated rate falling from $36.36 to a per-location fee of $18.91, much to the chagrin of the publishers, who stayed a part of the PROs’ blanket licenses. The ASCAP rate court returned a similar finding.

             Congressman Doggett also correctly raised this question in his Letter and it is entirely understandable—without disclosure of all consideration, strangers to the settlement are being asked to buy a pig in a poke.

            Accordingly, we ask that you compel the disclosure of all documents, payments and other consideration that changed hands or were promised to change hands in the purported settlement.  This would include any payments outside the four corners of the Motion but related to the purported settlement. In the absence of that disclosure or binding certification that it does not exist, the proposed rule is simply not a reasonable basis for setting statutory terms or rates until the full terms of the purported settlement are disclosed or the settlement is cabined as a voluntary license among the parties. 

7.  Raising the Rates

                 First and foremost, the problem with the CRB adopting the purported settlement as the law of the land is the appearance of the bootstrapping of a private deal among apparently related parties and the controlled opposition into rates and terms that apply to all songwriters in the world.  As Congressman Doggett says in his Letter, these are rates and terms that apply to all songs ever written or that ever may be written.  We know you will agree that the rule making authority of the CRB is a serious and solemn example of the awesome power of the government over unrepresented songwriters. 

                 The potential for this bootstrapping is particularly offensive to songwriters who live outside the United States as evidenced by opposition to the frozen mechanicals from a host of international songwriter groups. 

                 We wish to express our desire for a separate and higher rate from the frozen rate accepted by the parties to the purported settlement.  We recognize the corner that the CRB has been backed into regarding raising the rates that have been frozen for so long that they have been substantially eroded by inflation without even considering the value of songs to the booming vinyl business.  According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI-U calculator[42] (the same index used by the Judges in the recent Web V rate determination), a 9.1¢ rate set in 2006 would be indexed to 12¢ today. We therefore estimate that 9.1¢ in 2006 would have the buying power today of approximately 6¢, less than the 1992 mechanical rate established 29 years ago.[43]   

                 However justified, we are sure that raising the 9.1¢ rate across the board would be met by a great howling and rending of garments by at least some of the parties to the purported settlement.  The easy answer to this issue is one raised by Congressman Doggett in his Letter–limiting the settlement rate to the settling parties and setting a higher rate for non-settling parties, i.e., the inverse of the trick referenced above that was played by DMX on the entire industry and the rate courts.

                 The new minimum statutory rate applied to the non-settling parties could be as simple as a headline rate between a bounded range greater than 9.1¢ and up to 12¢ with the appropriate adjustment for the long-song formula.  That headline rate could then be adjusted for inflation and indexed to the CPI-U for the out-years in a similar manner as the Judges applied in Web V.  Even these rates are excruciatingly low and demonstrate the deep hole that the government imposed on songwriters between 1909 and 1978 when the rate for generations of songwriters was frozen at 2¢ through two World Wars, the Great Depression, a global pandemic, two post-war booms and a moon walk.  Songwriters have been digging out ever since, both in the US and abroad due to America’s long commercial shadow.  The Writers fear that a similar freeze has developed with the Subpart B rates and without meaningful consultation.[44]  While we cannot reasonably ask the CRB to solve all the world’s mistakes, we can ask that the Judges not repeat them.  As Congressman Doggett says, we are concerned that we not misstep.

           Alternatively, the CRB could, after consultation with representative parties opposing the frozen rates such as the Songwriters Guild of America, Ivors Academy, ATX Musicians, the Society of Composers and Lyricists, MusicAnswers, the Screen Composers Guild of Canada, Alliance of Latin American Composers & Authors, Asia-Pacific Music Creators Alliance, Pan-African Composers and Songwriters Alliance, Music Creators North America, the Alliance for Women Film Composers and ECSA appoint a representative for independent songwriters to negotiate with both the major labels and the independent labels on rates applicable to and higher than the rates in the settlement.  Such a consultation in this or another forum would go a long way toward clearing up the due process and equal protection Constitutional issues hanging like a cloud over the current Proceeding.  Obviously, the cost of such negotiation should not be borne by the songwriters or recouped from their royalties.

           Therefore, absent such a ruling by the Judges, the proposed rule is simply not a fair or reasonable basis for setting statutory terms or rates until there are truly representative bodies negotiating on behalf of songwriters and independent copyright owners. 

              Thank you again for this opportunity to express our views on the proposed rule.  We respectfully hope that our comment has provided the Judges with some additional insight into how the proposed rule affects independent songwriters and publishers both in America and around the world, particularly since none of us can afford to participate in the rate setting proceeding itself.  We greatly appreciate the Judges’ willingness to avoid process becoming punishment.

                                                                  Respectfully submitted.

                                                                 Christian L. Castle
                                                                
                                                                 Christian L. Castle, Attorneys
                                                                 9600 Great Hills Trail, Suite 150W
                                                                 Austin, Texas 78759

                                                                 July 26, 2021


                  [1]  We focus in this comment almost entirely on the Subpart B rates applicable to physical carriers under 37 C.F.R. §385.11(a).  We note, however, that there is some apprehension among songwriters that the “music bundle” rate in 37 C.F.R. § 385.11(c) could be twisted in a way to drag Non-Fungible Tokens into the frozen rates.  We doubt that Congress intended to include NFTs in the statutory rates since they did not exist even at the time of the Title I amendment to Section 115.  It would certainly add insult to injury for large sums to change hands for NFTs but songwriters be reduced to their usual meagre gruel in compensation while everyone else enriches themselves from the songs. Clarity on this point would be appreciated.

                  [2] See The Scope of Fair Use: Hearing before the Subcomm. on the Courts, Intellectual Property and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (Jan. 28, 2014) (statement of David Lowery)

                  [3] See #IRespectMusic campaign, available at https://www.irespectmusic.org.

                  [4] See Reps. Issa, Deutch Introduce Bill to Ensure Artists Receive Fair Pay for FM/AM Radio Airplay (June 21, 2021) available at https://issa.house.gov/media/press-releases/reps-issa-deutch-introduce-bill-ensure-artists-receive-fair-pay-fmam-radio.

                  [5] Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc., 593 U.S. ___ (2021), Brief of Amici Curiae Helienne Lindvall, David Lowery, Blake Morgan and the Songwriters Guild of America in support of Respondent (2021) available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18-956/133298/20200218155210566_18-956%20bsac%20Helienne%20Lindvall%20et%20al–PDFA.pdf.

                  [6] Motion To Adopt Settlement Of Statutory Royalty Rates and Terms For Subpart B Configurations, Docket No. 21-CRB-0001-PR (2023-2027) hereafter the “Motion.”

                  [7] See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §115(c)(1)(D).

                  [8] We invite the Judges to take notice of the relationships at the board level between the NMPA and the NSAI which is beyond the scope of the comment, but we think the Judges may find very relevant for discussions of negotiating authority and the scope of designation of a common agent.

                  [9] It must be noted that the NMPA board and the NSAI board share members from time to time.

                  [10] We are mindful of the result of the WTO arbitration over the Fairness in Music Licensing Act that found the United States liable for damages in violating the TRIPS Agreement. See WT/DS160/12 (Jan. 15, 2001) available at https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Query=(@Symbol=%20wt/ds160/*)%20and%20(@Title=%20((arbitration%20under%20article%2021.3)%20and%20((award%20of%20the%20arbitrator)%20or%20(report%20of%20the%20arbitrator))))&Language=ENGLISH&Context=FomerScriptedSearch&languageUIChanged=true#,

                  [11] See, e.g., United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 594 U.S. ____ (2021).

                  [12] Motion at 4.

                  [13]  The Cambridge English Dictionary defines “consensus” as either a “generally accepted opinion” or a “wide agreement,” neither of which apply to frozen mechanicals.

                  [14] Paul Resnikoff, AMLC Board Member Accuses NMPA President David Israelite of Tortious Business Interference and Collusion, Digital Music News (Nov. 28, 2018) available at https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2018/11/28/amlc-nmpa-president-david-israelite-collusion/

                  [15] Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (1801) (“All too will bear in mind this sacred principle, that though the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will, to be rightful, must be reasonable; that the minority possess their equal rights, which equal laws must protect, and to violate would be oppression.”)(emphasis added); James Madison, Federalist Papers 10 and 51.  John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (1689) at par. 95 (“[N]o one can be put out of [his property], and subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent.”)

            [16] The tradition of concern with the familiar “tyranny of the majority” sounds in discussions of representative government, the concern being that the majority that gives a representative quorum in a body also could lead to disastrous consequences for the minority.  This is particularly true when the governed have rules imposed on them that they had no part in crafting by persons they had no part in electing.  Washington expressed it well and highlights the very point before this Court today:  “To be fearful of vesting Congress, constituted as that body is, with ample authorities for national purposes, appears to me the very climax of popular absurdity and madness. Could Congress exert them for the detriment of the public without injuring themselves in an equal or greater proportion? Are not their interests inseparably connected with those of their constituents? By the rotation of appointment must they not mingle frequently with the mass of citizens? Is it not rather to be apprehended, if they were possessed of the power before described, that the individual members would be induced to use them, on many occasions, very timidly and inefficaciously for fear of losing their popularity and future election?”  George Washington, “To John Jay,” August 15, 1786, The Papers of George Washington, “Confederation Series,” Vol. 4 (1976) at 212–13 (emphasis added).  If the truth is as we apprehend it, that a dedicated group of essentially unelected likeminded people known for extracting vengeance from anyone who dares question them got in a private room at a private meeting and decided the fate of the world’s songwriters was their unelected remit, then this is not even a vote fulfilling the tyranny of the majority because there was no vote and there was no majority—just tyranny.  de Tocqueville admonishes that “[t]he despotism of faction is not less to be dreaded than the despotism of an individual.”  Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. 2, Ch. XIV (1840) at 289.

                  [17] This is particularly relevant in the case of a songwriter who has entered one of the various publishing, co-publishing or administration agreements commonly in use in the music business.  If publisher X intends to be bound by the settlement, yet does not act under its own name in the settlement, songwriters “signed” to publisher X have no way of knowing if they are to be bound.  While certain relationships can be inferred, it seems that there should be clarity regarding the parties to such a watershed agreement.

                  [18] Letter from Hon. Lloyd Doggett to Librarian of Congress Dr. Carla Hayden and Register of Copyrights Shira Perlmutter (July 13, 2021), available at https://thetrichordist.files.wordpress.com/2021/07/letter-library-of-congress-register-of-copyrights-7.13.21.pdf hereafter “Letter”.

                  [19] “Concurrent with the settlement, the Joint Record Company Participants and NMPA have separately entered into a memorandum of understanding addressing certain negotiated licensing processes and late fee waivers.” Motion at 3.

            [20] The “MOU” description and “late fee waiver” reference brings to mind another late fee “MOU” being the NMPA Late Fee Program available at http://www.nmpalatefeesettlement.com/mou2/index.php.  If this MOU is a version of that MOU, it could be a substantial sum.  (“The Record Companies have represented there is approximately $275 million in “pending and unmatched” accrued royalties (the “P&U Royalties”) that have not been distributed to the music publishers. In exchange for waivers of certain late fees through 2012, the Record Companies must comply with the provisions of the MOU, including paying participating music publishers and foreign societies their respective market share of accrued P&U Royalties.”  Available at http://www.nmpalatefeesettlement.com/group_1/summary.pdf)

                  [21] For example, see the Songclaims.com portal used to implement the Spotify class action settlement.

                  [22] 17 U.S.C. §§ 112, 114(d)(2).

                 [23] 17 U.S.C. §§ 115(b)(1) and (3).

                  [24] It is worth noting that we have been unable to find any reference to the unitary buyer/seller in any of the public comments or legislative history regarding the Music Modernization Act.  In fact, the NMPA’s “pitch sheet” entitled Music Modernization Act (MMA): Bringing Songwriters into the Digital Age (Dec. 28, 2017) states that the new MMA rate standard establishes “[r]ates based on what a willing buyer and a willing seller would agree to reflect market negotiations” in contrast to the 801(b) standard that resulted in “below-market rates.”

                  [25] Digital Culture Media and Sport Committee, Economics of Music Streaming (Second Report of Session 2021-22), UK Parliament (July 15, 2021) available at https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/6739/documents/71977/default/.

                  [26] Id. at 3 and 105.

                  [27] Id. at 71 (emphasis added).

                  [28] Tina Benitez-Eves, Vinyl Record Sales up 108.2% in First Half of 2021, American Songwriter (July 16, 2021) (“For the past 15 years, vinyl record sales have seen consecutive growth, despite the continued uptick of digital consumption in the U.S. and drop in sales and backup in production due to the pandemic.”)  available at https://americansongwriter.com/vinyl-record-sales-up-108-2-in-first-half-of-2021/;  Sarah Whitten, Music Fans Pushed Sales of Vinyl Albums Higher, Outpacing CDs, Even As Pandemic Sidelined Stadium Tours, CNBC (July 14, 2021) (“Music consumption in the first half of the year has remained robust even without the sold-out stadium tours, according to a new report. While on-demand audio streaming is up 15%, consumers are also looking to own more tangible collectibles like vinyl albums, which continue to surpass CD sales. In the first six months of 2021, 19.2 million vinyl albums were sold, outpacing CD volume of 18.9 million, according to MRC Data, an analytics firm that specializes in collecting data from the entertainment and music industries.”) available at https://www.msn.com/en-us/entertainment/news/music-fans-pushed-sales-of-vinyl-albums-higher-outpacing-cds-even-as-pandemic-sidelined-stadium-tours/ar-AAM6S31; Ed Christman, Audio Streams Up 15%, Vinyl Sales Double in First Half of 2021, Billboard (July 15, 2021) (“Vinyl sales, which have grown for the past decade, more than doubled between January and June, up 108.2% to 19.2 million from 9.2 million in the first six months of last year. Even CD sales, which have been steadily and precipitously declining, posted a modest 2.2% gain, to 18.9 million units. The only serious loss was in digital sales: Album downloads fell 26.8%, to 12.92 million, while track sales dropped 20.3%, to 101.8 million. But physical sales rose so much that, for the first time in years, total album sales rose, by 12.6% to 51.26 million.”) available at https://www.msn.com/en-us/music/news/audio-streams-up-15-vinyl-sales-double-in-first-half-of-2021/ar-AAM9Sk7); Sam Willings, Sainsbury’s Supermarket Will Stop Selling CDs, Sale of Vinyl Records Will Continue (July 13, 2021) (“A spokesperson for the British Phonographic Industry (BPI) told the BBC that “The CD has proved exceptionally successful for nearly 40 years and remains a format of choice for many music fans who value sound quality, convenience and collectability.”  They continued: “Although demand has been following a long-term trend as consumers increasingly transition to streaming, resilient demand is likely to continue for many years, enhanced by special editions and other collectable releases.”) available at https://www.musictech.net/news/sainsburys-supermarket-will-stop-selling-cds-sale-of-vinyl-records-to-continue/; Andre Paine, Record Store Day set to deliver another summer boost for vinyl sales, Music Week (July 15, 2021)(“ Participating shops will be expecting queues from the early hours as fans and record collectors seek out rare and exclusive vinyl titles being released especially for the day.”) available at https://www.musicweek.com/labels/read/record-store-day-set-to-deliver-another-summer-boost-for-vinyl-sales/083710; Sage Anderson, Barnes & Noble ‘Vinyl Weekend’ Launches With Grateful Dead, Fleetwood Mac Exclusives, Rolling Stone (July 15, 2021)(“Barnes & Noble may be known for their cozy bookstores and massive collective of great reads across all genres, but the retailer has also just announced the return of their fan-favorite “Vinyl Weekend,” which offers dozens of limited-edition records and exclusive in-store and online specials.”) available at https://www.rollingstone.com/product-recommendations/lifestyle/barnes-and-noble-vinyl-turntable-sale-1197904/. 

                  [29] L.B. Cantrell, NSAI Songwriters Respond to Criticism of Decision not to Challenge Physical Mechanical Rates, Music Row (June 2, 2021)(“Based on industry revenue analysis, it is anticipated that physical mechanical royalties will amount to less than 1% of the total mechanical royalty revenue in the United States during 2023-2028, the rate period this CRB proceeding covers.”) available at https://musicrow.com/2021/06/nsai-songwriters-respond-to-criticism-of-decision-not-to-challenge-physical-royalty-rates/.

                  [30] Erin Osman, “It’s a Total Nightmare”: Problems at Direct Shot Distributing Has Made New Vinyl and CDs Scarce, Billboard (Dec. 18, 2019) (“Since April, record stores and labels have been plagued by a distribution bottleneck that began when Warner Music Group moved its physical product to Direct Shot Distributing (DSD). The change made DSD, which also has contracts with Universal and Sony, one of the largest distributors of physical music in the country. The problem became apparent on April 13 — Record Store Day, the busiest and most profitable day of the year for many retailers — when some stores didn’t receive the exclusive releases they had ordered. Since then, the problem has gotten worse.”), available at https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/8546794/direct-shot-distributing-problems-vinyl-cds-physical-product.

                  [31] Allison Hussey, A Major Music Distributor Has Stifled Vinyl Sales for Record Stores and Indie Distributors, Sources Say, Pitchfork (Dec. 19, 2019) available at https://pitchfork.com/thepitch/a-major-music-distributor-has-stifled-vinyl-sales-for-record-stores-and-indie-labels-sources-say/.

                  [32] David Rowan, Daniel Ek: Europe’s Greatest Digital Influencer Tops Wired 100, Wired (May 16, 2014) available at https://www.wired.co.uk/article/wired-100-daniel-ek.

                  [33] “Thriving on scorn from the establishment since 2015”, http://www.artistrightswatch.com               

[34] Artist Rights Watch, Songwriter Mechanical Royalty Income Questionnaire June-July 2021 to be made available at http://www.artistrightswatch.com and results available from the commenters (N=54).

                  [35] https://recordmecca.com/about/

                  [36] Available from the authors.

                  [37] See, e.g., https://recordstoreday.com

                  [38] See, e.g., Artist Rights Watch Podcast Episode 1 “Frozen Mechanicals” available at https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/the-artist-rights-watch/id1574250584; The Trichordist.com “frozen mechanicals” category https://thetrichordist.com/category/frozen-mechanicals/

                  [39] We are likewise unaware of any provision of the Copyright Act or regulations promulgated there under that provides for a sales-based determination of any particular rate.  Such an argument appears to be exactly what underlies the NMPA and NSAI acquiescence to frozen rates but it simply is not the law that the fewer phonorecords sold the lower the royalty rate that the CRB may set.

                  [40] There may be other side agreements that are not disclosed in the Motion.

                  [41] Ed Christman, Less Could Be More:  Why Merlin’s Deal with Pandora May Pay Off, Billboard (Dec. 11, 2014) (emphasis added).

                  [42] U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI Inflation Calculator available at https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm.

                  [43] The minimum statutory royalty rate in effect during the 1992-93 period was 6.25¢.  U.S. Copyright Office, Mechanical License Royalty Rates (Sept. 2018) available at https://www.copyright.gov/licensing/m200a.pdf.

                  [44] Respectfully, the Congress missed an opportunity to strike a blow for fairness in the Copyright Act of 1976 when it failed to index the 2¢ rate retroactively and instead treated a 70-year wage and price control as thought there were nothing to see here.  Had Congress indexed the rate retroactively and then increased the rate prospectively based on value and indexed to inflation, songwriters would be exponentially better off.  When songwriters complain to the CRB that they struggle to make a living, it is this decades long dark hole of the 2¢ rate freeze that is a major contributing factor and apparently punishment for some long-forgotten original sin.  While the CRB is not tasked to fix all the songwriters’ financial woes, an argument could be made that it is at least partly responsible for fixing the ones cause by the government or at least not making it any worse by taking actions such as freezing mechanical royalty rates for twenty years.

The @ArtistRights Watch Podcast: Episode 1: The Frozen Mechanicals Crisis with Guest @CrispinHunt

Nik Patel, David Lowery, and Chris Castle feature in this podcast where they discuss the current issues of artists’ rights in the music industry. Find the Artist Rights Watch on your favorite podcast platform here https://linktr.ee/artistrightswatchpod Please subscribe, rate and share!

On the first episode of the Artist Rights Watch, Nik Patel, David Lowery, and Chris Castle sit down with Ivors Academy Chair, Crispin Hunt to talk about the frozen mechanical royalties crisis currently playing out in the United States and how it threatens UK songwriters and indeed songwriters around the world.

Crispin gives us his invaluable analysis of how the frozen mechanicals crisis affects songwriters around the world and the highly effective #brokenrecord and #fixstreaming campaigns that Ivors Academy supports in the UK that has lead to a parliamentary inquiry and legislation introduced in the UK Parliament.

The “frozen mechanicals” crisis is rooted in a private deal between big publishers and their big label affiliates to essentially continue the freeze on the already-frozen U.S. mechanical royalty rate paid by the record companies for CDs, vinyl and permanent downloads. The private deal freezes the rate for another five years but does not even account for inflation. Increasing the royalty rate for inflation, does not actually increase songwriter buying power.

The major publishers and labels have asked the Copyright Royalty Board in the US to make their private deal the law and apply that frozen rate to everyone.

In the past, the music industry has experienced a $0.02 mechanical royalty rate that lasted for 70 years, and with the current mechanical royalty rate of $0.091 being set in 2006, advocates hope it’s not a repeat of the past.

In this Artist Rights Watch episode, we cover its numerous implications and consequences such as controlled compositions clauses, the Copyright Royalty Board, CPI and fixed increases, how the UK compares, and potential resolutions.

Below are some links for further reading on frozen mechanicals and Crispin Hunt:

Take the Artist Rights Watch Survey on Mechanical Royalty Rates

How to file your comment with the Copyright Royalty Board on the frozen mechanicals crisis!

Controlled Compositions Clauses and Frozen Mechanicals. Chris Castle

https://musictechpolicy.com/2020/10/10/controlled-compositions-clauses-and-frozen-mechanicals/embed/#?secret=Rftsxg1vsl

What Would @TaylorSwift13 and Eddie @cue Do? One Solution to the Frozen Mechanical Problem. Chris Castle

https://musictech.solutions/2021/05/13/what-would-taylor-and-eddie-do-one-solution-to-the-frozen-mechanical-problem/embed/#?secret=N8n44nO4gn

The Trichordist posts on frozen mechanicals

https://thetrichordist.com/category/frozen-mechanicals/

The Ivors Academy Joins the No Frozen Mechanicals Campaign

Year-End 2020 RIAA Revenue Statistics

Click to access 2020-Year-End-Music-Industry-Revenue-Report.pdf

Below are our social links and terms of use:

Crispin: https://twitter.com/crispinhunt

Chris: http://www.christiancastle.com/chris-castle

David: https://twitter.com/davidclowery?s=20

https://www.instagram.com/davidclowery/

Nik: https://www.instagram.com/nikpatelmusic/

Website: https://artistrightswatch.com
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/artistrightswatch
Twitter: https://twitter.com/ArtistRights?s=20

Terms of Use: https://artistrightswatchdotcom.files.wordpress.com/2021/01/arw-podcast-terms-of-use-v-1-i-1.pdf