Physical/Download Song Rate Increases, No Change for Streaming

Thanks to the efforts of the “frozen mechanicals” commenters to the Copyright Royalty Judges and the labels who agreed to the structure, there is now an annual cost of living adjustment (called a “COLA”) for the statutory mechanical royalty paid for songs on physical (like vinyl or CDs) and permanent downloads. Starting this month and going forward, that COLA is made by the Copyright Royalty Judges in December, effective the next January 1.

Remember that the frozen minimum statutory mechanical rate was 9.1¢ since 2006 but increased to 12¢ effective 1/1/23.

The Copyright Royalty Judges announced the new COLA rate yesterday which has increased to a minimum rate of 12.40¢ for recordings of songs with a running time of 5 minutes or less, and a per-minute long-song rate of 2.39¢. Depending on how frequently you get accountings, you could see that COLA rate increase show up on your next statements for sales after 1/1/24.

Remember, the purpose of having a COLA is to preserve the buying power of the government’s royalty because songwriters get one opportunity every five years to negotiate compensation for mechanical royalties. Of course, the COLA rate may get distorted by “controlled compositions” clauses in artist agreements, so check your contracts.

Also remember that the rate paid for physical and downloads is actually paid by the record companies as the “licensee” who agreed to the COLA on royalties they pay.

The rate paid for streaming is paid by the digital music platforms like Spotify, Apple, Google, Amazon, Tidal and others.

There is no COLA adjustment for streaming even though same songs and same time period and even though the MLC gets a guaranteed annual increase in its “administrative assessment”.

2024 rate. For the year 2024 for every physical phonorecord and Permanent Download the Licensee makes and distributes or authorizes to be made and distributed, the royalty rate payable for each work embodied in the phonorecord or Permanent Download shall be either 12.40 cents or 2.39 cents per minute of playing time or fraction thereof, whichever amount is larger.

The Coming COLA Adjustment for Mechanical Royalties on Physical and Downloads

By Chris Castle

We’re about to experience an historical event—the U.S. government’s statutory mechanical rate for physical and permanent downloads will increase twice in 12 months.  This is because the record companies agreed in “Phonorecords IV” to raise the statutory mechanical rate from 9.1¢ to 12¢ for physical and permanent downloads (with corresponding long-song royalties) effective January 1, 2023.

This is quite a change from the frozen rate that lasted for 17 years.  Not only did the labels agree to increase the rate to 12¢, they agreed to index that increased rate to inflation annually starting in 2024.

Indexing requires increasing the 12¢ rate to current inflation based on a “COLA” or “cost of living adjustment” by applying an uplift formula to the 12¢ rate.  That formula itself is a function of the Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index which itself comes in a number of varieties. A common version of CPI that the record companies agreed to is the “Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (U.S. City Average, all items),” or “CPI-U.”   The CPI-U is weighted toward the cost of living for urban consumers.  (Compare CPI-U to the “CPI-W” or Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers which is used by Social Security, for example.)

We have experienced a time of high inflation for the last few years and given the indicators, we are likely to continue to suffer with inflation for years to come.  So the labels’ agreement to a COLA protects the purchasing power of the hard-won mechanical royalty for physical and downloads and may end up being a critical deal point over the 5 year rate period covered by Phonorecords IV.

The statutory basis for the COLA is found in 37 CFR §385.11(a)(2):

Annual rate adjustment. The Copyright Royalty Judges shall adjust the royalty rates in paragraph (a)(1) of this section each year to reflect any changes occurring in the cost of living as determined by the most recent Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (U.S. City Average, all items) (CPI–U) published by the Secretary of Labor before December 1 of the preceding year. The calculation of the rate for each year shall be cumulative based on a calculation of the percentage increase in the CPI–U from the CPI–U published in November, 2022 (the Base Rate) and shall be made according to the following formulas: for the per-work rate, (1 + (Cy−Base Rate)/Base Rate) × 12¢, rounded to the nearest tenth of a cent; for the per-minute rate, (1 + (Cy−Base Rate)/Base Rate) × 2.31¢, rounded to the nearest hundredth of a cent; where Cy is the CPI–U published by the Secretary of Labor before December 1 of the preceding year. The Judges shall publish notice of the adjusted fees in the Federal Register at least 25 days before January 1. The adjusted fees shall be effective on January 1.

One must have the published CPI-U in order to make the COLA calculation.  The CPI is published by Bureau of Labor Statistics (technically “by the Secretary of Labor”) on a regularly published schedule.  If the regulations require that the relevant CPI-U must be published before December 1, that will be the CPI-U for October to be published next week on November 14 because the CPI-U for November won’t be published until December 12 (which of course is after December 1).

According to the Cleveland Federal Reserve, month over month inflation for November is projected to be pretty much the same as October.  So based on the Phonorecords IV Subpart B formula, the minimum statutory rate will likely increase from 12¢ to approximately 12.41¢ starting January 1.

Keep an eye out for the October CPI-U next week when it is announced by BLS at 8:30am ET on November 14.  The Copyright Royalty Board is to publish the new COLA-adjusted mechanical rate in the Federal Register, on or about December 8.  And remember that the same calculation with then-current CPI-U will apply in December 2024, 2025, 2026 and 2027.

Remember, this COLA rate increase only applies to physical and permanent download configurations, not to streaming.  This is because the services refused to engage on the topic.  There’s really no good explanation for why the streaming services refused to give a COLA.  A COLA really should be mandatory given that the government essentially takes away the songwriters’ ability to bargain for their inflation expectations during a five year rate period.

@RepDarrellIssa Holds a Hearing on the Mechanical Licensing Collective

By Chris Castle

U.S. Representative Darrell Issa and the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet that he chairs will hold a field hearing on Tuesday, June 27, 2023, at 10:00 a.m. CT at Belmont University, Gabhart Student Center, in Nashville, Tennessee. The hearing, entitled “Five Years Later – The Music Modernization Act,” will focus on the entire blanket licensing regime added to the Copyright Act by the MMA to (1) administer blanket mechanical licenses for “covered activities” (largely streaming) and (2) to collect and distribute compulsory mechanical licensing royalties. 

Most importantly, the IP Subcommittee website tells us that “[t]he hearing will also explore whether the legislation is operating as intended by Congress and consider reforms.”  So why is this happening and why is it happening right now given everything else that Congress is dealing with.

Congress considers whether to renew The MLC, Inc.‘s designation as the mechanical licensing collective. If that sentence seems contradictory, remember those are two different things: the mechanical licensing collective is the statutory body that administers most of the compulsory license under Section 115 of the Copyright Act that was the entirety of Title I of the Music Modernization Act (aka the Harry Fox Preservation Act). The MLC, Inc. is the private company that was “designated” by Congress through its Copyright Office to do the work of the mechanical licensing collective. This is like the form of a body that performs a function (the mechanical licensing collective) and having to animate that form with actual humans (The MLC, Inc.). The MLC, Inc. was designated by the Copyright Office in 2019.

Congress reviews the work product of The MLC, Inc. every five years (17 USC §115(d)(3)(B)(ii)) to decide if Congress should allow The MLC, Inc. to continue another five years. That is, Congress has the right to fire The MLC, Inc. and find someone else if they fail to perform. Hence, “Five Years Later” in the title of the field hearing. This process is called “designation” or “redesignation” and is performed for Congress by the U.S. Copyright Office in their soft oversight role.

That five year period is actually up next year, so Congress may be getting an early start to identify performance benchmarks for The MLC, Inc. so that the Copyright Office doesn’t have to wing it. If you have some thoughts about what The MLC, Inc. could be doing better or is doing well, you have a chance to write to your representative or even members of the subcommittee before (or after) the June 27 hearing and let them know.

The witness list is well-chosen and seems unlikely to produce the usual propaganda from the controlled opposition that the lobbyists usually try to spoon feed to lawmakers:

I have a few concerns myself. 

  1. Investment Policy: According to its 2021 tax return, the MLC, Inc. was at that time holding more than $650 million in publicly traded securities. According to the MLC, Inc.’s annual report (at p. 4), this sum seems to include the $424 million of black box monies that the MLC, Inc. received in 2021. Congress is entitled to know exactly how this money is handled, where it resides and who is responsible for making investment decisions.

    Congress should consider whether all black box sums and unspent operating costs advanced by blanket licensees should be held in a bank account controlled by the US government so that there is no confusion if Congress fires The MLC, Inc. or any successor.

    Congress should also consider whether the same fiduciary duties apply to The MLC, Inc.’s management of the black box as would apply to a pension fund (under ERISA) or comparable duty. (There’s lots of pension funds and even banks with less than $600 million in assets and they are all regulated.) At least with a pension fund the fund trustees know who they owe money to; The MLC, Inc. seems like it should have an even higher responsibility to be good stewards of money it owes to the very unknown songwriters Congress tasked it with finding, thus cementing the moral hazard.  

    It goes without saying that the infamous “Hoffa Clause” in the MMA should be repealed (17 U.S.C. § 115 (d)(7)(C)). The Hoffa Clause allows the collective to dip into the black box to pay its expenses if the millions of the administrative assessment paid by the blanket licensees just isn’t quite enough.
  2. Succession Plan: What if Congress did fire The MLC, Inc.? Is there a succession plan in place that would allow the seamless transfer to a new collective of databases, operating software, cash on hand, and of course the black box? If there is a succession plan in place, then perhaps Mr. Ahrend should bring it with him to Chairman Issa’s hearing for the records. If not, perhaps he could draft one. In any event, Mr. Ahrend should have ready answers to at least some questions about a succession plan should the Subcommittee ask him. After all, the lobbyists wrote the bill and the five year review language was written into the earliest drafts so he should expect a few questions about what happens. Particularly since the Subcommittee has announced that they want to know “…whether the legislation is operating as intended by Congress and consider reforms.”
  3. Nondisclosure Agreements: I am struck by the fact that there have been no leaks of information about the black box, investment policy, or even life at The MLC, Inc. This usually means that there are nondisclosure agreements in place that scare people into silence–along with a healthy dose of intimidation in a small and incestuous industry when it’s likely that your employer is on the board of directors. Maybe not, but Congress may want to find out what these people are up to so it can decide if it wants to let them keep doing it. This may seem like a small issue, but either people aren’t talking because they have nothing to say or people are talking but nobody will print the story.
  4. Songwriter Directors and Geographical Diversity: The hearing may provide a good opportunity for the Subcommittee to look into how the collective’s controversial board composition is working out, not to mention the membership levels in the confusing by laws of The MLC, Inc. For example, I for one really see no reason to continue the concept of non-voting directors on the board, and Congress could just eliminate that role. One need only look to other collectives and PROs in the US and around the world for examples. A non-voting board member is a close analog to a “board observer” which is usually someone appointed by an investor to essentially spy on the board.  

    Similarly, it must be said that all the board members are either from New York, Nashville, Los Angeles or are lobbyists from the Imperial City. There are songwriters all over the country and internationally. Since the collective is really a quasi governmental organization, it is entirely in the remit of Congress to increase transparency and fairness as well as diversity. This could be accomplished by requiring an equal number of songwriter and publisher directors and having them come from states or regions with a big music contribution to America such as one of the reservations ,Atlanta, Chicago, Houston, Miami, New Orleans, Tulsa or Appalachia.  
  5. Revisit the Compulsory License: There is, of course, the threshold question of whether the compulsory license should be continued at all. This five year examination really should include this fundamental review rather than just blindly pushing forward with the compulsory license. (I discussed this in some detail in a separate post.) One songwriter has suggested that the Copyright Office reprise another study on the continued viability of the entire compulsory license system and I think he’s got a point there. Perhaps the Subcommittee could task the Copyright Office with conducting such a study as a finding of the field hearing. Those studies allow the public to comment without fear or favor which would be a breath of fresh air. Congress could then hear from more people whose jobs depend on the system working well resulting in the payments to songwriters that Congress wanted rather than the system just stumbling on resulting in high salaries to the operators and little to no transparency.

    Let’s see what happens at the field hearing.  You can watch it here courtesy of the YouTube monopoly.



    This post first appeared in MusicTechPolicy

Trickle-Down Streaming Mechanical Royalties Will be Be Up for Discussion

You may have noticed that a cost of living adjustment for statutory royalties was front and center in the recent (and still ongoing) physical mechanicals rate setting. Unfortunately, the idea of a COLA seems to have disappeared in the streaming mechanicals proceeding.

Note that it’s different music users on the physical mechanicals than on streaming. The physical mechanicals are paid by record companies and streaming mechanicals are paid by some of the biggest corporations in history, namely Amazon, Apple and Google and other wealthy public companies like Spotify and Pandora/SiriusXM. All these companies have market capitalizations greater than the gross national product of some countries. 

You may have also noticed that after years of frozen subscription rates, Apple is the first of the streaming subscription services to raise rates by $1 on several of its services including Apple Music. Tim Ingham is asking if Spotify will follow (you know, one of those price fixing agreements inferred from conduct). Who knows, but what’s interesting about this is the effect it will have on streaming mechanical rates, or more pointedly the effect that the Big Tech cartel would like you to think it will have.

The calculation for streaming mechanicals is absurdly complicated. You do have to wonder which of the genii came up with that one. About the only thing that is certain is that the negotiation of that rate every five years (and judicial appeals occasionally) guarantees employment for lots of lawyers and lobbyists on both sides, although definitely skewed toward Big Tech’s share of the 46 lawyers on the docket.

The streaming rates are so bizarre that the Copyright Royalty Judges seem to have lost trust in the process and have issued two separate orders instructing the participants in the streaming mechanical proceedings to either disclose or “certify” that they have come clean with the Judges as to any side deals that may have artificially lowered the rates–the second order makes for interesting reading.

Unlike the physical mechanical, the settling parties rejected a cost of living adjustment in these historically inflationary times. Why they rejected a COLA is hard to understand aside from the fact that they thought they could get away with it.

One thing that is clear, however, is that any argument that a COLA is not necessary with streaming mechanicals because the rate is theoretically based on increases or decreases in revenue is a particularly insulting form of trickle down gaslighting. 

It must be said that the record company group of music users that pays the physical mechanical rate voluntarily agreed a COLA on their rates that is currently pending approval by the Judges. There really is no excuse for the streaming services to rely on the discredited trickle down theory to pawn off their Rube Goldberg royalty structure on songwriters for streaming mechanicals.

A Response to A2IM’s Objection to the New Statutory Mechanical Rates: Part 2

By Chris Castle

This post first appeared on MusicTechPolicy, continued from Part 1

The American Association of Independent Music, the independent label trade association, filed comments with the Copyright Royalty Board opposing increasing the mechanical royalty to songwriters from the “frozen rates” to the 12¢ (plus cost of living adjustment) settlement rate of the participating record companies with the NMPA and NSAI. I wrote a reply to the A2IM comment that was timely filed with the CRB–barely. I will repost that comment in a few parts here on MTP. As I had about 10 minutes to write the comment due to the lateness of the A2IM filing, I will add some bracketed language to make it a bit less inside baseball.

Unfortunately, A2IM chose not to participate in the Phonorecords IV proceeding and came in a bit late to the party complaining of the check. Nobody stopped them from participating; it appears they put it all on red and it came up black. This is important because unlike independent songwriters who cannot afford the cost of participating at the CRB hearings, A2IM could have participated but chose not to.

As I told the Judges in my comment, I will focus on a few issues raised by A2IM regarding the CRB settlement process in general, the penny rate structure of the mechanical royalty system in the United States, and their proposal that mechanical licensing for physical configurations be handed over to the Mechanical Licensing Collective.

The Longer Table

I actually was pleased to join A2IM at their annual Indie Week conference recently in New York on a panel devoted to this very topic.  I am well aware that they believe their members will be disproportionately affected by the increase in cost although I have not seen the data.  After many years in the music business, I will take on faith for purposes of this letter that they are correct.

I completely concur that the negotiation process for CRB needs a relook if not an overhaul.  I made the point on the A2IM panel that David Lowery and I intend to host a conference devoted largely to this subject [on November 15] at the University of Georgia at Athens.  Dr. Lowery and I are both of a mind that this issue needs to be vetted by the Copyright Office in their roundtable format.

However, I do not concur that the Subpart B resolution should be derailed at the 11th hour because of these structural issues that lawmakers no doubt will need to resolve.  The time for A2IM to have made their views known in Phonorecords IV has long passed.  They had the opportunity to participate in the proceeding, which individual songwriters could not afford to do, and they did not.  They had the opportunity to comment on the first and second comment periods for what became the rejected settlement and they did not.  They had the opportunity to insert themselves in the second settlement and appear not to have done so until filing a comment on the last day at the 11thhour.

Derailing the settlement for this purpose at the 11th hour is inappropriate.  Whether the Judges can even accomplish what is asked of them, I respectfully leave to Your Honors to decide, but I do think there’s a question of authority here.  I do support including all these topics being on the table for Phonorecords V as do many other commenters.

What is the Actual Cost to Labels of the New Rates?

While I am prepared to take disproportionate impact on faith, I am less prepared to take disproportionate financial impact without more data.  There is an assumption that A2IM labels all will have a one-to-one increase in costs because of the new rates, whatever they end up being.  I’m not so sure about that and would want to know a few things including the following.

Many indie labels operate on a revenue share basis with their artists (or licensors).  In those revenue share deals, the artist or licensor is paid a percentage of revenue that includes all mechanical royalties.  In that structure, the new rates have arguably zero impact on the [independent] label.

Because of rate fixing dates in deals [with controlled compositions clauses] where the label does pay the mechanicals, the new rates would only apply to records delivered during the rate period, i.e., after January 1, 2023.  Term recording artist agreements would typically include a controlled compositions clause as the Judges have noted in the Withdrawal Notice.  In such an arrangement, the label would be paying a modest increase and could easily tell the artist that unless the artist-songwriter agreed to take still lower rates based on the previously frozen rates, the label would be unable to release their records.

A2IM does make a good point about the bull-headedness of the DSPs on permanent download rates.  Perhaps the Judges could refer this issue to the Register for subsequent referral to the Department of Justice Antitrust Division to investigate these pricing practices.  Congress seems focused on these kinds of issues at the moment.

[It is unfair for A2IM to complain of being excluded from settlement negotiations by the labels who did participate in the proceedings and who did negotiate a settlement with the NMPA publishers who also participated in the proceedings. Participating in the proceedings is a threshold condition for participating in a settlement of the proceedings. It’s hardly the case that the major labels conspired against the indies this time. If A2IM labels were concerned about being included in these negotiations there are a number of steps they could have taken, starting with participating in the bifurcated Subpart B proceeding–a much less expensive proposition than the streaming side.

There is also a threshold question–that A2IM does not really address–as to whether the CRB has the authority to unilaterally change U.S. mechanical licensing structure that Congress initiated in 1909 and has been based on a penny rate ever since, not to mention hundreds of thousands of term recording artist agreements and licenses incorporating those statutory rates. The entire US recording industry is built on statutory rates and controlled compositions clauses, not to mention the valuations of music publishing catalogs. 

That change requested by A2IM is a question of such “magnitude and consequence” that it should require Congress to act based on both the CRB’s statutory authority, the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent holding in West Virginia vs. EPA as well as common sense. Not to mention there are other reasons why getting a CRB case before the Supreme Court could backfire and disrupt a process that in other important ways is working quite well.]

A Response to A2IM’s Objection to the New Statutory Mechanical Rates: Part 1

By Chris Castle

This post first appeared on MusicTechPolicy

A2IM, the independent label trade association, filed comments with the Copyright Royalty Board opposing increasing the mechanical royalty to songwriters from the “frozen rates” to the 12¢ (plus cost of living adjustment) settlement rate of the participating record companies with the NMPA and NSAI. I wrote a reply to the A2IM comment that was timely filed with the CRB–barely. I will repost that comment in a few parts here on MTP. As I had about 10 minutes to write the comment due to the lateness of the A2IM filing, I will add some bracketed language to make it a bit less inside baseball.

Unfortunately, A2IM did not participate in the Phonorecords IV proceeding and came in a bit late to the party complaining of the check. Nobody stopped them from participating; it appears they put it all on red and it came up black.

As I told the Judges, I will focus on a few issues raised by the American Association of Independent Music regarding the CRB settlement process in general, the penny rate structure of the mechanical royalty system in the United States, and their proposal that mechanical licensing for physical configurations be handed over to the Mechanical Licensing Collective.

The Clean Slate

A2IM raises the idea of compensating songwriters on a percentage of wholesale basis which is how mechanicals are paid in many if not most other countries.  I understand why labels favor this structure but I also understand why publishers and songwriters do not.

First, I am of the view that a percentage of wholesale royalty is incompatible with a compulsory license.  [To my knowledge, the European countries operating on a percentage of wholesale basis do not have a compulsory licensing regime.] Imposing a compulsory obligation to have a third party set the “just compensation” for rights the government takes from the songwriter has that unconstitutional ring to it [see 5th Amendment and Takings by Prof. Richard Epstein, an oldie but goodie].

And that really is the problem with a percentage of wholesale royalty—it allows the conflicted record company to call the tune [for songwriters] which is the very definition of moral hazard.  Having said all that, I am happy to have a conversation about a clean slate and reimagining of the entire structure as long as it really is a clean slate.  Of course, that will mean throwing away the entire controlled composition structure.

It must be said that in countries with a percentage of dealer price mechanical royalty there [are] no controlled composition terms at all.  So if we are to have the discussion, let’s have all the discussion for all the record companies including catalog.  If we want to be like Europe, let’s be European.

We cannot overlook that changing that compensation system will throw royalty compliance examinations of every record company onto the table with great force.  How can songwriters be asked to give up a system that has been in place since 1909 without knowing whether they have gotten a straight count heretofore?

It must also be said that if A2IM members feel justified in changing the entire U.S. mechanical rate system, there is nothing stopping them from creating such terms in their new signings under controlled compositions clauses.  In fact, such arrangements might be a good laboratory to experiment with these alternative structures.

[To be continued.]

Do Songwriters Want the Cheese or to Escape the Trap in Phonorecords IV?

By Chris Castle

Here it is.  The US economic data is undeniably leading to a stagflationary outlook reminiscent of the 1970s.  If you don’t have first hand knowledge of the inflation that started under Nixon and Arthur Burns, burned through Ford and Carter and finally came to rest with Federal Reserve Chair Paul Volker and President Ronald Reagan that ultimately resolved in the low inflation that began trending downward in 1983, trust me; it was awful.  

This is why it is insane–if not actually cruel–to force songwriters to take a fixed five year mechanical rate with no downside inflation protection in the form of a cost-of-living adjustment. What is bizarre is that this just happened in the streaming mechanical for the Phonorecords IV proceeding, in case you didn’t hear it over the sound of the backslapping.

It appears that songwriters will get the cost of living adjustment (or “COLA”) on the physical mechanical side–you know, the one the smart people told us was unimportant–but failed to get it on the streaming mechanical side which the smart people tell us is critical to the continuation of life as we know it. Even though it certainly looks more likely than not that growth of the money supply and government debt produces the rocket fuel for the inflation that took 1200 points off of the DJIA in one day. 1970s all over again, including James Taylor crooning “Fire and Rain.”

But economists are beginning to remind us that what makes anyone think the 1970s is the worst it can get?  There’s a tendency to think of 1970s stagflation as a downside boundary.  It’s not.  It just happens to be the worst sustained economic times in living memory as the Depression-era Greatest Generation settles into the silence of old age.  However, there’s nothing magical about the 1970s. 

As it stands today, over 40 countries already have an inflation rate in the double digits, America is a debtor nation, Wall Street has sold a huge number of jobs off shore, productivity growth is lower than the 1970s and we’ve gone along with the central banks’ zero interest rate policies in the years since the 2008 crash.  The piper must be paid for the Lehman Bros. of this world leading us all over the cliff in the great recession, even though the central banks’ easy money policy has delayed that payback.  All of these are reasons why there must be a cost of living adjustment in any government imposed statutory rate that takes away bargaining rights. But wait, there’s more.

When Federal Reserve Chair Jay Powell changed the Fed’s inflation targeting (remember “transitory inflation”?), he blew an opportunity to start fixing the real problem.  But no more.  The chickens are coming home to roost with increases in interest rates and yet-to-materialize promise of quantitative tightening. Now that Mr. Powell was reconfirmed for another term.

If there’s even a chance—any chance—that 1970s style stagflation and depression-level demand destruction may be the best we can hope for, anyone setting a wage control like the statutory mechanical royalty rate simply cannot order that rate for five years and fail to take into account the potential for a coming inflation spike even if the smart people sign a suicide pact.  Yet this is exactly what just happened with the settlement of the streaming mechanical rates for Phonorecords IV at the Copyright Royalty Board.

Admittedly, the Copyright Royalty Judges are boxed in given the preference for voluntary settlements baked into the Copyright Act.  That gives the smart people far too much credit and fails miserably to allow the Judges to do what judges do—bring contemplative thought to the problem.  This is what judges do, it is not what lobbyists and their lawyers do.  But unless the public raises the failure to include a cost of living adjustment in comments, so far there’s little basis for the Judges to correct the defective settlement.

It is essential that the Judges are allowed to do their job outside the hurley burley of the commercial relationship with the biggest corporations in history whose lawyers are hell-bent on conducting a scorched earth litigation campaign to crush songwriters.  This is especially true of Google, Amazon and Spotify who have demonstrated truly vile behavior during the entire proceeding, a bully-fest beyond category.

George Johnson hit upon a potential solution in his recent comment. If one applies the COLA to the royalty pool after the mind-numbing “greater than/lesser of formula” created by those seeking full employment for lobbyists, lawyers and accountants, that’s actually a pretty elegant solution. I would quibble a little bit with the idea and apply the COLA as an uplift to the actual royalty statement so that the royalty recipients could see how that uplift was arrived at (which in theory would make them less likely to audit the MLC). That “show your work” approach would allow the payee to see how the MLC got there and make it easier to audit upstream for obvious mistakes.

It will also make it easier for the Judges to add the COLA because the building blocks of the calculation won’t change from the voluntary settlement (TCC, revenue share, etc.).

If songwriters are forced to stay in the confines of the statutory license trap, at least a COLA keeps the cheese from melting before their eyes. Plus they’re not required to guess today what the cost of food at home, shelter and gasoline will be five or six years from now.

The Judges would also have the opportunity to bring the services into a new era of fairness and wipe out the bullying of process as punishment that we all had to endure through two different proceedings.

Remember, as you have probably read or realized yourselves, all the US needs is one more good exogenous roundhouse shock to the economy (such as the world abandoning petrodollars for a basket of currency such as the ruble, the renminbi and the real to pick a few out of thin air), and we are in serious economic straights with hyperinflation as the real bugaboo.

Remember also that the US bonds pay interest at less than the inflation rate.

The decline of the dollar as the premier world reserve currency will put a stop to that interest/inflation spread practically overnight. The US government will not be able to borrow from a seemingly bottomless pit of lenders paying US dollars for US bonds at any price for the stability and transferability. What happens then? Probably interest rates will increase–a lot–to make it worth the lender’s money. Which means the debt service will take up an even bigger chunk of the US budget which will give us less to spend on the “Cross of Iron” weaponry that got us into the petrodollar business in the first place. And so it goes.

Songwriters may not be able to do anything tangible to stop cataclysmic economic events, but they can demand at least a bare minimum of downside protection through a COLA.

You may say, why so cynical? I’m not altogether cynical, I hope that I’m just cynical enough. The numbers don’t lie. If you know anyone who was a child during the Great Depression, or is the child of that person, ask them what it was like.

The overarching point is why would you want to take a chance and bet it all on the smart people?

The cheese or the trap. Which will you have?

Streaming Mechanical Complexity Begets Complexity Begets Legal Fees

Remember how the physical mechanical increased from 9.1¢ to 12¢? And it applies to each record sold? If a songwriter got a cut and the artist sold 100 records, the songwriter got $12. That’s $12 today, next month, six months from now. You could plan. You could complain about a statement to the record company. If the record company wanted you to write more songs for their artists, they’d listen and might even fix an error on your statement. Remember: On records and downloads, the record companies pay.

But what about streaming? The record companies don’t pay on streaming, Big Tech pays. The biggest corporations in the world pay: Spotify, Amazon, Apple, Google, Pandora, and their dozens of lawyers. Artist Rights Watch posted a series of Tweets that shows excerpts from the proposed regulations to calculate streaming royalties–and remember this is the one that we’re told is the important one, the one that dozens of lawyers spend millions in legal fees to come up with. It reads kind of like a drunk you can smell a block away but who sits down next do you and asks how do they look for three days?

The first think you realize is that unlike the 12¢ rate for physical, there’s no way anyone call tell a songwriter how much they’re going to make today or next year on a per play. They can’t even tell you how much you’re going to make today for a burger next Tuesday. Or Wednesday. Or Thursday. But one thing you definitely know is that the lawyers are going to make bank writing this crap, appealing this crap, renegotiating this crap. This section here is a big part of what the fight is all about, can you believe it? This is what the Big Boys and Girls think is important and you can understand why. It puts more legal fees on the table and you know who eventually pays for the legal fees one way or another? Take a look in the mirror.

And understand this: If you get a royalty statement for streaming royalties, take a look at the per-stream rate! It usually starts three or four or even five zeros to the right of the decimal place. It’s even worse than the recording royalty. And DIMA wants us to fight among ourselves against the record companies after all this?

@davidclowery and @musictechpolicy Talk Copyright Royalty Board on Who Knew: The Smartest People in the Room

Big thanks to Tom Truitt and the wonderful audience!

David and Chris discuss improvements in the Copyright Royalty Board rules and procedures including:

–A songwriter advocate as a permanent independent representative of songwriter interests and participant in the Phonorecords proceedings with full rights of a participant. All other participants would bear the cost of the advocate. Other participants would be prohibited from using the advocate as a way to engage in overreaching discovery against individual songwriters or their publishers.

–Each participant would be limited to one lawyer representing their interests in the Phonorecords proceedings. This would counteract the current abuses forced upon the CRB and intimidation tactics of Big Tech.

–Songwriters would be permitted to form a bargaining collective with a general antitrust examption.

–Music users who appeal the Judges’ rulings must pay higher rates pending appeal.

–Discovery would be extremely curtailed to protect songwriters from abuses by Big Tech to punish and intimidate songwriters such as that currently being imposed by Google and other Big Tech companies without songwriter consent or even notification.

–Should songwriters get an across-the-board antitrust exemption under competition law (like the Sherman Act)?

Save the date: A2IM Indie Week Panel with @musictechpolicy on the Impact on Indie Labels of Unfreezing Mechanicals

If you are coming to Indie Week, Trichordist readers might enjoy a panel Chris Castle is on to discuss the impact on indie labels of the Great Unfreeze! 

Entitled How the CRB’s Rejection of Frozen Mechanicals Will Affect Your Label?, the panel goes off at 10:30 am ET on Wednesday, June 15 at the New York Law School.

Speakers are Victor Zaraya: Concord (Moderator), Danielle Aguirre: NMPA (National Music Publishers’ Association), Glen Barros: Exceleration, and Chris.

If you want to read up on the issues that caused the Copyright Royalty Board to reject the failed settlement, here’s some background:

Copyright Royalty Board’s Rejection of NMPA, NSAI, Sony, Warner, Universal settlement

Copyright Royalty Board’s Reaction to Second Settlement Proposal by NMPA, NSAI, Sony, Warner and Universal

Survey Results from Songwriter Survey on Frozen Mechanicals

Comments:

Rosanne Cash

Helienne Lindvall, David Lowery, Blake Morgan

David Poe

Abby North, Erin McAnally, Chelsea Crowell

Kevin Casini

NMPA, NSAI, Sony, Warner, Universal Comment with Copy of MOU4

Chris will post about the panel afterward.