No Hits, No Hit Records: The Streaming Mechanicals Poverty Program at the CRB

by Chris Castle

Government intervention into the economy can, and usually does, produce negative externalities (or unanticipated harms). Government interference with price can produce the negative externality of poverty. While we can sue if we are harmed by some negative externalities, we usually can’t sue the government for causing poverty. 

Understanding poverty often considers the government’s interaction with citizens. Do the government’s policies increase poverty or reduce poverty? 

One of those analytical inquiries is whether the government gives the people too much or too little agency in establishing poverty policy. Does poverty policy remember to allow people the ability to have a meaningful effect on their lives and outcomes based on their own efforts and human agency? Or does poverty policy trap them and limit or even take away their agency? 

The Compulsory License as Poverty Program

I can’t think of a better example of the government limiting the outcomes of a class of people than the compulsory mechanical license. Minimum wage tries to influence poverty favorably by establishing a lower bound of fair compensation for employees. Minimum wage policy anticipates that some employers will pay above minimum wage because employees will be able to quit a lower paying job and strive for a higher paying job. 

Employees exercise agency because the government policy does not stop them from doing so and gives them a seat at the table in negotiating their own compensation. Money isn’t the only consideration, but it is a core issue. And employees can walk across the street and get a better paying job. Unlike the minimum wage, the compulsory license places a limit on what the biggest corporations in the world are required to pay a specific class of people–songwriters. 

Neither can I think of a better example of the government working with Big Tech to destroy human agency than the Copyright Royalty Board–which is strangely consistent with Big Tech’s dehumanizing data trafficking business model.

The New Streaming Mechanical Rates

The Copyright Royalty Judges have issued their final ruling on the rates and terms under the government-mandated compulsory license for streaming mechanicals. That ruling is to be published in the Federal Register in the coming days and is based on a settlement among the National Music Publishers Association, Nashville Songwriters International, Amazon, Apple, Google, Pandora, and Spotify.

The CRJs mostly discuss the 20 comments they received on the proposed version of their rule and don’t really spend much time defending why they are adopting the settlement reached by the richest corporations on Earth (and in Earth’s history) on the one hand and–let’s be honest (and we’ll come back to this)–the major publishers on the other hand. The Judges are adopting the deal these parties made essentially because the CRJs can’t find anything unreasonable or illegal about it.

Said another way, the Judges can’t find a reason to take the heat of rejecting it. That’s unfortunate, because they did reject the “frozen mechanicals” settlement as is their role in the Copyright Royalty Board process required by Congress.

I’m not going to argue about the rates and terms of the settlement itself. I could and I know others will, but I’m going to focus on one economic point today: the absence of a cost of living adjustment (or COLA). There are some other points that should also be addressed that are more nuanced and policy oriented which I’ll come to in another post.

It’s important to understand one aspect of the CRB’s procedural nomenclature: Participants and commenters. There is only one individual songwriter who is a participant in Phonorecords IV–a songwriter named George Johnson who represents himself. Being a “participant” means that you are appearing before the Judges as a legal matter. In the case of settlements that the Judges intend to approve and adopt as law, the Judges are required to make those settlements available for public comment which they did. Those comments are posted in the CRB’s docket for the particular proceeding, styled as “Phonorecords IV” in our case today. Note that if the Judges did not make those settlements available, no one who is answerable to the electorate would be involved in the rate setting.

It is important to understand that the voluntary settlement excludes George Johnson from negotiation and drafting of the settlement even though he is a participant. Commenters are also excluded and only find out the terms of the proposed settlement once the Judges post the settlement as a proposed rule and seek public comments.

Unless commenters persuade the Judges to reject a settlement (which MTP reader will recall happened in the “frozen mechanicals” proceeding), this means that the only people who have a meaningful opportunity to affect the outcome are the important people: The National Music Publishers Association, Nashville Songwriters International, Amazon, Apple, Google, Pandora, and Spotify, that is, “Big Tech.”

Nobody else.

It should be noted that the smart money is betting that the next session of Congress will not be a pleasant experience for any of these DSPs based on public statements of a number of Members, including House Judiciary Chairman-select Jordan. It will be easy for songwriters to point to the latest insult in the form of the streaming mechanical ruling as yet another example of that special combination of Big Tech, the compulsory license and the nine most terrifying words in the English language. One novel issue of law at least at the CRB that the Copyright Office may wish to opine on is what happens if one or more participants in a proceeding negotiate an oppressive voluntary agreement but cease to exist when it is put into effect. Just sayin.

But songwriters will be able to point to the poverty-creating externality of the compulsory rate and the human agency-destroying effect of Congress’s Copyright Royalty Board.

The Failure to COLA

As the Judges confirm in the streaming mechanicals ruling, George Johnson and the commenters who opposed the settlement all support some version of a cost of living adjustment applied to the statutory rate. A COLA is the standard government approach to preserving buying power in a number of areas of the economy driven by government intervention including the physical mechanical royalty for the same songs.

However, since the important people did not agree to a COLA as part of their settlement for the streaming mechanical, the Judges evidently believed they were unable to add a COLA in the final rule because it might disturb the “negotiation” by the biggest corporations in commercial history and God know we wouldn’t want to do that. They might get mad and there’s no poverty at Big Tech.

The Judges authority is an issue that one day may be decided in another forum, perhaps even the Supreme Court. I’m not so sure the role of the Judges was to ignore the utility of a COLA and merely scriven into law the deal the lobbyists and lawyers made while ignoring George and all the public comments in this case supporting a COLA.

This is of particular interest because the Judges had just adopted a COLA in Phonorecords IV for physical records and permanent downloads and have adopted COLAs in other compulsory licenses (and have done so for many years). It must be said that one reason there is a COLA in the “Subpart B” proceeding for physical royalties is because the Judges themselves suggested it when they rejected the initial Subpart B settlement. Presumably the Judges could have done the same thing in the streaming mechanicals proceeding despite the tremendous political clout wielded by Big Tech, at least for the moment.

For some reason, the Judges decided not to treat likes alike when it involved the richest corporations on Earth.  This means that the exact same writers with the exact same songs will have the value of the government’s compulsory rate protected by a COLA when exploited on vinyl but not when the exact same song and the exact same writers on the exact same recordings are streamed.

If that’s not arbitrary, I’m looking forward to the explanation. I’m all ears.

Bootstrapping for Rich People

One might think that this unequal treatment wasn’t arbitrary because the Judges are directed by Congress to favor adopting as the law applicable to all songwriters voluntary settlements agreements on rates and terms reached among some or all of the participants in a proceeding like Phonorecords IV. Of course Congress made it so expensive to be a participant in a proceeding (and that negotiation) that it’s likely that if you are both a participant and also a party to any voluntary settlement, you must be one of the rich kids.

What is very interesting about Phonorecords IV is that the proceeding was divided between physical and streaming mechanicals. Although the publisher representatives were the same (NMPA and NSAI), the music users were, of course different: The major labels were in the physical negotiation and the DSPs were in the streaming. Faced with strident opposition from commenters and continued opposition from George Johnson, the major labels came up with a solution that included a COLA and got the publishers to agree. That solution increased the minimum penny rate from 9.1¢ to 12¢ as a base rate with an annual COLA. 

Why this difference between labels and DSPs? Could it be because the labels understand that they are in the age of the songwriter and they need to be certain that songwriters thrive? You know, no hits, no hit records? Could it be because the DSPs are so blinded by leverage, wealth and political power that they and their THIRTY SIX LAWYERS lack this understanding?

The label deal was acceptable to a lot of people, albeit begrudgingly in some cases, but it closed. And the deal was a step toward what I would call the primary goal of government rate setting–stop bullying songwriters with insulting rates while repeating nonsense talking points that nobody in the trenches believes for a second. It should not be forgotten that the label deal also came with a renewed commitment to finding a way toward a longer table with more people at it to negotiate these deals in the future. We’ll see, but the labels should expect to be reminded about this in the future.

But–nothing like this common sense approach to inclusion happened on the streaming side with DSPs. Why not? Probably because the rich kids were calling the shots and did not give a hoot about what the songwriters thought. They used their situational leverage as participants throughout the Phonorecords IV proceeding to jam through an insulting deal no matter how much they embarrassed themselves in the process. The conduct of the DSPs–and did I mention their THIRTY SIX LAWYERS–was the complete opposite of how the major labels conducted themselves.

You may notice that I refer to the DSPs and the labels as calling the shots in these negotiations. There’s a very simple reason for that–the government has put its thumb on the scale because of the compulsory license. Songwriters can’t say “no” (much less “Hell, no”), so are forced to fight a rear guard action because the outcome is predetermined–unless the settling parties do something to change that outcome. To their great credit, the labels did. But to their great–and highly predictable–shame the DSPs–and did I mention their THIRTY SIX LAWYERS–didn’t. The way the government has constructed the CRB procedures songwriters are thrown into the arena to engage in what amounts to slow motion begging and managed decline.

When the Judges’ ruling is subject to legal review, this arbitrary distinction may be difficult to defend and the Judges certainly don’t put much effort into that defense in their ruling. They say, for example:

[T]he Judges observe the broad increases within the Settlement, including the headline percentage rate applicable to Service Revenue, the percentage of Total Content Costs, and each of the fixed per subscriber elements. The Judges find that the structure and increases are a reasonable approach to providing an organic cost of living adjustment.

In other words, the DSPs and the Judges are pushing a “trickle down” approach that a rising tide lifts all boats. They ignore the underlying algebra that is the flaw at the heart of the “big pool” royalty calculation that’s as true for songwriters as it is for artists. The more DSPs keep prices the same and the more songs are added to the big pool denominator, the lower the per-song royalty trends (particularly for estates because the numerator cannot grow by definition). If the rate of change in the denominator is greater than the rate of change in revenue or the number of songs being paid out in the numerator, the Malthusian algebra demands that the per-writer rate declines over time. It may be less obvious in streaming mechanicals due to the mind bending greater of/lesser than formula, TCC, etc., but gravity always wins. 

Why COLA?

There is a common misapprehension of what the COLA is intended to accomplish as well as the government’s compulsory license rate. A COLA is not an increase in value, it is downside protection to preserve value. Stating that the headline rate increases over time so you don’t need a COLA compares apples to oranges and gets a pomegranate. It’s a nonsense statement.

Plus, no element of the Judge’s list of producer supply side inputs have anything to do with cost items relevant to songwriters providing songs to DSPs (or publishers and labels for that matter). The relevant costs for COLA purposes are the components of the Consumer Price Index applicable to songwriters who receive the government’s royalty such as food at home, rent, utilities, gasoline and the like. That’s why you have a COLA–otherwise the real royalty rate declines BOTH because of inflation AND because of the Malthusian algebra. And that creates the negative externality of poverty among songwriters and discourages new people from taking up the craft.

There’s a reason why Big Tech never wants to talk about per-stream rates on either recordings or songs. That’s because if you explained to the average person or Member of Congress what the rates actually were in pennies, the zeros to the right would make it obvious how insulting the entire proposal is to songwriters. 

One of the surest ways to cause poverty is for the government to cap income and destroy human agency. But this is what has happened with the streaming mechanicals. Songwriters are crushed again by Big Tech–and did I mention their THIRTY SIX LAWYERS?

And don’t forget–if no one writes hits, no one has hit records. Eventually, this will become a catalog business and American culture will be impoverished right along side the impoverishment of songwriters.

Trickle-Down Streaming Mechanical Royalties Will be Be Up for Discussion

You may have noticed that a cost of living adjustment for statutory royalties was front and center in the recent (and still ongoing) physical mechanicals rate setting. Unfortunately, the idea of a COLA seems to have disappeared in the streaming mechanicals proceeding.

Note that it’s different music users on the physical mechanicals than on streaming. The physical mechanicals are paid by record companies and streaming mechanicals are paid by some of the biggest corporations in history, namely Amazon, Apple and Google and other wealthy public companies like Spotify and Pandora/SiriusXM. All these companies have market capitalizations greater than the gross national product of some countries. 

You may have also noticed that after years of frozen subscription rates, Apple is the first of the streaming subscription services to raise rates by $1 on several of its services including Apple Music. Tim Ingham is asking if Spotify will follow (you know, one of those price fixing agreements inferred from conduct). Who knows, but what’s interesting about this is the effect it will have on streaming mechanical rates, or more pointedly the effect that the Big Tech cartel would like you to think it will have.

The calculation for streaming mechanicals is absurdly complicated. You do have to wonder which of the genii came up with that one. About the only thing that is certain is that the negotiation of that rate every five years (and judicial appeals occasionally) guarantees employment for lots of lawyers and lobbyists on both sides, although definitely skewed toward Big Tech’s share of the 46 lawyers on the docket.

The streaming rates are so bizarre that the Copyright Royalty Judges seem to have lost trust in the process and have issued two separate orders instructing the participants in the streaming mechanical proceedings to either disclose or “certify” that they have come clean with the Judges as to any side deals that may have artificially lowered the rates–the second order makes for interesting reading.

Unlike the physical mechanical, the settling parties rejected a cost of living adjustment in these historically inflationary times. Why they rejected a COLA is hard to understand aside from the fact that they thought they could get away with it.

One thing that is clear, however, is that any argument that a COLA is not necessary with streaming mechanicals because the rate is theoretically based on increases or decreases in revenue is a particularly insulting form of trickle down gaslighting. 

It must be said that the record company group of music users that pays the physical mechanical rate voluntarily agreed a COLA on their rates that is currently pending approval by the Judges. There really is no excuse for the streaming services to rely on the discredited trickle down theory to pawn off their Rube Goldberg royalty structure on songwriters for streaming mechanicals.

Will the Copyright Royalty Board approve Big Tech’s attempted cover-up? 

By Chris Castle

[This MusicTechPolicy post appeared on Hypebot]

There’s an old saying among sailors that water always wins. Sunlight does, too. It may take a while, but time reveals all things in the cold light of dawn. So when you are free riding on huge blocks of aged government cheese like the digital music services do with the compulsory mechanical license, the question you should ask yourself is why hide from the sunlight? It just makes songwriters even more suspicious. 

This melodrama just played out at the Copyright Royalty Board with the frozen mechanicals proceeding. Right on cue, the digital services and their legions of lawyers proved they hadn’t learned a damn thing from that exercise. They turned right around and tried to jam a secret deal through the Copyright Royalty Board on the streaming mechanicals piece of Phonorecords IV. 

To their great credit, the labels handled frozen physical mechanicals quite differently. They voluntarily disclosed the side deal they made with virtually no redactions and certainly didn’t try to file it “under seal” like the services did. Filing “under seal” hides the major moving parts of a voluntary settlement from the world’s songwriters. Songwriters, of course, are the ones most affected by the settlement–which the services want the CRB to approve–some might say “rubber stamp”–and make law.

To fully appreciate the absolute lunacy of the services attempt at filing the purported settlement document under seal, you have to remember that the Copyright Royalty Judges spilled considerable ink in the frozen mechanicals piece of Phonorecords IV telling those participants how important transparency was when they rejected the initial Subpart B settlement.  

This happened mere weeks ago in the SAME PHONORECORDS IV PROCEEDING.

Were the services expecting the Judges to say “Just kidding”? What in the world were they thinking? Realize that filing the settlement–which IF ACCEPTED is then published by the Judges for public comment under the applicable rules established long ago by Congress–is quite different than filing confidential commercial information. You might expect redactions or filings under seal, “attorneys eyes only,” etc., in direct written statements, expert testimony or the other reams of paper all designed to help the Judges guess what rate a willing buyer would pay a willing seller. That rate to be applied to the world under a compulsory license which precludes willing buyers and willing sellers, thank you Franz Kafka. 

When you file the settlement, that document is the end product of all those tens of millions of dollars in legal fees that buy houses in the Hamptons and Martha’s Vinyard as well as send children to prep school, college and graduate school. Not the songwriters’ children, mind you, oh no. 

The final settlement is, in fact, the one document that should NEVER be redacted or secret. How else will the public–who may not get a vote but does get their say–even know what it is the law is based on assuming the Judges approve the otherwise secret deal. It’s asking the Judges to tell the public, the Copyright Office, their colleagues in the appeals courts and ultimately the Congress, sorry, our version of the law is based on secret information.

Does that even scan? I mean, seriously, what kind of buffoons come up with this stuff?  Of course the Judges will question the bona fides and provenance of the settlement. Do you think any other federal agency could get away with actually doing this? The lawlessness of the very idea is breathtaking and demonstrates conclusively in my view that these services like Google are the most dangerous corporations in the world. The one thing that gives solace after this display of arrogance is that some of them may get broken up before they render too many mechanical royalty accounting statements.

To their credit, after receiving the very thin initial filing the Judges instructed the services to do better–to be kind. The Judges issued an order that stated:

The Judges now ORDER the Settling Parties to certify, no later than five days from the date of this order, that the Motion and the Proposed Regulations annexed to the Motion represent the full agreement of the Settling Parties, i.e., that there are no other related agrements and no other clauses. If such other agreements or clauses exist, the Settling Parties shall file them no later than five days from the date of this order.

Just a tip to any younger lawyers reading this post–you really, really, really do not want to be on the receiving end of this kind of order.

Reading between the lines (and not very far) the Judges are telling the parties to come clean. Either “certify” to the Judges “that there are no other related agreements and no other clauses” or produce them. This use of the term “certify” means all the lawyers promise to the Judges as officers of the court that their clients have come clean, or alternatively file the actual documents.

That produced the absurd filing under seal, and that then produced the blowback that led to the filing of the unsealed and unreacted documents. But–wait, there’s more.

Take a close look at what the Judges asked for and what they received. The Judges asked for certification “that there are no other related agrements and no other clauses. If such other agreements or clauses exist, the Settling Parties shall file them no later than five days from the date of this order.”

What the Judges received is described in the purportedly responsive filing by the services:

The Settling Participants [aka the insiders] have provided all of the settlement documentsand, with this public filing, every interested party can fully evaluate and comment upon the settlement. The Settling Participants thus believe that the Judges have everything necessary to “publish the settlement in the Federal Register for notice and comment from those bound by the terms, rates, or other determination set by the” Settlement Agreement, as required under 37 C.F.R. 351.2(b)(2). The Settling Participants respectfully request that the Judges inform them if there is any further information that they require.

Notice that the Judges asked for evidence of the “full agreement of the Settling Parties”, meaning all side deals or other vigorish exchanged between the parties including the DSPs that control vast riches larger than most countries and are super-conflicted with the publishers due to their joint venture investment in the MLC quango.

The response is limited to “the settlement documents” and then cites to what the services no doubt think they can argue limits their disclosure obligations to what is necessary to “publish the settlement”. And then the services have the brass to add “The Settling Participants respectfully request that the Judges inform them if there is any further information that they require.” Just how are the Judges supposed to know if the services complied with the order? Is this candor?

It must also be noted that Google and the NMPA have “lodged” certain documents relating to YouTube’s direct agreements which they claim are not related to the settlement to be published for public comment. These documents are, of course, secret:

[And] are not part of the settlement agreement or understanding of the settling participants concerning the subject matter of the settlement agreement, and do not supersede any part of the settlement agreement with respect to the settling participants’ proposed Phonorecords IV rates and terms. Further, the letter agreements do not change or modify application of the terms to be codified at 37 C.F.R. 385 Subparts C and D, including as they apply to any participant. Rather, the letter agreements simply concern Google’s current allocation practices to avoid the double payment of royalties arising from YouTube’s having entered into direct agreements with certain music publishers while simultaneously operating under the Section 115 statutory license.

You’ll note that there are a number of declarative statements that lets the hoi polloi know that the Data Lords and Kings of the Internet Realms have determined some information involving their royalties is none of their concern. How do you know that you shouldn’t worry your pretty little head about some things? Because the Data Lords tell you so. And now, back to sleep you Epsilons.

So you see that despite the statements in the group filing to the CRB that the “Settling Participants” (i.e., the insiders) claim to have provided all of the settlement documents required by the Judges, Google turns right around and “lodges” this separate filing of still other documents that they think might be related documents with some bearing on the settlement that should be disclosed to the public but they apparently will not be disclosing without a fight. How do we know this? Because they pretty much say so:

Because the letter agreements are subject to confidentiality restrictions and have each only been disclosed to their individual signatories, each such music publisher having an extant direct license agreement with Google, Google and NMPA are lodging the letter agreements directly with the Copyright Royalty Judges, who may then make a determination as to whether the letter agreements are relevant and what, if anything, should be disclosed notwithstanding the confidentiality restrictions in each of the letter agreements.

Ah yes, the old “nondisclosure” clause. You couldn’t ask for a better example of how NDAs are used to hide information from songwriters about their own money.

The Judges noted when rejecting the similar initial frozen mechanical regulations that:

Parties have an undeniable right of contract. The Judges, however, are not required to adopt the terms of any contract, particularly when the contract at issue relates in part, albeit by reference, to additional unknown terms that indicate additional unrevealed consideration passing between the parties, which consideration might have an impact on effective royalty rates. 

So there’s that.

What this all boils down to is that the richest and most dangerous corporations in commercial history are accustomed to algorithmically duping consumers, vendors and even governments in the dark and getting away with it. The question is, if you believe that sunlight always wins, do they still want to hide as long as they can and then look stupid, or do they want to come clean to begin with and be honest brokers.

As Willie Stark famously said in All the King’s Men, “Time reveals all things, I trust it so.”

Thinking Outside the Pie: @legrandnetwork Study for GESAC Highlights Streaming Impact on Choking Diversity and Songwriter Royalties

By Chris Castle

[This post first appeared in MusicTech.Solutions]

Emmanuel Legrand prepared an excellent and important study for the European Grouping of Societies of Authors and Composers (GESAC) that identifies crucial effects of streaming on culture, creatives and especially songwriters. The study highlights the cultural effects of streaming on the European markets, but it would be easy to extend these harms globally as Emmanuel observes.

For example, consider the core pitch of streaming services that started long ago with the commercial Napster 2.0 pitch of “Own Nothing, Have Everything”. This call-to-serfdom slogan may sound good but having infinite shelf space with no cutouts or localized offering creates its own cultural imperative. And that’s even if you accept the premise the algorithmically programed enterprise playlists on streaming services should not be subject to the same cultural protections for performers and songwriters as broadcast radio–its main competitor.

[This] massive availability of content on [streaming] platforms is overshadowed by the fact that these services are under no positive obligations to ensure visibility and discoverability of more diverse repertoires, particularly European works….[plus]  the initial individual subscription fee of 9.99 (in Euros, US dollars, or British pound) set in 2006, has never increased, despite the exponential growth in the quality, amount of songs, and user-friendliness of music streaming services.

Artists working new recordings, especially in a language other than English, are forced to fight for “shelf space” and “mindshare”–that is, recognition–against every recording ever released. While this was always true theoretically; you never had that same fight the same way at Tower Records.

This is not theoretically true on streaming platforms–it is actually true because these tens of millions of historical recordings are the competition on streaming services. When you look at the global 100 charts for streaming services, almost all of the titles are in English and are largely Anglo-American releases. Yes, we know–Bad Bunny. But this year’s exception proves the rule.

And then Emmanuel notes that it is the back room algorithms–the terribly modern version of the $50 handshake–that support various payola schemes:

The use of algorithms, as well as bottleneck represented by the most popular playlists, exacerbates this. Furthermore, long-standing flaws in the operations of music streaming platforms, such as “streaming fraud”, “ghost/fake artists”, “payola schemes”, “royalty free content” and other coercive practices [not to mention YouTube withholding access to Content ID] worsen the impact on many professional creators….

This report suggests solutions to bring greater transparency in the use of algorithms and invites stakeholders to undertake a review of the economic models of streaming services and evaluate how they currently affect cultural diversity which should be promoted in its various forms — music genres, languages, origin of performers and songwriters, in particular through policy actions.

Trichordist readers will recall my extensive dives into the hyperefficient market share distribution of streaming royalties known as the “big pool” compared to my “ethical pool” proposal and the “user centric” alternative. As Emmanuel points out, the big pool royalty model belies a cultural imperative–if you are counting streams on a market share basis that results in the rich getting richer based on “stream share” that same stream share almost guarantees that Anglo American repertoire will dominate in every market the big streamers operate.

Emmanuel uses French-Canadian repertoire as an example (a subject I know a fair amount about since I performed and recorded with many vedettes before Quebecoise was cool).

A lot of research has been made in Canada with regards to discoverability, in particular in the context of French-Canadian music, which is subject to quotas for over the air broadcasters which however do not apply to music streaming services. The research shows that while the lists of new releases from Québec studied are present in a large proportion on streaming platforms, they are “not very visible and very little recommended.” 

It further shows that the situation is even worse when it is not about new releases, including hit music, when the presence of titles “drops radically.” It is not very difficult to imagine that if we were to swap Québec in the above sentence with the name of any country from the European Union [or any non-Anglo American country], and even with music from the European Union as a whole, we could find similar results.

In other words, there may be aggregators with repertoire in languages other than English that deliver tracks to streamers in their countries, but–absent localized airplay rules–a Spotify user might never know the tracks were there unless the user already knew about the recording, artist or songwriter. (Speaking of Canada, check the MAPL system.)

This is a prime example of why Professor Feijoo and I proposed streaming remuneration in our WIPO study to allow performers to capture the uncompensated capital markets value to the enterprise driven by these performers. Because of the market share royalty system, revenues and royalties do not compensate all performers, particularly regional or non-featured performers (i.e., session players and singers) who essentially get zero compensation for streaming.

Emmanuel also comments on the imbalance in song royalty payments and invites a re-look at how the streaming system biases against songwriters. I would encourage everyone to stop thinking of a pie to be shared or that Johnny has more apples–when the services refuse to raise prices in order to tell a growth story to Wall Street or The City, measuring royalties by a share of some mythical royalty pie is not ever going to get it done. It will just perpetuate a discriminatory system that fails to value the very people on whose backs it was built be they songwriters or session players.

We must think outside the pie.

@KerryMuzzey Calls Out Chinese Streamer iQiyi and Tencent for Massive Infringement of Composers

Readers will recall Kerry Muzzey, a leading film composer and outspoken advocate for composers. Kerry’s testimony before the U.S. Senate is some of the best analysis of the struggle of independent creators against the DMCA onslaught. We’ve also been lucky to have him post on MusicTechPolicy and Trichordist.

As Kerry has taught us, composers are often ripped off by some of the biggest names in streaming, some of which are based in China. This is particularly ironic given the long arm of companies like Tencent into the legitimate music business.

Never say never, but it does seem like the mainstream trade press never reports on this angle: These companies are ripping off our artists in a whole other kind of human rights violation because artist rights are human rights.

Save the date: A2IM Indie Week Panel with @musictechpolicy on the Impact on Indie Labels of Unfreezing Mechanicals

If you are coming to Indie Week, Trichordist readers might enjoy a panel Chris Castle is on to discuss the impact on indie labels of the Great Unfreeze! 

Entitled How the CRB’s Rejection of Frozen Mechanicals Will Affect Your Label?, the panel goes off at 10:30 am ET on Wednesday, June 15 at the New York Law School.

Speakers are Victor Zaraya: Concord (Moderator), Danielle Aguirre: NMPA (National Music Publishers’ Association), Glen Barros: Exceleration, and Chris.

If you want to read up on the issues that caused the Copyright Royalty Board to reject the failed settlement, here’s some background:

Copyright Royalty Board’s Rejection of NMPA, NSAI, Sony, Warner, Universal settlement

Copyright Royalty Board’s Reaction to Second Settlement Proposal by NMPA, NSAI, Sony, Warner and Universal

Survey Results from Songwriter Survey on Frozen Mechanicals

Comments:

Rosanne Cash

Helienne Lindvall, David Lowery, Blake Morgan

David Poe

Abby North, Erin McAnally, Chelsea Crowell

Kevin Casini

NMPA, NSAI, Sony, Warner, Universal Comment with Copy of MOU4

Chris will post about the panel afterward.

Clowns to the Left of Me, Jokers To the Right: When Will the MLC Show Us the Money?

If you’ve received one of these emails from the MLC about having to recast their monthly statement inside of a single month, when you’re eying that $500,000,000 of supposedly unmatched money that’s sitting in the MLC, Inc.’s bank account (maybe?), or if you’re trying to figure out when they are launching the vastly overdue claiming portal, you’re probably wondering–who’s in the clown car today? Bozo or Pennywise?

But maybe they’re smarter than they look. Because all they have to do to distribute that $500,000,000 on a market share basis is keep you looking at the bright and shiny object while they run out the clock.

And if you’re waiting for the Copyright Office to save you because they have “oversight”, you’re going to be waiting for a long time. Here’s the reality–nobody is minding the store. There’s a difference between “oversight” and “overwatch.” In Washington, “oversight” means finding someone else to blame and from the very beginning it has been clear who the MLC intends to blame–you. Because you didn’t “play your part” or sufficiently “connect to collect”.

The Copyright Office has done a couple things while under the supervision of the current head lobbyist for Spotify. They’re good at studies, terrible at oversight, so let’s give credit where it’s due. But also realize that’s where it stops because they have about as much moxie as a starfish. (And if you think the NMPA is going to save you, take a look at the frozen mechanicals debacle and ask yourself if a rational person could really take that seriously.)

At the core of the MLC’s business model is the ability to match. Matching is kind of a “See Spot run” building block. If you can’t match, it’s very close to saying you can’t count. Because it depends on what the definition of “match” is.

So what is a match? Or as the Bard might say, how can I screw thee? Let me count the ways. The Copyright Office produced the Unclaimed Royalties Best Practices study partly on this very topic. Notice the difference between “best practices” and “rules.” “Best practices” is not the same as “rule”. If you violate a best practice, nothing happens to you, so therefore perfect for Washington. If you violate a rule, bad things happen to you. The connective tissue is enforcement. If you violate a rule at the Securities and Exchange Commission, you wear stripes. If you violate a rule at the Environmental Protection Agency, you will pay a fine, for sure. If you violate a rule at the MLC? There really aren’t any so it can’t happen. In other words, it’s just like the Harry Fox Agency.

But that’s what we have so let’s look at one passage in particular from the Best Practice Study because that’s the closest we have to a rule book.

The Office recommends that the MLC make all [matching] metrics publicly available, except to the extent it would cause confidential or business sensitive information to be improperly disclosed. [God forbid.] Specifically regarding match rates, the Office acknowledges the MLC’s point that “vendors can easily increase their claimed ‘match percentage’ by simply dropping the confidence level at which they call something a match.” For that reason, the Office recommends that the MLC provide appropriate context for its metrics, including information surrounding how it defines a match, relevant confidence levels, and how confidence levels are tuned. Additionally, so that they are clear and precise, and to avoid possible confusion, the Office recommends that all royalty figures be provided both with and without accrued interest. [How about a best practice of how they are practicing complying with best practices best?

The Office recommends that in addition to providing annual statistics in its annual report, the MLC also have a dedicated public webpage displaying all of these metrics in a clear, well-organized, user-friendly, and accessible manner. The webpage should be interactive and allow users to search, sort, and break down the data so it may be more easily reviewed and analyzed. The webpage should also have an export or download feature, including bulk exporting/downloading, to aid public consumption and dissemination. The Office recommends that the webpage be updated monthly after each batch of new reports of usage arrive and go through initial matching processes. All metrics should be retained and made available online indefinitely (though the MLC could distinguish between current and historic metrics in the future) so long-term trends can be assessed and to ensure the public and the Office have access to them in connection with the review of the MLC’s designation every five years. The MLC should also be very clear about how applicable metrics may change in response to DMP reporting adjustments and the reconciliation of any related royalty underpayments or overpayments permitted by the Office’s regulations. Relatedly, the Office also recommends that the MLC make publicly available relevant metrics about DMP reported usage that the MLC determines is not subject to blanket licenses (e.g., where it is subject to a voluntary license instead, public domain musical works, etc.), such that any related paid royalties have been credited or refunded back to the DMP.

What would also be nice is to tell you how much of your money they are holding and how you get it back. Maybe they could practice the best out of that.

There’s nothing particularly insightful about any of that, right? It’s the kind of thing that any songwriter giving the subject a moment or two of thought could have figured out at any point in the last 100 years. It’s also the kind of thing that you would have expected to have been built into the MLC’s system–which is essentially the HFA system–from the beginning.

It doesn’t matter what they say they aspire to do. Naturally they have to say they aspire to get it 100% correct–because otherwise that raises some interesting questions about intent, right?

Will they ever be called to account for their failures? Doubtful. The only business in the world where you can get the government to let you hold $500,000,000 of other people’s money and then keep it because paying it out was just too hard for you.

Do you think this mess is what Congress had in mind after they were fed a bunch of crap by the know-nothing lobbyists?

So let’s ask again–Bozo or Pennywise?

A new proposal for songwriters in the Imperial City

[This post first appeared on MusicTechPolicy]

By Chris Castle

As MTP readers will recall, the National Music Publishers Association and the Nashville Songwriters Association International purported to agree on behalf of a “consensus” that never seemed to materialize to extend the long-frozen 9.1¢ mechanical rate for physical and downloads in the form of a settlement agreement in the Copyright Royalty Board’s Phonorecords IV proceeding.  I thought this deal reeked and so did a number of other people, including the Copyright Royalty Board itself which rejected the settlement.

To their great credit, Sony, Universal and Warner stepped up and agreed to offer all the world’s songwriters increased rates of 12¢ plus inflation indexing for the next five years which they didn’t have to do (and was a deal that the CRB hinted that they would find acceptable when they resoundingly rejected the first settlement).  Assuming the Copyright Royalty Board accepts the deal—a step you might miss out from the press coverage–this had the effect of a quick end to a process the labels had every right to litigate at the CRB.

The other benefit to the settlement is that it should—if it doesn’t get screwed up again—it should take away a major argument that the digital retailers are using against songwriters in the streaming part of the Phonorecords IV proceeding.  That argument is the most obvious negotiating tactic in the world:  What’s good for the goose is good for the gander.  The services are essentially saying that if the rates should be frozen when the labels are paying the mechanical (which they are on physical and downloads), then the rates should be frozen when the services are paying the mechanical (which the services are on streaming).  And no inflation adjustment. Well, no kidding.

In one power move, the labels did something fair for songwriters and incidentally also helped publishers in spite of themselves by taking away a major argument from the digital retailers.  Rather than play a schoolyard game of high/low bargaining and stretching out the process for another couple years, the labels cut to the chase and closed. Hopefully the CRB will agree (again, don’t forget that the CRB still has to approve the proposed deal.)

Do we still have bones to pick with the labels?  Absolutely.  Could the rate have been even more fair?  Sure.  Might it have been if the publishers had actually done their job and negotiated in the first place?  Maybe.  Probably.  But they didn’t so we’ll never know.  However, credit where credit’s due, the labels pulled this one out and saved the publishers’ bacon in spite of themselves.

I do have to note in passing that when you read the press coverage on the filing of the settlement, there’s not one US group with a press release today that actually picked up a pen and filed a comment at the CRB when they were needed and duty called.  The awesome UK songwriter group Ivors Academy stepped up and bled with songwriters like Rosanne Cash, George Johnson, Helienne Lindvall, David Lowery and Blake Morgan and all the other commenters who took one for the team when it was unpopular to do so. And as that guy said, he who sheds his blood with me shall be my brother.

You’ll hear a lot of hoorah about how streaming is what’s important from people who are trying to CYA today.  Here’s a hot tip:  IT’S ALL IMPORTANT IF IT’S YOUR MONEY.  Why is that so hard to understand?

Which is why going forward all songwriters and all publishers need to be involved with the rate-setting proceedings at CRB including on streaming.  The CRB knows this and acknowledges.  I think the labels know this on their side.

The question is whether the publishers do.  The announcement of this settlement proposal is both inauspicious and true to form.  Remember—they had practically nothing to do with making the deal they celebrate today.  But don’t let that stop anyone.

We need fairness at the Copyright Royalty Board.  Notice I’m not using the word “transparency” which means whatever the speaker wants it to mean.  I’m very specifically talking about a seat at the table not just for songwriters, but for independent labels and publishers as well as the majors.  As Ann Richards used to say, if you’re not at the table you are on the menu, and this was a very, very close run thing in Phonorecords IV. 

If it weren’t for all the people who commented negatively and resisted the rates that had been bootstrapped in the past and would have been again, I don’t know where songwriters would be today. You gave the Judges the truth, straight from the heart and they responded. So thank you, all of you. And thank you to the readers of MTP and The Trichordist who raised hell right along side. It’s a good day for everyone.

Remember–keep coming back because it works if you work it.

Guest Post by @georgejohnson: The only songwriter in Phonorecords IV speaks his mind

[You may have never heard of George Johnson, but you should have. He’s the only songwriter in the Phonorecords III and IV rate proceedings at the Copyright Royalty Board, representing himself. It’s also important to understand that if George wasn’t carrying the flag as a “participant” in the proceedings, it’s unlikely that the Copyright Royalty Judges would have rejected the bizarre “settlement” proposed by the major labels and publishers paving the way for the second proposed settlement announced today that raises the mechanical rate to 12¢. George asked us to post a short comment on today’s settlement.]

Unfortunately, as glad as I am to see the labels finally offer a slightly better rate of 12 cents, the Judges have not even ruled on the last unreasonable settlement that they rejected, nor had time to hear a back from the Register on the Novel Question of Law proposed by the 3 Major Record Labels. Therefore, it would be premature for me to agree to any rushed deal before first hearing the Register‘s and the Judges’ rulings of law on this issue, and the many other problems the Judges pointed out with these extremely flawed settlements.

Furthermore, the multiple conflicts of interest, self dealing, vertical integration “warning flags”, side deals, and other problems may still need to be resolved by the Judges before any new settlement can be approved.

NMPA CEO David Israelite even stated in 2015 that the rate should be 50 cents, yet he continues to fight me to keep the rate frozen and below market, despite now being forced to offer 12 cents to the Judges which he absolutely did not want to do and fought every step of the way. He is no songwriter advocate whatsoever. He also makes $2 million dollars a year in salary and extra compensation to keep songwriters frozen at 9.1 cents all these years because he really works for the parent record labels, not their vertically integrated publishing division as he claims. It’s a total waste of time for songwriters and I hope Congress puts a stop to this self-dealing and increasing antitrust issues created by these two-timing lobbyists’ behavior.

Btw, when the rate is accurately calculated for inflation since 2006 it’s actually 13 cents, not 12 cents like they offered, but it’s still way below market considering the rate was 2 cents in 1909.  A rate based on today’s marketplace reality would place the rate at a break-even point of 58 cents per song to make up for 89 ignored years of zero inflation adjustments for songwriters, who are entitled to a raise, much less a simple cost of living adjustment for 2022 real world prices. Plus there is no legal difference between adjusting from 2006 or 1909.  NMPA, NSAI, and RIAA just don’t want to increase the profits for their own songwriters, much less all their competitors who have to have their rates frozen by NMPA, NSAI, and the RIAA, which is extraordinary and must end.

There is also the issue of the free unlimited “limited download” loophole which must be paid a mechanical and, of course, the labels completely ignored this core issue which goes hand in hand with a properly adjusted 58 cent inflation royalty rate which all songwriters and publishers deserve now.  Apple and the other Services need to reduce their 30% per dollar fee on downloads to help share in the cost of the Judges’ ruling of no more static rates for songwriters.  If the labels offer a reasonable rate and fix their self dealing conflicts and side deals, along with a paid mechanical for limited downloads, then I would sign a deal like that. Plus, the labels refuse to address the issue of old controlled composition clauses at 75% of the lawful statutory rate or any new controlled composition clauses to reduce any new agreed increases.

Keeping the Songwriter Survey Open!!

Thanks for the HUGE response to the songwriter survey on what you think the new unfrozen mechanical rate should be!! The response has been so strong we’re going to keep the survey open so more of you can participate.

This Survey Monkey questionnaire is anonymous and easy to take–3 minutes to complete–and you could really help a lot by giving your opinions on what you think the rate should be! We will post the results so everyone can see.

You can start the survey at this link. Thank you!