Chief Copyright Royalty Judge Jesse M. Feder Copyright Royalty Judge David R. Strickler Copyright Royalty Judge Steve Ruwe
U.S. Copyright Royalty Board 101 Independence Ave SE
P.O. Box 70977
Washington, DC 20024-0977
SENT VIA ELECTRONIC DELIVERY
RE: DETERMINATION OF ROYALTY RATES AND TERMS FOR MAKING AND DISTRIBUTING PHONORECORDS, DOCKET NUMBER 21-CRB-0001-
PR (2023-2027) (Phonorecords IV)
Honorable Judges:
My name is Monica Corton, and I am the CEO and Founder of Go to Eleven Entertainment, a newly formed independent music publishing company that is funded. I have been in the music publishing business for over thirty years, twenty- seven of which were spent as the Senior Executive Vice President of Creative Affairs & Licensing at Next Decade Entertainment. My experience is in all areas of music licensing, registrations, and royalty payments, and my former clients included the catalogs of Boston, Harry Belafonte, Vic Mizzy (the “Addams Family Theme” and “Green Acres Theme”), Sammy Hagar, and many more.
It is my understanding that the CRB judges are being asked to accept a Motion to Adopt a freeze or a non-rate increase for all mechanical licensing uses for physical phonorecords, i.e., CDs and vinyl, permanent digital downloads, ringtones and music bundles (when multiple songs are downloaded in groups) for the Rate Period of 2023 to 2027. The rates for these types of uses have been frozen and have not increased for any music publisher or songwriter since 2006. In the past, the National Music Publishers Association (“NMPA”) has explained these freezes as a necessary component to their negotiation for an increase in the digital rates for mechanical licenses. For many years (2006-2021), I have gone along with this explanation, but after fifteen (“15”) years of having no increase on any physical product or digital downloads, I now believe it is completely unfair and no longer justifiable for music publishers and songwriters, particularly the independents and DIY creators (do-it-yourself), to have been denied an increase in these rates after
15 years of allowing record labels to get away without paying any increase whatsoever and now face being blocked from a raise for another five (“5”) years.
To date, the justification for not increasing our physical and digital download mechanical royalty rates has been a fear of potentially stalling or disrupting the transition to the distribution of music digitally. We now are long past that transition, and the major record labels who are pressing for a freeze or no increase in our mechanical rates now are very stable businesses. Indeed, they are flourishing. Universal Music Publishing Group is expected to go public, the major labels are signing more catalog than ever before, and they all are claiming a very healthy, booming industry in the media and to their investors. Part of the reason they are so financially sound is because they are not paying their fair share in mechanical royalties to creators when it comes to physical product, digital download, ringtone, and music bundle mechanical royalties.
You might ask, “Why are the parties outlined in the Motion to Adopt Settlement of Statutory Royalty Rates and Terms for Subpart B Configurations agreeing to this freeze on mechanical rates?” Let’s look at who the parties are that are agreeing: all the major labels, all of their sister music publishing companies, such as Sony Music, Universal Music Publishing, Warner/Chappell Music, and the Nashville Songwriters Association International (“NSAI”). The odd man out is NSAI, a songwriter organization based in Nashville. Why would songwriters approve of a rate that does not allow them to make a living from the mechanical licensing of their songs? The answer is unclear as many NSAI members, when asked, tell me that they are unaware that their organization is selling out their member’s copyrights for an under-market mechanical rate price in the 2023-2027 mechanical rate negotiations with the CRB. A perusal of the NSAI website shows nothing about NSAI’s participation in these negotiations or the positions it is taking in such negotiations. If their membership does not know that NSAI is agreeing to freeze these mechanical rates, how can the songwriter member of NSAI be a “willing buyer, willing seller”?
The NMPA’s Motion to Adopt Settlement states “the Settlement represents the consensus of buyers and sellers representing the vast majority of the market for “mechanical” rights for Subpart B Configurations”, yet this is incorrect. It seems likely that songwriters represented by the major labels have no idea that their publisher is agreeing to not increase their mechanical royalties for another 5 years, for a total twenty-one (“21”) years of non-increases in physical product, digital download, ringtone, and music bundle mechanical rates. While these songwriters have been denied any increased rates, nearly everything else in the world has
increased in price substantially. There is no food item, rent, mortgage, car, gasoline, school or tax rate that has not increased from 2006 to 2021 and will not increase from 2023 to 2027.
Further, another concern is that the NMPA has kept the negotiations for this subsection very quiet. As a member of many of the music trade organizations and someone who is paying attention to the pulse of independent publishers and songwriters, I can attest that there has been no discussion of these frozen mechanical rates. Outside of the major companies that control copyrights, there is vast market of independents, foreign music publishers/songwriters, and do-it- yourself (“DIY”) creators who have no voice in these hearings or rate settings.
These are the people who are having a much harder time making a living from their music. Many of them have songs that sell a lot of physical product and digital downloads, as physical product is still doing well in many niche markets where independent music publishers/songwriters and DIY creators live. These creators are not well-educated in music publishing, either from an industry knowledge of licensing perspective or a legal perspective (where they would follow the day-to- day happenings of the CRB hearings.) They are the silent 40+% of the market that makes up the independent side of music publishing. We are a mighty group. We represent thousands of creators, and our numbers are increasing the balance of the business every year, so much so that Sony Music just bought AWAL, a formerly independent label that administered master rights for thousands of DIY creators and was owned by Kobalt. Please read (https://www.rollingstone.com/pro/features/why-did-sony-music-just-spend-430- million-on-kobalt-indie-label-awal-1122350/).
Are you certain that those AWAL artists, who often also are the songwriters of the songs that they record, have any idea that their new label owner is advocating for them not to get a mechanical rate increase for physical copies, digital downloads, ringtones, and music bundles for the next 5 years, after already 15 years of not receiving an increase in their mechanical rates? I would argue that a significant majority of them have no idea that this is happening.
There is reference in several places that the major labels and major publishers are party to some “side deal” which ostensibly could mean the major publishers are receiving some extra compensation for these frozen rates with some additional payments that effectively make the major music publishers mechanical rates increase their rates for physical mechanicals, digital downloads, ringtones, and music bundles. What is this settlement? Who is party to it? How will it affect the music publishing industry at large?
I would ask that the CRB consider raising the mechanical rates for physical product, digital downloads, ringtones, and music bundles to at least a standard of living increase since 2006, which I have calculated using the CPI Inflation Calculator that is provided by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm). This would mean that the physical mechanical rate and the digital download rate for songs under five minutes would increase to $.12 per unit and the per minute rate for anything over five minutes would increase to $.02 per minute. The ringtone rate would increase to $.33 per ringtone, and the music bundle rate should increase proportionally as well. Unfortunately, I am unclear regarding where the music bundle rates stand now, but the calculator is very easy to use, and I leave it to the CRB judges to assist reasonably in determining the increase for said music bundle mechanical royalty rate(s). These mechanical rates should take effect on January 1, 2023 and be the starting point for the next rate period. In addition, the rate should increase each year of the 5-year term as is the standard with all other mechanical rates that are set by the CRB.
I believe this is the only fair and equitable way to deal with these frozen mechanical rates, and I hope that my explanation on behalf of thousands of independent publishers and songwriters who represent the independent and DIY communities will give the CRB judges pause to reconsider the physical product, digital download, ringtone, and music bundle mechanical rates included in Subpart B for the period 2023-2027. I am happy to elaborate in any way regarding any aspect of this letter should the CRB judges like further explanation on my reasoning herein.
Determination of Rates and Terms for Making and Distributing Phonorecords (Phonorecords IV)
Copyright Royalty Judge David R. Strickler Chief Copyright Royalty Judge Jesse M. Feder Copyright Royalty Judge Steven Ruwe US Copyright Royalty Board 101 Independence Ave SE Washington, DC 20024
To Your Honors:
My name is Abby North. I am a music publishing administrator based in Los Angeles. My views expressed in this letter are solely my own.
With my husband, I am a copyright owner of the classic song “Unchained Melody,” among other copyrights. I also administer musical works on behalf of songwriters, their families and heirs. My clients depend on royalties to pay for life’s essentials.
It is imperative that the Judges understand that despite what some parties may argue, Subpart B royalties absolutely are meaningful to songwriters.
There is no dispute over the fact that streaming is the most prominent form of music distribution, as reported in the popular press. But mounting evidence shows a significant and consistent growth in vinyl production. CDs remain popular among some listeners. Other listeners prefer to have permanently available digital copies, i.e., downloads.
Vinyl, once written off for dead, has enjoyed almost 15 years of consecutive growth, with more than 19 million vinyl records sold in the US so far this year. Per Digital Music News, this is an increase of 108% over the previous year. The Judges need only look to this year’s Record Store Day on July 17 for confirmation of the vinyl resurgence.
Amazon Music now offers a “Vinyl of the Month” club, curated by “the experts at Amazon Music.”
Vinyl pressing plants are overwhelmed by the volume of orders they are fulfilling, and it is commonly understood in the industry that vinyl sales would be far higher if production could keep up with demand.
Vinyl is now treated as a merchandise item by many labels and artists, and as such it is a significant contributor to the overall earnings of many artists, from the smallest independent to Taylor Swift.
An artist/songwriter of Taylor Swift’s stature may not rely on earnings from vinyl, but other songwriters most certainly do. This is particularly true of artist/songwriters who have seen their high margin vinyl sales cannibalized by streaming (as was noted in the recent report by the UK Parliament’s Digital Culture Media & Sport Committee on the Economics of Music Streaming). And ALL songwriters rely on any source of revenue available for exploitation of their songs.
As a rightsholder and administrator of legacy and current copyrights, I can testify that mechanicals from physical and download media are a substantial share of overall royalties.
In reviewing my clients’ 2Q21 statements, one legacy songwriter received 57% of his period royalties from physical mechanicals and 9% from download mechanicals. Another writer had uniquely high grand rights and sync royalties for the period, but still saw 17% of overall royalties from physical and download mechanicals. If we remove the grand rights and sync amounts, the overall total from physical and download mechanicals is 35%.
It is clear that streaming rates, even at 15.1%, are not sustainable for most songwriters. It is obvious that without a more equitable streaming revenue distribution model, we will continue to see songwriters leave the business entirely, or at least be forced to pick up side gigs to increase their income.
These facts provide the undeniable case against freezing the Subpart B rate at $.091 per unit. Arguments I have heard from insiders defending their decision to freeze the rates are that downloads will decline if Apple stops supporting iTunes, and that physical sales are so negligible that they just do not matter. Walk into any record store or follow fans to the merch stands at a concert and you will see and hear the real story. Also, Apple is not the only distributor of digital downloads.
It appears that significant and impactful decisions are allowed to be made by a tiny group of participants that is in the room primarily because this group has tens of millions of dollars to fund legal expenses. This very small group with undeniably substantial resources and very deep pockets decided that it is in support of a rate freeze.
This very small group is now asking the Judges to apply its private deal to each and every songwriter in the world. And yet, almost none of these songwriters were included in that decision to freeze the rate.
The ability for just two trade organizations to have such an oppressive global impact is staggering. What about the rest of the songwriters and independent publishers and their due process rights?
Respectfully, I implore the Judges to keep in mind that the NMPA does not represent all music publishers, and the NMPA itself owns no copyrights. At best, the NMPA Board of Directors could speak solely for the music publishers that employ them.
NSAI is one of many United States songwriter organizations, and like the NMPA, owns no copyrights. It most certainly does not represent all songwriters from all US songwriter organizations, and it certainly does not represent songwriters around the world who are not affiliated with songwriter organizations.
As an illustration of global songwriter opposition, both the UK’s Ivors Academy and the European Composer and Songwriter Alliance have each come out against frozen mechanicals.
I ask the Judges to recognize that NSAI and the NMPA do not have such broad authority to reasonably put forth decisions that affect all the world’s songwriters and publishers.
In the recent Web V decision, the Judges acknowledged the need for an inflation-indexed increase in the statutory rate for sound recordings. Due to the inevitable decline in buying power created by inflation, the physical and download mechanical rate must correspondingly increase.
I have no objection to a settlement related to mechanicals. I do have an objection to a freeze proposed without authority that does not both increase the old $.091 rate and also include an adjustment for inflation at a bare minimum.
To freeze the rate for 20 years ignores the debilitating impact of inflation, ignores the needs of songwriters and truly independent music publishers like me who are not represented before the CRB, and frankly, displays a willingness to undervalue music.
It is imperative that in the future, publishers and songwriters at large, domestically, and globally be given a mechanism to participate in the rate-setting process, whether or not they have millions of dollars to spend on lawyers.
Music is crucial to human well-being. The American Songbook and its many creators are a treasured element of United States, and in fact, world culture.
How can something so important, so meaningful and so rare not be deserving of a rate increase that at least mitigates the effect of inflation?
Chief Copyright Royalty Judge Jesse M. Feder Copyright Royalty Judge David R. Strickler Copyright Royalty Judge Steve Ruwe
U.S. Copyright Royalty Board
101 Independence Ave SE / P.O. Box 70977 Washington, DC 20024-0977
July 26, 2021
IN RE DETERMINATION OF ROYALTY RATES AND TERMS FOR MAKING AND DISTRIBUTING PHONORECORDS, DOCKET NUMBER 21-CRB-0001-PR (2023-2027)
(Phonorecords IV)
Honorable Judges,
I am a music lawyer in Austin, Texas, and represent songwriters throughout the state of Texas. Over the last two months, I have spent a considerable amount of time educating songwriters about the proposed settlement (“Proposed Settlement”) presented by the three major labels, the National Music Publishers Association (NMPA) and Nashville Songwriters International (NSAI) (collectively “Settlement Parties”) to freeze the statutory mechanical rate in connection with physical products and digital downloads through 2027.
The feedback I received was straightforward and foreseeable: songwriters do not wish to see this rate frozen for yet another five years. As someone who works with songwriters far removed from the major music industry hubs, like Los Angeles, Nashville and New York, and from the place where the rules are made, Washington, D.C., you quickly recognize that a significant education gap exists, and many songwriters do not comprehend basic copyright and music publishing concepts. Naturally, if songwriters do not grasp music publishing basics, they do not know about this Phonorecords IV proceeding, or government rate-settings in general.
We must remember those songwriters as this rate-setting progresses – as they too are copyright owners who are entitled to due process and transparency. There would be no music publishing business without them.
Thank you for the opportunity to comment in this proceeding and please note that the views I am expressing here are not made on behalf of any client or the State Bar of Texas.
I. Private Party Settlements Between Willing Buyers and Willing Sellers Representing Different Sides of the Same Corporate Coin Do Not Reflect an Effectively Competitive Market.
With the passage of the Music Modernization Act in 2018, the Copyright Royalty Board (CRB) was instructed in future Section 115 rate-setting proceedings, like this Phonorecords IV proceeding, to “establish rates and terms that most clearly represent the rates and terms that would have been negotiated in the marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing seller.” Pub. L. No. 115-264, § 102(a)(3), 132 Stat. at 3680. In establishing such rates and terms, the Copyright Royalty Judges (“CRJs”) are to base their decision on “economic, competitive and programming information presented by the parties.” 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(1)(F).
While Phonorecords IV is the first proceeding by which this “willing buyer/willing seller” standard will be applied in the Section 115 context, this standard and the aforementioned language have been the basis for Section 114 rate-settings which provide instructive precedent. Both the CRB and D.C. Circuit in prior Section 114 proceedings understood that proposed rates are to reflect an effectively competitive market. “Legislative history supports the conclusion that
§ 114 directs the Judges to set rates that reflect the workings of a hypothetical effectively competitive market.” 81 FR 26316, 26334. And the CRB “can and should determine whether the proffered rates reflect a sufficiently competitive market, i.e., an ‘effectively competitive’ market.” SoundExchange, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 438 U.S. App. D.C. 332, 346, 904 F.3d 41, 55 (2018). Thus, the CRB should examine whether the mechanical rate freeze proffered by the Settlement Parties reflects an effectively competitive market.
While there has been much discourse and disagreement regarding the true meaning of the “willing buyer/willing seller” standard in prior CRB rate proceedings, this Phonorecords IV proceeding has presented a novel conundrum that the CRJs must inspect: what happens when the willing buyer and willing seller are effectively the same parties at the corporate level?
On one side of the Proposed Settlement sits the three major record labels (Sony Music Entertainment, Warner Music Group and Universal Music Group), who are to pay these mechanical royalties to music publishers and songwriters. On the other side of the proposed settlement sits the NMPA and NSAI. The NMPA’s board is comprised of representatives of the publishing company corporate affiliates of the three major labels on the other side of the negotiating table.1 Further, these major publishing company board members appear to have greater voting power than other NMPA board members on account of their gross annual revenue.2It is also worth noting that the NSAI represents only fragment of the songwriter community, and that two of the three songwriters who penned the “SONGWRITERS REFUTE FALSE CLAIMS REGARDING COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BOARD” letter3
2 “NMPA shall have two classes of voting members: executive members and general members. A member shall be an executive member if its Gross Revenue is equal to or in excess of One hundred million dollars in the prior calendar year. A member shall be a general member if its Gross Revenue is less than One hundred million dollars in the prior calendar year.” “Each executive and general member shall be entitled to one vote for each one-hundred thousand dollars of gross revenue of such member (including its affiliates) with respect to any matter to be voted on by members; provided that (i) each member shall have at least one vote, and (ii) with respect to a particular calendar year, each executive member shall have no more votes than the number of votes held by the General Member with the greatest number of votes for such year.” NMPA Inc. 2018 IRS 990, Schedule O, at 27.
3SONGWRITERS REFUTE FALSE CLAIMS REGARDING COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BOARD, available at
(presumably published in response to negative press on account of this proposed freeze) sit on NMPA boards, one on the board of NMPA Inc., and the other on the board of the NMPA SONGS Foundation.4
How these organizations wish to conduct their business is wholly up to them, as is how they choose to represent their members. Nonetheless, when I see a phrase in a motion reflecting the intentions of a group of parties riddled with conflicts of interest, “the settlement represents the consensus of buyers and sellers representing the vast majority of the market for `mechanical’ rights for [the 37 CFR 385] Subpart B Configurations”5– I believe it is important to acknowledge that there are countless millions of copyright owners that these parties do not represent. While the Proposed Settlement may represent the “consensus” of the wealthy major music publishing companies and their record label counterparts, in no manner does this settlement speak for the consensus of songwriters and independent publishers, who lack the overwhelming resources needed to participate in this proceeding and whose views were not solicited.
In sum, none of these factors lead me to believe that this Proposed Settlement reflects an “effectively competitive market.”
II. The Dire Need for Transparency.
In addition to the proposed settlement, the Settlement Parties (less the NSAI) also referenced a separate Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”):
“Concurrent with the settlement, the Joint Record Company Participants and NMPA have separately entered into a memorandum of understanding addressing certain negotiated licensing processes and late fee waivers.”6
If this “Memorandum of Understanding” is irrelevant to the proposed settlement, why would it be referenced in the motion to adopt the settlement? Setting aside the broadly drafted “certain negotiated licensing processes,” the phrase “late fee waivers” is exceptionally concerning. I interpret this language to mean that money is changing hands as consideration for this proposed rate freeze – but ultimately, I cannot know this with certainty since neither the Proposed Settlement nor the MOU have been published.
As songwriters worldwide may be bound to the decisions rendered in this Phonorecords IV, it is of the utmost importance for the CRB to work to afford songwriters with complete transparency. In a letter dated July 13, 2021,7Representative Lloyd Doggett (TX-35) asked,
“May the CRB disclose (or compel the settlement participants to disclose) the unredacted actual settlement agreements referenced in the Motion, including the MOU?”
I would also like to know the answer to this question. Further, in the event the CRB does not reject this Proposed Settlement, it should publish both the actual, unredacted proposed settlement, along with the MOU, not merely the regulations giving effect to the settlement. If songwriters and independent music publishers worldwide are to be bound to these terms, they deserve to have the opportunity to review and to be able to provide meaningful comment on these actual documents at a minimum.
III. Songwriters and Independent Music Publishers Should Not Face a Rate Freeze In The Midst of a Vinyl Resurgence, During a Worldwide Pandemic.
With the constant consumption of music via the streaming services, many do not realize the degree of revenue generated from the sale of physical products (vinyl, CDs) and digital downloads in the United States. Notwithstanding the devastating pandemic which forced the majority of musicians to pivot, and resulted in at the very least the temporary shutdown of a significant amount of businesses, revenue from the physical music sales amounted to $1.13 billion dollars in 2020.8Additionally, vinyl record sales increased by more than 28% from 2019 to 2020.9 Further, physical and downloads accounted for 15% of worldwide revenue for U.S. recorded music in 2020.10 Just within the last couple of months, Taylor Swift broke the modern- era weekly vinyl album sales record.11Record Store Day Drop #1 sparked 1.3 million vinyl album sales during the week ending June 17, 2021, with 942,000 records sold at independent record stores — resulting in the largest weekly vinyl sales at the indie sector in MRC Data history.12Those Record Store Day figures represent over $1.1 million dollars in mechanical royalties generated within a weekly period (assuming 10 tracks per album at the current statutory rate of 9.1 cents) – which I believe is economically significant for songwriters.
Given the vinyl resurgence, mechanical royalties from physical product sales are a crucial revenue stream for all songwriters, and particularly for independent songwriters who have struggled financially on account of COVID-19 and do not have the resources to compete for the streaming numbers generated by top artists signed with major labels. The effects of COVID-19 are properly taken into account when approximating a free market agreement because of what
U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen described as “long-term scarring”13which is projected to exceed the period of the Phonorecords IV rate setting. For context, the mechanical royalty “rate” pertaining to streams on Spotify Premium during April 2020 amounted to $0.00059 per
stream (according to the Audiam U.S. Mechanical rate calculator14). The “rate” for the ad- supported tier of Spotify was even lower.
Not only is the music industry experiencing a vinyl resurgence, but also, even CD sales are seeing a boost. According to a July 14, 2021, report from Billboard:
“Vinyl sales, which have grown for the past decade, more than doubled between January and June, up 108.2% to 19.2 million from 9.2 million in the first six months of last year. Even CD sales, which have been steadily and precipitously declining, posted a modest 2.2% gain, to 18.9 million units.”15
IV. What’s Changed Since 2014? The Willing Buyer/Willing Seller Standard was Supposed to Result in Fairer Rates.
Every person reviewing the comments in this proceeding should go back and review the Copyright Office’s 2015 “Copyright and the Music Marketplace Study.”16Copyright owners and their representatives within the study shared a common judgement: the then-current 801(b)(1) four-factor test standard resulted in deflated rates — however, this quagmire could be remedied by the adoption of the “willing buyer/willing seller standard.”17According to the NMPA and Harry Fox Agency’s joint comment in 2014:
“Continued application of the 801(b) standard will ensure that the statutory royalty rate is held artificially low, and that songwriters and music publishers will continue to be treated unfairly in the marketplace.”18
Phonorecords IV is the first proceeding in the Section 115 context by which this “willing buyer/willing seller” standard is to be applied. If the Proposed Settlement is accepted by the CRJs, songwriters and music publishers are no better off than they were under the former 801(b)(1) standard; the statutory rate will continue to be held artificially low through 2027, and songwriters and music publishers will continue to endure unfair treatment in the marketplace.
Proposing a freeze for the Subpart B rates during the first Section 115 proceeding applying the “willing buyer/willing seller” standard produces a disastrous ripple-effect with respect to other current and future rate-settings. In the current Phonorecords III remand, Pandora not only has used the Proposed Settlement to make the case that the streaming mechanicals rate in the 2012 settlement was a “good benchmark,” but also used this argument to rationalize the 2012 rate being too high.19
Equally perplexing upon retrospect is commentary from the NSAI. After stating the organization’s support of eliminating Section 115 entirely (which as an aside, I agree with), the NSAI stated:
“We favor a willing buyer-willing seller free marketplace approach to determining mechanical royalty rates. We believe the underlying work is more valuable that the present 9.1 [sic] rate established by the Copyright Royalty Board.”20
It does not sit well when the organization representing songwriters is party to a settlement proposing extending the freeze at 9.1 cents, seven years after advocating for a “willing buyer/willing seller” rate-setting standard because songs were more valuable than the 9.1 cent rate.
V. Rates Should not be Frozen Just Because Certain Settlement Parties Deem a Format is Not Worth the Fight.
It is evident that trade organizations representing the publishers and songwriters in this proceeding and prior proceedings have not wished to advocate for an increased mechanical rate for physical products, as they prefer to concentrate on categories that they believe to be economically significant, such as the interactive streaming categories.21This lack of advocacy was not intended to demonstrate that rate freeze at 9.1 cents reflected the appropriate value of mechanical royalties for physical products, but instead that physical medium revenue was not going to make much of an economic difference within the next five years.22It is understandable that the NMPA and NSAI have concentrated their efforts on the abysmal streaming services and I applaud the organizations for such efforts. The NSAI also reechoed these sentiments in early June, 2021:
“Based on industry revenue analysis, it is anticipated that physical mechanical royalties will amount to less than 1% of the total mechanical royalty revenue in the United States during 2023-2028, the rate period this CRB proceeding covers. History and experience told us not to create a powerful opponent when there is a strong possibility of losing with little to gain. So, we decided to focus on the digital streaming services and streaming rates during the next trial. While 1% of revenue is meaningful, waging war was not worth the risk, especially since the rate may have been lowered!”23
To date, I have not seen this industry revenue analysis claiming that physical mechanical royalties will amount to less than 1% of the total U.S. mechanical royalty revenue over the next five years. Even if this is the consensus of various industry experts, the figure is simply a prediction. And as the data in Section III shows, the physical format has become increasingly
popular and provides a meaningful revenue stream for songwriters and publishers — despite prior economic predictions from industry leaders.
In sum, songwriters should not face a continued rate freeze for Subpart B configurations due to trade organizations deeming that these formats are not worth the fight.
VI. May the CRJs Determine this Proposed Settlement Applies only to the Settlement Participants?
Given the volume of songwriters who are self-published (or self-administered, as the Mechanical Licensing Collective calls it), and the number of independent music publishers who are not NMPA members and have no ties to the major publishers, the question becomes, what recourse do they have when private parties with endless resources decide to convene with their major label counterparts and propose a mechanical rate freeze? May the CRB determine that this frozen rate only applies to the Settlement Parties, but hold that a higher rate will apply to everyone else?
Conclusion
This is the first time I have commented on a CRB rate-proceeding — I was in high school during Phonorecords I and was completing law school when Phonorecords III commenced. This Phonorecords IV proceeding has taught me a lot, and has also raised a lot of questions in my mind about the process of rate-proceedings in general. Ultimately, a settlement to freeze the mechanical rate for the physical format, forged by parties who are one and the same at the corporate level during a vinyl boom in midst of a worldwide pandemic neither reflects an effectively competitive market nor is in the interest of songwriters. Making this situation all the worse is the fact that some of these Settlement Parties advocated for the repeal of the prior rate- setting standard in favor of this “willing buyer/willing seller” standard because they contended the former resulted in deflated rates and the latter would bequeath songwriters with higher rates. If this is truly the end result of CRB rate-proceedings, a process must be established by which copyright owners without the financial resources will have the ability to not only participate in such proceedings, but also have their own independent advocacy arm which can represent their interests. Because as it stands, I do not see the interests of songwriters being adequately represented in Phonorecords IV.
[The great David Poe was among the first songwriters to post a comment opposing freezing the mechanical royalty rate for physical and downloads promoted by the NMPA and the Nashville Songwriters Association International. We’re going to be posting the comments, but wanted to start with David Poe’s passionate and well-reasoned comment that you can download here.]
July 12, 2021
Via Electronic Delivery
Chief Copyright Royalty Judge Jesse M. Feder
Copyright Royalty Judge David R. Strickler
Copyright Royalty Judge Steve Ruwe
US Copyright Royalty Board
101 Independence Ave SE / P.O. Box 70977 Washington, DC 20024-097
To Your Honors:
Choices you will make regarding mechanical rates will impact the current and future musicmakers’ ability to contribute to our most profound national export: art.
Musicmakers intuitively understand how we stand on the shoulders of giants. Similarly, each aspect of music- adjacent policy sets a precedent for another. And for years, the devaluation of music has been trending: when music piracy made music free, cover charges at local live venues disappeared; when media conglomeration became legal, playlists became homogenous, and far less localized; when algorithms control streaming services, offerings became more generic, by design.
A culture that declares music to be worth less can expect worthless music. It can also expect more musical careers to be sustained only by those who can afford to lose money.
Consider this: our Top Ten is full of artists who are children of the affluent — those who can afford to do this gig. Not children of millionaires: Stevie Wonder, Aretha Franklin, Bob Dylan. The quality of the contributions made by
those who come from privileged upbringings may be a matter of taste, but we can be certain that lessening the ability for musicmakers to make a credible living will beget barriers to entry and a less equitable cohort.
Beyond the cultural impact, common sense arguments against re-freezing mechanical rates that have already in place for two generations include:
Money. The rate that was a little less than a dime in 2009 is functionally worth a little more than a nickel now
— its buying power will only decrease with time.
2. Ethics. Objectively speaking, the proposed freeze represents neither a free nor a fairly-regulated market. It is best characterized as “willing buyer, unwilling seller.”
3. Support from authentic shareholders. Exponentially more musicmakers and music advocacy groups oppose re-freezing mechanical rates. Organizations doing so comprise a distinctly inclusive cohort that looks like America, as well as the diverse, borderless history of music. Among groups opposing frozen mechanicals are the Songwriters Guild of America, the Alliance of Women Film Composers, the Alliance of Latin- American Composers & Authors, the Pan-African Composers and Songwriters Alliance, the Society of Composers and Lyricists, Music Answers, and the Music Creators of North America.
Groups expressing support for freezing mechanicals believe that musicmakers should make less than what we make now. Given this, any claim they make to represent the interests artists is disingenuous. While these groups’ lobbying resources are formidable, both their agenda and actual membership represent a perilously slim minority of musicmakers.
I believe the technological democratization of tools and access for artists of all mediums could enable a new American renaissance. Let us support a regulatory model that fosters that goal, and gives a diverse group of artists the means to do great work that inspires us all.
[Anthony Garnier has the honor of being the first commenter in the frozen mechanicals hearing.]
July 18, 2021
Via Electronic Delivery
Copyright Royalty Judge David R. Strickler Chief Copyright Royalty Judge Jesse M. Feder Copyright Royalty Judge Steven Ruwe US Copyright Royalty Board 101 Independence Ave SE Washington, DC 20024
To Your Honors:
As an artist whose career depends on the sustainability of songwriters, I write with considerable concern for the proposed settlement agreement in Phonorecords IV which will affect ALL songwriters, including independents who are not party to the private, non transparent settlement agreement.
As your Honors are aware, the “willing buyer-willing seller” concept was established as a basis for fairness in the regulatory regime of the compulsory license when the Copyright Royalty Board (CRB) was established. Vertical integration (ownership, interlocking boards) between the major labels and major publishers poses a serious conflict of interest and engenders self dealing among negotiators. Concurrent to the antitrust discussions in Congress concerning vertical integration between corporations, this important “willing buyer-willing seller” concept is an issue which songwriters who are not party to the private agreement wish to address as a matter of fairness.
Along with hundreds of thousands of songwriters and composers, I am strongly opposed to the proposed adoption by the CRB of a freeze on mechanical royalty rates for physical phonorecords and downloads, and against other non-transparent elements of the so-called agreement presented to the CRB for adoption by the National Music Publishers Association (NMPA), the Nashville Songwriters Association lnt’I (NSAI), and the major record labels.
NMPA and NSAI have not consulted with any other songwriter organizations despite claiming to represent the interests of songwriters for the entire world. No other songwriter or composer group, neither US or otherwise, joins NSAI in agreeing that adoption of the agreement would serve the interests of music creators rather than cause irreparable harm to their members.
Their secret agreement should be binding only on the parties who opt into the secret agreements, while everyone else should be subject to a different royalty rate determined by equitable and fair marketplace conditions and principles.
[This is a letter from Austin Congressman Lloyd Doggett (D-TX) to the Librarian of Congress (who appoints and can sack the Copyright Royalty Judges) and the head of the Copyright Office about procedures in the Copyright Royalty Board’s proceeding on frozen mechanicals. Download the original letter here.]
Dr. Carla Hayden, Librarian of Congress Shira Perlmutter, Register of Copyrights The Library of Congress 101 Independence Ave SE Washington, DC 20540
Dear Dr. Hayden and Ms. Perlmutter,
As a Representative covering music communities from San Antonio to Austin, the “Live Music Capitol of the World,” some of my songwriter constituents[1] are concerned about some procedural and substantive issues arising in the ongoing “Determination of Royalty Rates and Terms for Making and Distributing Phonorecords (Phonorecords IV)” currently pending before the Copyright Royalty Board (CRB). I write to seek some clarity for them and for me. The statutory rates set by the CRB are binding on all songs ever written or that may ever be written by anyone in the world who exploits songs in copyright in the United States. While referred to as a “minimum” I am told that statutory rates in practice are a maximum and are, of course, compulsory. Naturally, I am concerned that we not misstep.
While I know the CRB has not rendered a decision in Phonorecords IV, I am trying to understand the process by which the CRB: (1) evaluates settlement agreements proffered by certain parties to a proceeding prior to publishing those settlements for public comment, (2) determines the application of the new “willing buyer/willing seller” standard for rate setting when buyer and seller are related parties, and (3) the degree of transparency that the CRB may require of participants in the proceeding particularly terms of private settlements that the parties voluntarily disclose related to the rates they have negotiated.
In particular, I draw your attention to the Motion To Adopt Settlement Of Statutory Royalty Rates And Terms For Subpart B Configurations, Docket No. 21-CRB-0001-PR (2023-2027) filed by the National Music Publishers Association (NMPA), Nashville Songwriters Association International, Sony Music Entertainment, UMG Recordings, Inc. and Warner Music Group Corp.[2] This settlement has provoked concern because of its disclosed terms regarding an additional five-year freeze for “mechanical” royalty rates on phonorecords in the physical and permanent download configurations, and undisclosed terms if adopted by the CRB in its determination.
The settling parties apparently refer to both a settlement agreement relating to certain mechanical royalty rates and another agreement that refers to undisclosed “negotiated licensing processes and late fee waivers.” Those settling parties ask the CRB to adopt their settlement on an “industry-wide basis,” and I am trying to better understand what this request means. I do not wish to interfere in the CRB’s adjudication of the matters before it, but I hope you can help me understand certain procedural matters relating to the CRB itself.
I would appreciate your answering the following questions at your earliest convenience due to the ongoing nature of both Phonorecords IV and other rate setting proceedings before the CRB and thank you in advance for your courtesy.
(1) There appear to be two settlements referenced in the Motion, being the rate setting settlement summarized in draft regulations attached and this other “memorandum of understanding” (“MOU”) between Sony Music Entertainment, UMG Recordings, Inc. and Warner Music Group Corp. (i.e., the same parties to the private rate settlement except the NSAI).
Question: May the CRB disclose (or compel the settlement participants to disclose) the unredacted actual settlement agreements referenced in the Motion, including the MOU?
(2) In the Music Modernization Act,[3] Congress directed CRB Judges to set the statutory mechanical royalty rate by utilizing a “willing buyer/willing seller” rate standard designed to model the rates that would be reflected in a free market. In the case of the “industry-wide” settlements proposed by the Motion, it appears that there may be joint ownership of some of the members of the NMPA and the record companies proposing the settlement on rates.
Question: Are the Subpart B rates subject to the “willing buyer/willing seller” rate standard?
Question: If so, what is the rule when the “willing buyer” and “willing seller” are under the same corporate umbrella?
(3) It seems that the participants in the proceeding, and certainly the participants in the settlement, are dominated by major publishers and record companies seeking to impose their private settlement on all other songwriters. If other songwriter groups are not participating in the proceeding but object to the settlement (such as songwriters from more diverse communities) I am concerned that those songwriters may have no recourse.
Question: May the CRB limit the scope of a private party settlement to the parties, but determine a higher rate applies to others?
The Motion and the “frozen mechanicals” issue has prompted considerable public debate in the United States and Europe as reported in The Trichordist artist blog[,[4] Billboard, [5] Complete Music Update[ [6] and the Creative Industries Newsletter[7]. Three NSAI songwriters have published a defense[8] of their participation in the Motion. The Trichordist notes that the CRB produces considerable frustration and passion on all sides because the process is “inequitable, unwieldy and prohibitively expensive.”[9]
On page 4 of the Motion, the parties advise the CRB that this settlement represents the “consensus of buyers and sellers representing the vast majority of the market for “mechanical ” rights for [physical, permanent downloads]…” Setting aside the issue of the settlement participants representing “buyers” and “sellers” under the same corporate umbrellas, it seems appropriate that every songwriter who will be affected by the outcome of this proceeding, from San Antonio and Austin, Memphis, to Detroit and beyond, should have the opportunity to read and comment meaningfully on the actual settlement agreement posed for adoption, and the related MOU referenced.
I look forward to your response and to continuing to work with you on these matters of such critical importance to our culture and to songwriters everywhere. Please also let me know if you have any other insights to this which may be helpful for my constituents.
If you’ve been following the heated controversy around the frozen mechanicals crisis, you’ll know that the Copyright Royalty Board has received a proposal from the NMPA, NSAI and the major labels to freeze the statutory rate for songwriter mechanical royalties on physical (like CDs and vinyl) and permanent downloads (like iTunes) for another five years. That proposal mentions a settlement to establish the frozen rates (which extends the rates that were first frozen in 2006 for another 5 years) and a memorandum of understanding between the NMPA and the major labels for something, we’re not quite sure what.
Filing comments with the CRB is not quite as simple as filing comments with the Copyright Office and it takes a bit of time–comments close on July 26, so do not leave setting up your account until July 26, or even July 25. I would do it today. You can set up your account before you file your comments so that the account part is all ready to go.
Here are some steps you will probably go through to set up your account:
Go to app.crb.gov. Look for “Register for an account” (the one in small print at the bottom of the list)
2. “Register for an account” will take you to a sign up page. Scroll down to “User Information”. You only need to complete the required fields with a red star (so ignore the bar number, etc.)
There is a pull down menu under “Register as” with a few different roles listed. The one you want is “Commenter”
Then complete the form completing only the required fields.
3. The CRB will then authenticate your account and send you an email confirmation. That part goes pretty quickly. However, once your account is authenticated, make sure you log on. You should be taken to a dashboard, but the question is whether your dashboard looks like this:
Note that the dashboard does not have a button to “File a comment”. If this is what you see when you log into your account, you are not done. Contact the CRB support people ecrbsupport@egov.com and tell them that your account has not been activated to comment.
4. Your account should look like this:
The comment you want to file is for Phonorecords IV. You can ignore the other dockets. It took me several trips to the support desk to get the correct filing tabs on my account, hopefully you won’t have that problem. But–just in case, don’t be running around crazy on July 26 trying to file the comment you slaved over because you left the account to the last minute.
The Trichordist 
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