Category: Redesignation of The MLC

Who Will Get to the Bottom of The Hundreds of Millions of Black Box Money at MLC?

By Chris Castle

One of the most common questions we get from songwriters about the MLC concerns the gigantic level of “unmatched funds” that have been sitting in the MLC’s accounts since February 2021.  Are they really just waiting until The MLC, Inc. gets redesignated and then distributes hundreds of millions on a market share basis like the lobbyists drafted into the MMA?  

Not My Monkey

Nobody can believe that the MLC can’t manage to pay out several hundred million dollars of streaming mechanical royalties for over three years so far.  (Resulting in the MLC holding $804,555,579 in stocks as of the end of 2022 on its tax return, Part X, line 11.) The proverbial monkey with a dart board could have paid more songwriters in three years.  Face it—doesn’t it just sound illegal?  In my experience, when something sounds or feels illegal, it probably is.

What’s lacking here is a champion to extract the songwriters’ money.  Clearly the largely unelected smart people in charge could have done something about it by now if they wanted to, but they haven’t.  It’s looking more and more like nobody cares or at least nobody wants to do anything about it.  There is profit in delay.

Or maybe nobody is taking responsibility because there’s nobody to complain to.  Or is there? What if such a champion exists?  What if there were no more waiting?  What if there were someone who could bring the real heat to the situation?

Let’s explore one potentially overlooked angle—a federal agency called the Office of the Inspector General.  Who can bring in the OIG?  Who has jurisdiction?  I think someone does and this is the primary reason why the MLC is different from HFA.

Does The Inspector General Have MLC Jurisdiction?

Who has jurisdiction over the MLC (aside from its severely conflicted board of directors which is not setting the world on fire to pump the hundreds of millions of black box money back into the songwriter economy).  The Music Modernization Act says that the mechanical licensing collective operates at the pleasure of the Congress under the oversight of the U.S. Copyright Office and the OIG has oversight of the Copyright Office through its oversight of the Library of Congress.

But, hold on, you say.  The MLC, Inc. is a private company and the government typically does not have direct oversight over the operations of a private company.

The key concept there is “operates” and that’s the difference between the statutory concept of a mechanical licensing collective and the actual operational collective which is a real company with real employees and real board members.  Kind of like shadows on the wall of a cave for you Plato fans.  Or the magic 8 ball.

The MLC, Inc. is all caught up with the government.  It exists because the government allows it to, it collects money under the government’s blanket mechanical license, its operating costs are set by the government, and its board members are “inferior officers” of the United States.   Even though The MLC, Inc. is technically a private organization, it is at best a quasi-governmental organization, almost like the Tennessee Valley Authority or the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.  So it seems to me that The MLC, Inc. is a stand-in for the federal government.

But The MLC, Inc. is not the federal government.  When Congress passed the MMA and it charged the Copyright Office with oversight of the MLC.  Unfortunately, Congress does not appear to have appropriated funds for the additional oversight work it imposed on the Office.  

Neither did Congress empower the Office to charge the customary reasonable fees to cover the oversight work Congress mandated.  The Copyright Office has an entire fee schedule for its many services, but not MLC oversight.  

Even though the MLC’s operating costs are controlled by the Copyright Royalty Board and paid by the users of the blanket license through an assessment, this assessment money does not cover the transaction cost of having the Copyright Office fulfill an oversight role.

An oversight role may be ill suited to the historical role of the Copyright Office, a pre-New Deal agency with no direct enforcement powers—and no culture of cracking heads about wasteful spending like sending a contingent to Grammy Week.

In fact, there’s an argument that The MLC, Inc. should write a check to the taxpayer to offset the additional costs of MLC oversight.  If that hasn’t happened in five years, it’s probably not going to happen.  

Where Does the Inspector General Fit In?

Fortunately, the Copyright Office has a deep bench to draw on at the Office of the Inspector General for the Library of Congress, currently Dr. Glenda B. Arrington.  That kind of necessary detailed oversight is provided through the OIG’s subpoena power, mutual aid relationships with law enforcement partners as well as its own law enforcement powers as an independent agency of the Department of Homeland Security.  Obviously, all of these functions are desirable but none of them are a cultural fit in the Copyright Office or are a realistic resource allocation.

The OIG is better suited to overseeing waste, fraud and abuse at the MLC given that the traditional role of the Copyright Office does not involve confronting the executives of quasi-governmental organizations like the MLC about their operations, nor does it involve parsing through voluminous accounting statements, tracing financial transactions, demanding answers that the MLC does not want to give, and perhaps even making referrals to the Department of Justice to open investigations into potential malfeasance.  

Or demanding that the MLC set a payment schedule to pry loose the damn black box money.

One of the key roles of the OIG is to conduct audits.  A baseline audit of the MLC, its closely held investment policy and open market trading in hundreds of millions in black box funds might be a good place to start.  

It must be said that the first task of the OIG might be to determine whether Congress ever authorized MLC to “invest” the black box funds in the first place.  Congress is usually very specific about authorizing an agency to “invest” other people’s money, particularly when the people doing the investing are also tasked with finding the proper owners and returning that money to them, with interest. 

None of that customary specificity is present with the MLC.

For example, MLC CEO Kris Ahrens told Congress that the simple requirement that the MLC pay interest on “unmatched” funds in its possession (commonly called “black box”) was the basis on which the MLC was investing hundreds of millions in the open market.  This because he assumed the MLC would have to earn enough from trading securities or other investment income to cover their payment obligations.  That obligation is mostly to cover the federal short term interest rate that the MLC is required to pay on black box.

The Ghost of Grammy Week

The MLC has taken the requirement that the MLC pay interest on black box and bootstrapped that mandate to justify investment of the black box in the open market.  That is quite a bootstrap.

An equally plausible explanation would be that the requirement to pay interest on black box is that the interest is a reasonable cost of the collective to be covered by the administrative assessment.  The plain meaning of the statute reflects the intent of the drafters—the interest payment is a penalty to be paid by the MLC for failing to find the owners of the money in the first place, not an excuse to create a relatively secret $800 million hedge fund for the MLC.  

I say relatively secret because The MLC, Inc. has been given the opportunity to inform Congress of how much money they made or lost in the black box quasi-hedge fund, who bears the risk of loss and who profits from trading.  They have not answered these questions.  Perhaps they could answer them to the OIG getting to the bottom of the coverup.

We do not really know the extent of the MLC’s black box holdings, but it presumably would include the hundreds of millions invested under its stewardship in the $1.9 billion Payton Limited Maturity Fund SI (PYLSX). Based on public SEC filings brought to my attention, The MLC, Inc.’s investment in this fund is sufficient to require disclosure by PYLSX as a “Control Person” that owns 25% or more of PYLSX’s $1.9 billion net asset value. PYLSX is required to disclose the MLC as a Control Person in its fundraising materials to the Securities and Exchange Commission (Form N-1A Registration Statement filed February 28, 2023).  This might be a good place to start.

Otherwise, the MLC’s investment policy makes no sense.  The interest payment is a penalty, and the black box is not a profit center.

But you don’t even have to rely on The MLC, Inc.’s quasi governmental status in order for OIG to exert jurisdiction over the MLC.  It is also good to remember that the Presidential Signing Statement for the Music Modernization Act specifically addresses the role of the MLC’s board of directors as “inferior officers” of the United States:

Because the directors [likely both voting and nonvoting] are inferior officers under the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, the Librarian [of Congress] must approve each subsequent selection of a new director. I expect that the Register of Copyrights will work with the collective, once it has been designated, to ensure that the Librarian retains the ultimate authority, as required by the Constitution, to appoint and remove all directors.

The term “inferior officers” refers to those individuals who occupy positions that wield significant authority, but whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate. Therefore, the OIG could likely review the actions of the MLC’s board (voting and nonvoting members) as they would any other inferior offices of the United States in the normal course of the OIG’s activities.

Next Steps for OIG Investigation

How would the OIG at the Library of Congress actually get involved?  In theory, no additional legislation is necessary and in fact the public might be able to use the OIG whistleblower hotline to persuade the IG to get involved without any other inputs.  The process goes something like this:

  1. Receipt of Allegations: The first step in the OIG investigation process is the receipt of allegations. Allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, and other irregularities concerning LOC  programs and operations like the MLC are received from hotline complaints or other communications. 
  2. Preliminary Review: Once an allegation is received, it undergoes a preliminary review to determine if OIG investigative attention is warranted. This involves determining whether the allegation is credible and reasonably detailed (such as providing a copy of the MLC Congressional testimony including Questions for the Record). If the Office is actually bringing the OIG into the matter, this step would likely be collapsed into investigative action.
  3. Investigative Activity: If the preliminary review warrants further investigation, the OIG conducts the investigation through a variety of activities. These include record reviews and document analysis, witness and subject interviews, IG and grand jury subpoenas, search warrants, special techniques such as consensual monitoring and undercover operations, and coordination with other law enforcement agencies, such as the FBI, as appropriate.  That monitoring might include detailed investigation into the $500,000,000 or more in black box funds, much of which is traded on open market transactions like PYLSX.
  4. Investigative Outputs: Upon completing an investigation, reports and other documents may be written for use by the public, senior decision makers and other stakeholders, including U.S. Attorneys and Copyright Office management. Results of OIG’s administrative investigations, such as employee and program integrity cases, are transmitted to officials for appropriate action. 
  5. Monitoring of Results: The OIG monitors the results of those investigations conducted based on OIG referrals to ensure allegations are sufficiently addressed.

So it seems that the Office of the Inspector General is well suited to assisting the Copyright Office by investigating how the MLC is complying with its statutory financial obligations.  In particular, the OIG is ideally positioned to investigate how the MLC is handling the black box and its open market investments that it so far has refused to disclose to Members of Congress at a Congressional hearing as well as in answers to Questions for the Record from Chairman Issa.

This post previously appeared on MusicTech.Solutions

by Trichordist

The First Shot Across the Bow at the MLC’s “Redesignation” Proceeding #TheReup

We must always tell what we see. Above all, and this is more difficult, we must always see what we see.
Charles Peguy

By Chris Castle

The Reup is on! MTP readers will remember that The MLC, Inc. is in the beginning of its “redesignation” proceeding before the U.S. Copyright Office that we call “the rep,” because…because….well, you have to laugh at some point. Having appointed (or “designated”) The MLC, Inc. as the statutory mechanical licensing collective in 2019, the Copyright Office is required by statute to review The MLC, Inc. to see how they are doing with their exclusive monopoly over songwriter streaming mechanical collections.

It’s important to remember that the mechanical licensing collective (lower case) is a statutory body. Congress tasked the head of the Copyright Office with selecting an entity to actually do the work. In a shocker that rocked the industry, the Copyright Office selected (or “designated”) the favorite corporation of the National Music Publishers Association and the Nashville Songwriters Association International that styled itself “The MLC, Inc.” 

The MLC, Inc. then turned right around and selected the Harry Fox Agency as its data vendor to actually run the accounting part of the collective–another shocker. If you thought you were going to escape the hubris and incompetence of HFA under the glorious revolution of the Music Modernization Act, tough break. So it is now the Copyright Office’s decision to either redesignate The MLC, Inc. (and by default, HFA) for another five years of holding onto your money in their vast black box, or find someone else.

And just to be clear, these exclusive appointments or “designations” last for five years. Every five years, Congress required the Copyright Office to take a critical look at the wisdom of their prior decision and determine after soul-searching and self-criticism whether they should ratify their previous genius by extending the monopoly another five years. As Congress said in the legislative history narrative:

The Register [the head of the Copyright Office] is allowed to re-designate an entity to serve as the collective every 5 years after the initial designation. Although there is no guarantee of a continued designation by the collective, continuity in the collective would be beneficial to copyright owners so long as the entity previously chosen to be the collective has regularly demonstrated its efficient and fair administration of the collective in a manner that respects varying interests and concerns. In contrast, evidence of fraud, waste, or abuse, including the failure to follow the relevant regulations adopted by the Copyright Office, over the prior five years should raise serious concerns within the Copyright Office as to whether that same entity has the administrative capabilities necessary to perform the required functions of the collective. In such cases, where the record of fraud, waste, or abuse is clear, the Register should give serious consideration to the selection of a new entity even if not all criteria are met pursuant to section 115(d)(3)(B)(iii).

So the way this is going to go down according to the Copyright Office is that they will seek a kind of thesis defense from each of The MLC, Inc. and the MLC’s counterpart for the digital services called the Digital Licensee Coordinator or “the DLC” which we often forget is there. Then the public gets to comment on how things are going.

Let’s understand how this game is played. Nobody likes to open the kimono and have their operations examined. But opening the kimono is actually a much bigger deal for the MLC than for the DLC. The MLC has a lot of functionality that perpetuates the same old spaghetti code from HFA and the need to hide it from sunlight. In my view the sense of entitlement and hubris is overwhelmingly stronger at The MLC, Inc. than at the DLC. Remember, the DLC pretty much just writes the overpriced checks to keep MLC executives in the style to which they have become accustomed (see Trichordist “Know Your MLC 2022“).

We are starting to get a sense of how the DLC is going to approach the reup proceeding given a recent blog post by Graham Davies, the new head of the Digital Media Association. DiMA essentially is the DLC. Technically, the DLC’s mission is to represent all users of the blanket mechanical license, and I think perhaps for the first time, the DLC will represent all the users both large and small, not just DiMA members. Let’s take a look at some of the points Graham raised.

The Insult of Governance

But first, remember that the MMA created the first US mechanical licensing CMO. This was an event that had been coming for oh, say 100 years round numbers. The first difference between the US and most other countries is that in the US there is not equal board representation between publishers and songwriters. This is an insult to songwriters. 

That’s right–in the rest of the world, songwriters have at least equal representation. Just call it what it is, it’s an insult. And not a casual insult or the insult of low expectations. This insult is right in your face.

There will be a lot of rending of garments about the unfairness of the MLC’s board composition and that’s all fine, but know this: You will not change the board composition until you change the mindset that produced the board composition.

What is astonishing about how this happened is that before they get to Washington, all these publishers with board seats have good relations with songwriters and value their writers. Do we have arguments inside the family? Sure. But something happens to these publishers when they get to Washington, DC and they go rogue or they are encouraged to go rogue. 

So I would encourage these board members to come back to your values and what you hold dear and don’t listen to the bad advice. The bad advice didn’t build your companies; your relations with your songwriters did. Yet there is such hostility toward this board composition that it will take you years to overcome the insult and the distrust it produced. It didn’t have to happen that way and it should not be allowed to continue.

No Free Lunch

The next big difference is that the cost of standing up and operating the MLC is born by the licensees. There is a reason that this doesn’t happen in any other country–it is a bullshit idea. It OBVIOUSLY produced an inherent conflict of interest at the outset. Does it shovel money onto the kitchen tables of the insiders? Of course. Does it feed into salaries, bonuses and T&E of the MLC? Oh, yes. So let’s see what Graham Davies has to say about this one.

For starters, here’s a headline: THE MONEY IS NOT HAPPY. Get it? What do you think happens when the money is not happy? Maybe, just maybe, you think they might not want to keep paying? Maybe just maybe they gave you your lead for five years and let you get good and hooked before they started reeling you in?

As Graham says:

All around the world, it is the rightsholders who bear the cost of the collectives licensing their rights, and copyright offices or similar government bodies often have oversight powers over the collectives to ensure that royalties are distributed fairly and the collectives operate efficiently.  

In the US, unlike anywhere else in the world, legislators placed the burden of funding the collective’s operations on the licensees as opposed to the rightsholders. This particular arrangement was a feature of the statute, but means a collective’s traditional incentives for optimum performance are not inherently built in and may become skewed. [Now there’s a shocker.]

This structure makes it even more important that the Copyright Office ensures fair and efficient operation of the collective, including for those who fund it.

How can you read that and not realize that THE MONEY IS NOT HAPPY. See what you see. Anyone who believed that the licensees large and small would just go on writing the checks for absurd salaries and ridiculous travel and entertainment expenses must be from Washington.

Oversight Culture Clash

This goes hand-in-hand with the true problem with the entire megillah which is where Graham starts: Lack of oversight. Don’t blow past this. 

Remember, DiMA represents the biggest corporations in commercial history and make no mistake–they own Washington, DC. So when the DiMA members look at this oversight issue, from their point of view the government works for them and the government is falling down on the job. The money is not happy. See what you see.

Oversight is a key part of Graham’s complaint.

As we embark on the redesignation process, oversight of the mechanical licensing collective is a key issue. Collective licensing is common for many rights in the music sector, because it is a sensible solution for reducing transaction costs and improving efficiencies between rightsholders and licensees….

The MMA mandated that the MLC be run by a Board made up largely of music publishers and some songwriters. While it makes sense for rights holders to have oversight over a collective of their rights, it has become apparent in the five years since the MMA was passed, that this structure, without guardrails and robust oversight, provides little incentive for the collective to carefully weigh risks and conduct rigorous cost-benefit analysis of decisions before action. [Like any CMO conducts a “rigorous cost-benefit analysis”–try not to laugh, but you get the idea.] This is of great importance because without a clearly circumscribed remit for The MLC, the positions the collective takes can have significant consequences for the functioning of the US music market.

The record shows that in passing the MMA, Congress chose to establish a collective that would serve as the administrator of  the mechanical blanket license….Congress [did not] intend to write the collective a blank check.  Indeed, Congress was astute in requiring that streaming services be responsible only for the reasonable costs of the collective. Such reasonable costs relate to the collective’s core functions – such as work registration and matching. Where The MLC has focused on these core functions, there is good work [no there isn’t], particularly in the context of the relatively short window from designation to operation [already making excuses]. However, where The MLC has gone beyond its remit, there has been, and continues to be cause for concern. Reasonable costs of the collective cannot include everything from traveling to distant countries to conduct outreach to songwriters far beyond the U.S. licensing system, to suing one of the licensees that pays its costs — using licensee money to pursue its allegations against a licensee on a novel legal theory. [This is the Pandora lawsuit filed by The MLC, Inc. I was wondering how long that would take to get under the skin.]

I take Graham’s point and understand his frustration (and discretion in not calling out the ridiculous salaries). But it must also be said that only lobbyists in the Imperial City would have drafted Title I of the MMA to provide for oversight of a private company by a government agency. That’s just idiotic. First of all, it’s really unfair to expect the Copyright Office to supervise the MLC’s travel and entertainment expenses. They barely have the resources to manage their own operations much less have oversight on Kris Ahrend’s tips in transit. It’s also just not in the cerebral culture of the Copyright Office to have the kind of dressing down relationship with the MLC that would be necessary for financial oversight. 

I also have to call bullshit on this complaint about costs being framed as an oversight issue. Yeah, sure, I guess on some level everything is an oversight issue. But if anything, this is an issue for the board of directors at the MLC which includes the DLC. But in most companies it’s a management issue for the CEO and the CFO. So if Graham has a beef about T&E (which sounds like a legitimate beef and is not the first I’ve heard of it), he needs to take it up with the management. You know, the management that reports to the board the DLC sits on (nonvoting or not).

Alternatively, the operating budget of the MLC comes through the Copyright Royalty Board which approves the budget in the form of the “Administrative Assessment.” The DLC can raise these complaints about spending in that forum as well and really should.

So Graham raises some important points that we should be aware of as the MLC enters its all-important reup proceeding. Stay tuned for responses.

by Trichordist Editor

MLC “ReUp” Proceeding Highlights Ownership Issues for Your Musical Works Database When You Correct To Collect?

Guest post By Chris Castle

Ever wonder who owns the registration data you have slaved to correct and recorrect at your own cost when you “Play Your Part” to “Correct to Collect” at the MLC?

Remember the sainted Music Modernization Act allowed the lobbyists a vehicle to create their mechanical licensing collective in the US that was going to solve all of Big Tech’s problems. The MMA, unsurprisingly, also gave Big Tech a brand new copyright infringement safe harbor arising out of the Spotify class actions. Generations of the children of lawyers and lobbyists will be put through college–thank you songwriters!

One of the few things Congress got right in Title I of the Music Modernization Act is the five-year review of the mechanical licensing collective. Or more precisely, whether the private company previously designated by the Copyright Office to conduct the functions of the Mechanical Licensing Collective (The MLC, Inc.) should have another five years to continue doing whatever it is they do.

Impliedly, and I think a bit unfairly, Congress told the Copyright Office to approve its own decision to appoint the current MLC or admit they made a mistake. This is yet another one of the growing list of oversights in the oversight. Wouldn’t it make more sense for someone not involved in the initial decision to be evaluating the performance of the MLC? Particularly when there are at least tens of millions of dollars changing hands as well as some highly compensated MLC employees, any one of whom makes more than the Copyright Royalty Judges. The MLC’s budget (paid by the services they oversee) was $32,900,000 in 2023 and will be $39,050,000 this year because, you know, the budget is indexed to inflation, just like streaming mechanicals…oh sorry. Not like streaming mechanicals.

Who Owns the Database?

What happens if the Register of Copyright actually fires The MLC, Inc. and designates a new MLC operator? The first question probably should be what is The MLC, Inc.’s plan for a hand off to a successor. But since that doesn’t exist, it instead should be what happens to the vaunted MLC musical works database and the attendant software and accounting systems which seem to be maintained out of the UK for some reason.

I actually raised this ownership question in a comment to the Copyright Office back in 2020. In short, my question was probably more of a statement: ‘‘The musical works database does not belong to the MLC or The MLC and if there is any confusion about that, it should be cleared up right away.” 

The Copyright Office had a very clear response:

While the mechanical licensing collective must ‘‘establish and maintain a database containing information relating to musical works,’’ the statute and legislative history emphasize that the database is meant to benefit the music industry overall and is not ‘‘owned’’ by the collective itself….Any use by the Office referring to the public database as ‘‘the MLC’s database’’ or ‘‘its database’’ was meant to refer to the creation and maintenance of the database, not ownership. [85 FR at 58172, text accompanying notes 30 and 31.]

So if the current operator of the MLC is fired, we know from the MMA and the Copyright Office guidance that one thing The MLC, Inc. cannot do is hold the database and its attendant systems hostage, or demand payment, or any other shadiness. These items do not belong to them so they must not assert control over that which they do not own. Neither does the database belong to any contractor if for no other reason than the MLC, Inc. cannot transfer to a contractor something that the MLC, Inc. doesn’t own in the first place.

Another thing that doesn’t belong to The MLC, Inc. is the hundreds of millions of black box money that the MLC, Inc. has failed to distribute in going on four years. I’ve even heard cynics suggest that the market share distribution of black box will occur immediately following The MLC, Inc.’s redesignation and the corresponding renewal of HFA’s back office contract which seems to be worth about $10 million a year all by itself.

What would also have been helpful would be for Congress to have required the Copyright Office to publish evaluation criteria for what they expected the MLC’s operator to actually do as well as performance benchmarks. Like I said, it’s a bit unfair of Congress to put the Copyright Office in the unprecedented position of evaluating such an important role with no usable guidance whatsoever. Surely Congress did not intend for the Copyright Office to have unfettered autonomy in deciding what standards to apply to their review of a quasi-governmental agency like the MLC? Yet Congress seems to have defaulted to the guardrail of the Administrative Procedures Act or some other backstop to sustain checks and balances on the situation.

But at least the ownership question is settled.

by Trichordist Editor

Better than Cats: The Copyright Office Seeks Public Comment on Periodic Review of the Designations of the Mechanical Licensing Collective and Digital Licensee Coordinator aka #TheReup

In case you missed it, the MLC, Inc. was handed a five year contract in 2019 to operate the mechanical licensing collective. This contract was worth millions and millons of dollars, but more importantly guaranteed that the Harry Fox Agency would have a job for at least another five years. The salty arrangement was the brainchild of the lobbyists, the controlled opposition and the Copyright Office–and has resulted in The MLC, Inc. sitting on hundreds of millions of other peoples money. 

The Copyright Office has posted a notice letting us know that the time has come for the circular admiration society also known as the 5 year review of the MLC and the DLC as required by Title I of the oh so modern Music Modernization Act (yet we keep comeing back to these age-old problems that are not modern at all). This is all conducted by the Copyright Office which in a meaningful way is simply reviewing how well the Copyright Office did with the designation of the MLC, Inc. as much as how well the MLC met expectations.

After suffering through establishing some regulations for the MLC that largely favored the services, the head lawyer at the Copyright Office threw down the pretenses and became employed as a lobbyist for Spotify. Another went to work for the National Association of Broadcasters to screw artists our of a performance right for sound recordings. Can’t wait to congratulate current Copyright Office staff on their employment futures after we get through this important reup for the MLC, Inc. and the lobbyists. I hear the chief butterfly killers have openings for copyright lawyers trained on the public purse.

The comment period in this vitally important review is divided into at least two parts: The special people, i.e., The MLC, Inc. quango and the DLC get to go first, and then the hoi polloi (that’s you and me). You’ll find this language buried at the very bottom of the Reup notice:

Interested members of the public are encouraged to comment on the topics addressed in the designees’ [i.e., the DLC or the MLC’s] submissions or raised by the Office in this notification of inquiry. Commenters may also address any topics relevant to this periodic review of the MLC and DLC designations. Without prejudice to its review of the current designations, the Office hopes that this proceeding will serve as an opportunity for any songwriter, publisher, or DMP who wishes to express concerns, satisfaction, or priorities with respect to the administration of the MMA’s blanket licensing regime to do so, and that any designated MLC or DLC will use that feedback to continually improve its services.

Bite your tongue now.

The Reup Copyright Office MLCDownload
by Trichordist

Bridgeport Music Files Notice of The MLC’s First Royalty Audit

[Editor Charlie sez: a royalty “audit” is a right of the song owner to look inside the books and records of the party paying royalties to confirm that all royalties were paid and that all royalties were paid correctly, usually during a specified period of time. This usually results in the song owner discovering an underpayment that would have gone unpaid without the audit.]

By Chris Castle

It is commonplace for artists to conduct a royalty examination of their record company, sometimes called an “audit.” Until the Music Modernization Act, the statutory license did not permit songwriters to audit users of the statutory license. The Harry Fox Agency “standard” license for physical records had two principal features that differed from the straight statutory license: quarterly accounting and an audit right. When streaming became popular, the services both refused to comply with the statutory regulations and also refused to allow anyone to audit because the statutory regulations they failed to comply with did not permit an audit. I brought this absurdity to the attention of the Copyright Office in 2011.

After much hoopla, the lobbyists wrote an audit right for copyright owners into the Music Modernization Act. However, rather than permitting copyright owners to audit music users as is long standing common practice on the record side, the lobbyists decided to allow copyright owners to audit the Mechanical Licensing Collective. At the expense of the copyright owner, of course, no matter how many mistakes the copyright owner discovered or how big the underpayment. This is consistent with the desire of services to distance themselves from those pesky songwriters by inserting the MLC in between the services and their ultimate vendors, the songwriters and copyright owners. The services can be audited by the MLC (whose salaries are paid by the services), but that hasn’t happened yet to my knowledge.

But the MLC has received what I believe is its first audit notice that was just published by the Copyright Office after receiving it on November 9. First up is Bridgeport Music, Inc. for the period January 1, 2021, through December 31, 2023. January 1, 2021 was the “license availability date” or the date that the MLC began accounting for royalties under the MMA’s blanket license.

2023-27554-bridgeport-audit-noticeDownload

Why Audit Now?

Bridgeport’s audit is wise. There are no doubt millions if not billions of streams to be verified. The MLC’s systems are largely untested, compared to other music users such as record companies that have been audited hundreds, if not thousands of times depending on how long they are operating. Competent royalty examiners will look under the hood and find out whether it’s even possible to render reasonably accurate accounting statements given the MLC’s systems. Maybe it’s all fine, but maybe it’s not. The wisdom of Bridgeport’s two year audit window is that two years is long enough to have a chance at a recovery but it’s not so long that you are drowned in data and susceptible to taking shortcuts. 

In other words, why wait around?

Auditing the Black Box

A big difference between the audit rules the lobbyists wrote into the MMA and other audits is that the MLC audit is based on payments, not statements. The relevant language in the statute makes this very clear (17 USC §115(d)(3)(L):

A copyright owner entitled to receive payments of royalties for covered activities from the mechanical licensing collective may, individually or with other copyright owners, conduct an audit of the mechanical licensing collective to verify the accuracy of royalty payments by the mechanical licensing collective to such copyright owner…The qualified auditor shall determine the accuracy of royalty payments, including whether an underpayment or overpayment of royalties was made by the mechanical licensing collective to each auditing copyright owner.

Royalty payments would include a share of black box royalties distributed to copyright owners. It seems reasonable that on audit a copyright owner could verify how this share was arrived at and whatever calculations would be necessary to calculate those payments, or maybe the absence of such payments that should have been made. Determining what is not paid that should have been paid is an important part of any royalty verification examination.

Systems Transparency

Information too confidential to be detected cannot be corrected.  It is important to remember that copyright owner audits of the MLC will be the first time an independent third party has had a look at the accounting systems and functional technology of The MLC. If those audits reveal functional defects in the MLC’s systems or technology that affects any output of The MLC, i.e., not just the royalties being audited, it seems to me that those defects should be disclosed to the public. Audit settlements should not be used as hush money payments to keep embarrassing revelations from being publicly disclosed.

Unsurprisingly, The MLC lobbied to have broadly confidential treatment of all audits. Realize that there may well be confidential financial information disclosed as part of any audit that both copyright owners and The MLC will want to keep secret. There is no reason to keep secrets about The MLC’s systems. To take an extreme example, if on audit the auditors discovered that The MLC’s systems added 2 plus 2 and got 5, that is a fact that others have a legitimate interest in having disclosed to include the Copyright Office itself that is about to launch a 5 year review of The MLC for redesignation. Indeed, auditors may discover systemic flaws that could arguably require The MLC to recalculate many if not all statements or at least explain why they should not. (Note that a royalty auditor is required to deliver a copy of the auditor’s final report to The MLC for review even before giving it to their client. This puts The MLC on notice of any systemic flaws in The MLC’s systems found by the auditor and gives it the opportunity to correct any factual errors.)

I think that systemic flaws found by an auditor should be disclosed publicly after taking care to redact any confidential financial information. This will allow both the Copyright Office and MLC members to fix any discovered flaws.

The “Qualified Auditor” Typo

It is important to realize that there is no good reason why a C.P.A. must conduct the audit; this is another drafting glitch in the MMA that requires both The MLC’s audited financial statements and royalty compliance examinations be conducted by a C.P.A, defined as a “qualified auditor” (17 USC § 115(e)(25)). It’s easy to understand why audited financials prepared according to GAAP should be opined by a C.P.A. but it is ludicrous that a C.P.A. should be required to conduct a royalty exam for royalties that have nothing to do with GAAP and never have. 

To be frank, I doubt seriously whether anyone involved in drafting the MMA had ever personally conducted or managed a royalty verification examination. That assessment is based on the fact that royalty verification examinations are one of the most critical parts of the royalty payment process and is the least discussed subject in the lengthy MMA; at the time, the lobbyists did not represent songwriters and tried very hard to keep songwriters inside the writer room and outside of the drafting room as you can tell from The MLC, Inc.’s board composition; and that the legislative history (at 20) has one tautological statement about copyright owner audits: ”Subparagraph L sets forth the verification and audit process for copyright owners to audit the collective, although parties may agree on alternate procedures.” Well no kidding, smart people. We’ll take some context if you got it.

As Warner Music Group’s Ron Wilcox testified to the Copyright Royalty Judges, “Because royalty audits require extensive technical and industry-specific expertise, in WMG’s experience a CPA certification is not generally a requirement for conducting such audits. To my knowledge, some of the. most experienced and knowledgeable royalty auditors in the music industry are not CPAs.” (Testimony of Ron Wilcox, In re Determination of Royalty Rates and Terms for Ephemeral Recording and Digital Performance of Sound Recordings (Web IV), Copyright Royalty Judges, Docket No. 14-CRB-0001-WR (Oct. 6, 2014) at 15.). 

I would add to Ron’s assessment that the need for “extensive technical and industry-specific expertise” has grown exponentially since he made the statement in 2014 due to the complexity and numerosity of streaming. I’m sure Ron would agree if he had a chance to revisit his remarks. But inside the beltway of the Imperial City, it ain’t that way and you can tell by reading their laws handed down by the descendants of Marcus Licinius Crassus. All accountants are CPAs, all accounting is according to GAAP, all the women are strong, all the men are good-looking, and all the children are above average and go to Sidwell Friends. In the words of London jazzman and club owner Ronnie Scott to an unresponsive audience, “And now, back to sleep.”

The “qualified auditor” defined term should be limited to the MLC’s financials and removed from the audit clauses. This was a point I made to Senate staff during the drafting of MMA, but was told that while they, too, agreed it was stupid, it’s what the parties wanted (i.e., what the lobbyists wanted). And you know how that can be. So now we sweep up behind the elephants in the circus of life. But then, I’m just a country lawyer from Texas, what do I know.

All praise to Bridgeport for stepping up.

This post first appeared on MusicTech.Solutions

by Trichordist Editor

Win Your Office Pool on MLC Salary Raises!

If you’re like us, you have an office pool on who will win the eagerly anticipated release of the MLC’s 2022 tax return! “Winning” in this case means who will get the biggest salary and bonus bump–for what, we’re not sure, but don’t that stop anything.

Based on the MLC’s 2020 tax return, these employees were the only ones disclosed:

But on the 2021 tax return, the MLC must have exceeded expectations so much that everyone got a raise and they staffed up! Nothing but blue skies on the sunlight uplands!

CEO Kris Ahrend went from a mere $566K a year base with a $57K bonus in 2020 to $603K base and an even bigger bonus in 2021. Ellen Truley also had a fantastic year with her base moving like a rocket from a mere $240K to $308K! During COVID!! And her bonus practically doubled. But for some reason Maurice Russell’s salary actually declined slightly from $236K to $235K, but maybe they pushed it into his bonus which rose from $22K to $25K.

But stay tuned for the 2022 results and maybe bet the trendline going up, because the MLC gets a statutory cost of living adjustment that is not based on performance! Just like streaming royalties they administer!

No wait–the MLC gets the cost of living adjustment not the songwriters, sorry. No, remember that songwriters are told that they will do better if the services do better on revenues. Not on the services’ stock price, but rather on revenues for people who never raise their prices but make millions on selling stock. Except for the physical royalty paid by the labels that agreed to give the songwriters they depend on a higher mechanical rate AND a cost of living bump. But these trillion dollar market cap Big Tech music users don’t ever include the real money in the rising tide that sinks all boats with the trickle down royalty. But we’re told to put it all on red and let it ride.

But we’re glad that the MLC employees are so well compensated and that their salaries are protected in the highest inflation in 40 years with that built-in inflation adjustment.

by Trichordist Editor

Should the Compulsory License be Re-Upped?

By Chris Castle

[This post first appeared on MusicTechPolicy]

The wisest of those among you learn to read your portents well
There’s no need to hurry, it’s all downhill to Hell…

Don’t Stand Still, written by The Original Snakeboy, performed by Guy Forsyth

Congress is considering whether to renew The MLC, Inc.‘s designation as the mechanical licensing collective. If that sentence seems contradictory, remember those are two different things: the mechanical licensing collective is the statutory body that administers the compulsory license under Section 115. The MLC, Inc. is the private company that was “designated” by Congress through its Copyright Office to do the work of the mechanical licensing collective. This is like the form of a body that performs a function (the mechanical licensing collective) and having to animate that form with actual humans (The MLC, Inc.), kind of like Plato’s allegory of the cave, shadows on the wall being what they are.

Congress reviews the work product of The MLC, Inc. every five years (17 USC §115(d)(3)(B)(ii)) to decide if The MLC, Inc. should be allowed to continue another five years. In its recent guidance to The MLC, Inc. about artificial intelligence, the Copyright Office correctly took pains to make that distinction in a footnote (footnote 2 to be precise. Remember–always read the footnotes, it’s often where the action is.). This is why it is important that we be clear that The MLC, Inc. does not “own” the data it collects (and that HFA as its vendor doesn’t own it either, a point I raised to Spotify’s lobbyist several years ago). Although it may be a blessing if Congress fired The MLC, Inc. and the new collective had to start from scratch.

But Congress likely would only re-up The MLC, Inc. if it had already decided to extend the statutory license and all its cumbersome and byzantine procedures, proceedings and prohibitions on the freedom of songwriters to collectively bargain. Not to mention an extraordinarily huge thumbs down on the scales in favor of the music user and against the interest of the songwriters. The compulsory license is so labyrinthine and Kafka-esque it is actually an insult to Byzantium, but that’s another story.

Rather than just deciding about who is going to get the job of administering the revenues for every songwriter in the world, maybe there should be a vote. Particularly because songwriters cannot be members of the mechanical licensing collective as currently operated. Congress did not ask songwriters what they thought when the whole mechanical licensing scheme was established, so how about now?

Before the Congress decides to continue The MLC, Inc. many believe strongly that the body should reconsider the compulsory license itself. It is the compulsory license that is the real issue that plagues songwriters and blocks a free market. The compulsory license really has passed its sell by date and it’s pretty easy to understand why its gone so sour. Eliminating the Section 115 license will have many implications and we should tread carefully, but purposefully.

Party Like it’s 1909

First of all, consider the actual history of the compulsory license. It’s over 100 years old, and it was established at a time, believe it or not, when the goal of Congress was to even the playing field between, music users and copyright owners. They were worried about music users being hard done by because of the anticompetitive efforts of songwriters and copyright owners. As the late Register Marybeth Peters told Congress, when Congress created the exclusive right to control reproduction and distribution in 1909, “…due to concerns about potential monopolistic behavior [by the copyright owners], Congress also created a compulsory license to allow anyone to make and distribute a mechanical reproduction of a nondramatic musical work without the consent of the copyright owner provided that the person adhered to the provisions of the license, most notably paying a statutorily established royalty to the copyright owner.”

Well, that ship has sailed, don’t you think? 

This is kind of incredible when you think about it today because the biggest users of the compulsory license are those who torture the bejesus out of songwriters by conducting lawfare at the Copyright Royalty Board–the richest corporations in commercial history that dominate practically every moment of American life. In fact, the statutory license was hardly used at all before these fictional persons arrived on the scene and have been on a decades-long crusade to hack the Copyright Act through lawfare ever since. This is particularly true since about 2007 when Big Tech discovered Section 115. (And they’re about to do it again with AI–first they send the missionaries.)

If the purpose of the statutory scheme was to create a win-win situation that floats all boats, you would have expected to see songwriters profiting like never before, right? If the compulsory was so great, what we really needed was for everyone to use Section 115, right? Actually, the opposite has happened, even with decades of price fixing at 2¢ by the federal government. When hardly anyone used the compulsory license, songwriters prospered. When its use became widespread, songwriters suffered, and suffered badly.

Songwriters have been relegated to the bottom of the pile in compensation, a sure sign of no leverage because whatever leverage songwriters may have is taken–there’s that word again–by the compulsory license. I don’t think Google, a revanchist Microsoft, Apple, Amazon or Spotify need any protection from the anticompetitive efforts of songwriters. Google, Amazon, Apple, Microsoft, Spotify are only worried about “monopolistic behavior” when one of them does it to one of the others. The Five Families would tell you its nothing personal, it’s just business. 

Yet these corporate neo-colonialists would have you believe that the first thing that happens when the writing room door closes is that songwriters collude against them. (Sounding very much like the Radio Music Licensing Committee–so similar it makes you wonder, speaking of collusion.) 

The Five Year Plan

Merck Mercuriadis makes the good point that there is no time like the present to evolve: “In the United States, we have a position of stability for the next five years – at the highest rates paid to songwriters to date – in the evolution of the streaming economy. We are now working towards improving the songwriters’ share of the streaming revenue ‘pie’ yet further and, eventually, getting to a free market.” The clock is ticking on the next five years, a reference to the rate period set by the Copyright Royalty Board in the Phonorecords IV proceeding. (And that five years is a different clock than the five years clock on the MLC which is itself an example of the unnecessary confusion in the compulsory license.)

What would happen if the compulsory license vanished? Very likely the industry would continue its easily documented history of voluntary catalog licenses. The evidence is readily apparent for how the industry and music users handled services that did not qualify for a compulsory license like YouTube or TikTok. However stupid the deals were doesn’t change the fact that they happened in the absence of a compulsory license. That Invisible Hand thing, dunno could be good. Seems to work out fine for other people.

Let’s also understand that there is a cottage industry complete with very nice offices, pensions and rich salaries that has grown up around the compulsory license (or consent decrees for that matter). A cottage industry where collecting the songwriters’ money results in dozens of jobs paying more in a year than probably 95% of songwriters will make, maybe ever. (The Trichordist published an excerpt from a recent MLC tax return showing the highest compensated MLC employees.) Generations of lawyers and lobbyists have put generations of children through college and law school from legal fees charged in the pursuit of something that has never existed in the contemporary music business–a willing buyer and a willing seller. Those people will not want to abandon the very government policy that puts food on their tables, but both sides are very, very good at manufacturing excuses why the compulsory license really must be continued to further humanity.

The even sadder reality is that as much as we would like to simply terminate the compulsory license, there is a certain legitimacy to being clear-eyed about a transition. (An example is the proposals for transitioning from PRO consent decrees–ASCAP’s consent decree has been around a long time, too.) There would likely need to be a certain grandfathering in of services that were pre or post the elimination of the compulsory, but that’s easily done, albeit not without a last hurrah of legal fees and lobbyist invoices. Register Pallante noted in the well-received 2015 Copyright Office study (Copyright and the Music Marketplace at 5) “The Office thus believes that, rather than eliminating section 115 altogether, section 115 should instead become the basis of a more flexible collective licensing system that will presumptively cover all mechanical uses except to the extent individual music publishers choose to opt out.”  An opt out is another acceptable stop along the way to liberation, or even perhaps a destination itself. David Lowery had a very well thought-out idea along these lines in the pre-MLC era that should be revisited.

X Day

However, while there is a certain attractiveness to having a plan that the dreaded “stakeholders” and their legions of lobbyists and lawyers agree with, it is crucially important for Congress to fix a date certain by which the compulsory license will expire. Rain or shine, plan or no plan, it goes away on the X Day, say five years from now as Merck suggests. So wakey, wakey. 

That transparency drives a wedge into the process because otherwise millions will be spent in fees for profiting from moral hazard and surely the praetorians protecting the cottage industry wouldn’t want that. If you doubt that asking for a plan before establishing X Day would fail as a plan, just look at the Copyright Royalty Board and in particular the Phonorecords III remand. Years and years, multiple court rulings, and the rates still are not in effect.  Perseveration is not perseverance, it’s compulsive repetition when you know the same unacceptable result will occur.

But don’t let people tell you that the sky will fall if Congress liberates songwriters from the government mandate. The sky will not fall and songwriters will have a generational opportunity to organize a collective bargaining unit with the right to say no to a deal. 

Who can forget Sally Fields in Norma Rae?

The closest that Congress has come to a meaningful “vote” in the songwriting world is inviting public comments through interventions, rule makings, roundtables and the like–information gathering that is not controlled by the lobbyists. Indeed, it was this very process at the Copyright Royalty Board that resulted in many articulate comments by songwriters and publishers themselves that were clearly quite at odds with what the CRB was being fed by the lobbyists and lawyers. So much so that the Copyright Royalty Judges rejected not only the “Subpart B” settlement reached by the insiders but the very premise of that settlement. Imagine what might happen if the issue of the compulsory license itself was placed upon the table?

Now that songwriters have had a taste of how The MLC, Inc. has been handling their money, maybe this would be a good time to ask them what they think about how things are going. And whether they want to be liberated from the entire sinking ship that is designed to help Big Tech. And you can start by asking how they feel about the $500 million in black box money that is still sitting in the bank account of The MLC, Inc. and has not been paid–with an infuriating lack of transparency. Yet is being “invested” by The MLC, Inc. with less transparency than many banks with smaller net assets.

This “investment” is another result of the compulsory license which has no transparency requirements for such “investments” of other peoples’ money, perhaps “invested” in the very Big Tech companies that fund the The MLC, Inc. That wasn’t a question that was on the minds of Congress in 1909 but it should be today.

Attention Must Be Paid

Let’s face facts. The compulsory license has coexisted in the decimation of songwriting as a profession. That destruction has increased at an increasing rate roughly coincident with the time the Big Tech discovered Section 115 and sent their legions of lawyers to the Copyright Royalty Board to grind down publishers, and very successfully. That success is in large part due to the very mismatch that the compulsory license was designed to prevent back in 1909 except stood on its head waiting for loophole seekers to notice the potential arbitrage opportunity. 

The Phonorecords III and IV proceedings at the Copyright Royalty Board tell Congress all they need to know about how the game is played today and how it has changed since 1909, or the 1976 revision of the Copyright Act for that matter. The compulsory license is no longer fit for purpose and songwriters should have a say in whether it is to be continued or abandoned.

We see the Writers Guild striking and SAG-AFTRA taking a strike authorization vote. When was the last time any songwriters voted on their compensation? Maybe never? Voting, hmm. There’s a concept. Now where have I heard that before?

by thetrichordist

When Will the MLC Disclose How they Invest the Black Box Money?

[this post originally appeared in MusicTech.Solutions as “Unrealized Losses and the Black Box Investment Policy” by Chris Castle. We asked him to update it a bit to repost.]

Well, another quarter is rolling around and the MLC is still sitting on 100s of millions of dollars of songwriter money as far as I can tell. Billboard says the MLC has “matched”–maybe different than “paid”–$200 million of the $427 million in black box that it was paid by the services in 2021. This doesn’t count the unmatched that the MLC has itself added to that sum. And Congress still haven’t required them to disclose their investment policy, returns on investment or much of anything else.

Compare the MLC to community banks. There are approximately 1,000 community banks with net assets between $250,00,000 to $500,000,000. There are approximately another 1,200 community banks with net assets between $100,000,000 to $250,000,000. It’s admittedly rough justice, but why should one entity holding hundreds of millions of other peoples’ money have virtually no disclosure requirements and be essentially unregulated while another is the opposite?

Remember that the MLC is supposed to pay interest “at the Federal, short-term rate” “for the benefit of copyright owners entitled to payment of such accrued royalties.” Note that the Federal short-term rate is today a lot higher than it was when the lobbyists wrote the Music Modernization Act, currently 4.21% or thereabouts. And through the power of compound interest, that’s a bunch of cash the MLC is supposed to come up with. I wonder where they’ll get it from. Wouldn’t you like to know?

Anyway, let’s talk about interest rates. The “risk free rate” is often thought of as the rate of interest paid on US government bonds. That interest rate is thought of as risk free because it is backed by the full faith and credit of the United States that you hear so much about these days. Want to know where you can find that full faith and credit? Look in the mirror. 

When you ask around about what collective management organizations do with their “black box” monies while they are waiting to match money with songwriters or at least copyright owners, you often hear that the money is invested in very safe instruments, like U.S. treasury bonds. This might be particularly true of CMOs that are required to pay interest on black box because that interest has to come from somewhere.

But–and here it is–but, as we have learned from the Silicon Valley Bank collapse and the number of federal government officials in the mumble tank about why these banks are failing and why they are getting bailed out by, you know, the full faith and credit of the United States, “risk free” seems to be a relative concept. When you buy US government bonds, there are a number of different maturity dates available to you, kind of like buying a certificate of deposit. A common maturity date is the 10-year bond and the two-year bond, both of which were recently down sharply.

But–there is a connection between the interest rate that the bond pays, the price of the bond, and the maturity date of that bond. When bond interest rates increase, the face price tends to decrease. So if you paid $100 for a bond with a interest rate of say .08% and that rate then increased to say 4.5%, the face price of that bond will no longer be $100, it will be less. If that increase happens fairly quickly, you can have difficulty finding a buyer. The good news is that when the Federal Reserve raises the interest rate, there is about as much news coverage of the event as it is theoretically possible to have, both before during and after the rate increase, not to mention the Federal Reserve chair testifying to Congress. It’s very public. Closely watched doesn’t really capture that level of attention.

When bond prices decline, holders only “realize” the loss or gain if they sell the bond unless the bond is marked to market so the firm has to disclose the amount of what the loss would be if they sold the bond. Hence the concept of “unrealized losses,” “maturity risk,” or “interest rate risk.”  Some think that US banks currently have $620 billion in unrealized losses due to interest rate risk. And don’t forget, these are your betters. These are the smart people. These are the city fellers.

This interest rate risk issue is not limited to banks, however. It is also present anytime that an entity tasked with caring for other people’s money invests that money in treasury bonds, crypto, or whatever. Like the MLC. You don’t have to be Wall Street Bets to end up losing your shirt or something in this environment.

So the point is that the same problem of interest rate risk and unrealized losses could apply to CMOs, such as The MLC, Inc. because of their undisclosed “investment policy” of investing the $424 million of black box they were paid by the services. They don’t disclose what the investment policy is and they don’t disclose their holdings so we don’t really know what has happened, if anything. The money could be perfectly safe.

Or not.

by Trichordist

Copyright Office Authorized a Star Chamber at the MLC to Hold Your Money

We knew this would happen. The Copyright Office has empowered the Mechanical Licensing Collective to decide whether a song (or a sound recording) can be copyrighted all under the guise of AI. If the MLC–not the Copyright Office–decides that your song is not capable of being registered for copyright, the MLC can hold your money essentially forever.

Where’s the regulation on this important subject? Did you get a chance to comment on these crucial regulations and precedent?

Ah…no. You didn’t miss any notices in the Federal Register. No, we know this because of this cozy “guidance letter” to MLC CEO Kris Ahrend from the general counsel of the Copyright Office. That’s right, a letter that we just happened to run across. That letter states:

More specifically, the Office advises that a work that appears to lack sufficient human authorship is appropriately treated by The MLC as an “anomal[y],” consistent with its Guidelines for Adjustments, and The MLC should “place [associated] Royalties in Suspense while it researches and analyzes the issue.” Such research could include corresponding with the individual or entity claiming ownership of the work or [could include] inquiring whether the Office has registered the work and whether there are any disclaimers or notes in the registration record.

If The MLC subsequently concludes that the work qualifies for copyright protection and the section 115 license, it should distribute any royalties and interest in suspense to the copyright owner. Alternatively, if The MLC believes that the work does not qualify for copyright protection following its research and analysis, it should notify the individual or entity claiming ownership of the work of its determination and that associated royalties will be subject to an adjustment. This conclusion and adjustment may be challenged by initiating an “Adjustment Dispute” consistent with The MLC’s policies. If legal proceedings are initiated to challenge The MLC’s actions, the disputed royalties and interest should remain suspended until those proceedings are resolved.

So just in one paragraph, the Copyright Office has effectively delegated its role in the U.S. government to a private corporation controlled by the largest music publishers and financed by the largest tech companies in the world (actually the largest corporations in the history of commerce). If the MLC decides that your song “appears to lack sufficient human authorship” The MLC can hold your money while they research the issue.

Note this doesn’t say who makes that decision, it doesn’t say when they have to notify you, it doesn’t say they have to give you an opportunity to be heard, it places no timeline on how long all this may take. “The MLC” (whoever that is) could sit on your money for years without ever telling you they are doing it and also keep invoicing the DSPs for your royalties while they “research and analyze the issue”.

The only time they have to give you notice if they “believe” (whatever that means) “that the work does not qualify for copyright protection” then “it should” (not the mandatory “shall”, but the permissive “should”) notify you of that determination. You can then file an “adjustment dispute” based on the MLC’s own guidelines which you will not be surprised to learn places no disclosure obligations on them, imposes no timeline and cannot be appealed.

Note that this guidance from the Copyright Office pretty expressly contemplates that the MLC may dispute a work that has already been registered for copyright without qualification–which raises the question of what a copyright registration actually means, and where is it written that the MLC has the authority to challenge a conformed Copyright Office registration.

It also places the MLC in a superior position to the Copyright Office because it allows the MLC to initiate a dispute resolution system outside of the Copyright Office channels. Is this written somewhere besides a burning bush on Mount Horeb?

The letter does seem to suggest that you can always sue the MLC or that the MLC could be prosecuted for state law crimes, perhaps, like conversion, but it would help to know who at the MLC is actually responsible.

This also raises the question of why the MLC is invoicing the DSPs in the first place and what happens to the money every step along the path. Because of the idiotic streaming mechanical royalty calculation, it seems inevitable that the royalty pool will be overstated or understated if the MLC is claiming works that are not subject to copyright (like it would for public domain works it invoiced).

Ever wonder what prompts letters like this to get written?

Play your part, dude. Go back to sleep.

by Trichordist Editor