StubHub’s FIFA Ticket Debacle Is Different This Time

For years, critics of the secondary ticketing industry (including us) have warned about the dangers of speculative ticket sales, hidden fees, and platforms that profit whether fans ultimately get through the gate or not. Those warnings were often dismissed as the complaints of disgruntled consumers.

The FIFA World Cup ticket controversy suggests those critics may have been right all along. As reported in Business Insider:

Countless World Cup fans are discovering that their tickets have gone poof, and they’re left scrambling to decide whether to buy new, pricier ones or simply give up on their World Cup dreams. They’re asking themselves how this could happen, since many people don’t realize it’s even a possibility.

The answer lies in the peculiar structure of secondary ticket marketplaces. Sites such as StubHub don’t actually sell tickets, much like eBay or Facebook Marketplace, they just connect buyers and sellers. This setup relies on sellers to come through with the tickets they say they have, essentially rendering it an honor system. Companies often don’t require sellers to upload their tickets immediately or provide proof of purchase. Many platforms give sellers until the day of the event to hand over the tickets.

It’s impossible to know the explanation for each individual situation, but one potential culprit is speculative ticketing, which I coined “ghost ticketing” last year. In these scenarios, resellers list tickets on StubHub or SeatGeek that they don’t yet have, hoping they’ll eventually secure them (for a lower price than they offered) and send them along.

FIFA warns fans about such practices:

You can transfer your tickets using the Ticket Transfer feature on the FIFA Resale/Exchange Marketplace. The marketplace is accessible via FIFA.com/tickets.

Please note: Transferring tickets to third-party platforms or accounts is discouraged as it may result in issues, including the inability to cancel or accept transfers. To ensure a secure and valid transfer process, please use the Ticket Transfer feature between FIFA accounts.

Fans reportedly purchased World Cup tickets through StubHub, booked flights, hotels, and vacations around those purchases, only to discover that tickets never arrived, could not be transferred, or could not be honored. In many cases, the offered remedy was a refund.

Business Insider reports that:

A SeatGeek spokesperson said in an email that [a fan’s] letdown “fell short” of the experience the company aims to provide and said they’d apologized to him and were working on a resolution. “We continue to invest significant resources in monitoring World Cup orders and supporting fans attending matches,” they said.

But a refund is not a remedy when the one-time event is over. An “apology” maybe very Internet (“we said we were sorry [for fill in the blank obvious scummy and shady behavior]”) but it ain’t going to cut it.

A World Cup match is not a toaster. Consumers are not merely purchasing a product; they are purchasing an experience tied to a specific place and time. Once the match is over, no amount of reimbursement can recreate the opportunity, no apologies will make the fan whole.

The deeper problem is that these incidents expose the fundamental flaw in speculative ticketing. In many cases, tickets appear—to be more fair than they deserve— to have been offered for sale before sellers possessed transferable inventory or before they could demonstrate a present ability to deliver what they were selling. Consumers were effectively asked to assume the risk that the ticket would eventually materialize. This kind of thing is often called “fraud” in the trade.

Imagine a securities market where brokers could freely sell commodities they did not possess and buyers discovered on settlement day that the shares or options never existed. Regulators would never tolerate such a system. Yet in secondary ticketing markets, similar concerns have persisted for years and nobody has gone to jail.

Longtime critics of the speculative ticketing industry may experience a sense of déjà vu.

As recently as 2024, plaintiffs in Kaiser v. StubHub advanced allegations that sound remarkably familiar: tickets to Hotspurs game allegedly offered for sale that sellers did not possess, consumers induced to purchase based on representations about availability, and a platform collecting fees while bearing relatively little delivery risk. The complaint included civil RICO allegations before being referred to arbitration, meaning many of the underlying claims were ruled on in private (secret) arbitration and never tested through a public merits determination.

The significance of Kaiser is not whether every allegation was ultimately proven. The significance is that the core complaints sound strikingly similar to those now emerging from the FIFA World Cup controversy. If the allegations prove accurate, critics will understandably ask why the same concerns appear to be resurfacing only two years later on a much larger stage.

Another uncomfortable question concerns StubHub’s longstanding reliance on mandatory arbitration clauses and class-action waivers contained in its consumer terms of service. Historically, those provisions have helped channel disputes into private proceedings, limiting public discovery and reducing the risk of large-scale class litigation. Indeed, in Kaiser, the court referred even the plaintiffs’ civil RICO claims to arbitration—a result that many consumer advocates viewed as troubling public policy because allegations involving potentially systemic marketplace practices were removed from public judicial scrutiny.

It must be said that StubHub is hardly alone in trying to stretch consumer arbitration provisions beyond what most consumers would reasonably expect. Disney drew national criticism when it initially sought to invoke a Disney+ arbitration clause in a wrongful-death case arising from an allergic-reaction death at Disney Springs. The Happiest Place on Earth later backed down, but the episode illustrates the same broader problem: companies increasingly treat arbitration clauses as all-purpose liability shields, even when the dispute bears little resemblance to the ordinary consumer transaction that supposedly created consent.

The FIFA controversy may test the limits of that strategy. When alleged consumer harm spans multiple countries, major sporting events, and potentially thousands of affected purchasers, the practical, political, and regulatory pressures become much harder to contain through private arbitration. More importantly, arbitration clauses do not bind government regulators. A consumer may be forced into arbitration, but the FTC is not. Nor are state attorneys general, foreign regulators, or other enforcement authorities. In that sense, arbitration may reduce private litigation exposure, but it provides little protection against the type of regulatory scrutiny that often follows high-profile consumer failures.

The larger the FIFA controversy becomes, the less likely it is that StubHub can resolve it behind closed doors. Plus, it makes America look bad and we can think of at least one person who might get really pissed about that.

The FIFA controversy is also notable because the underlying conduct is not universally accepted as a legitimate market practice. In the United Kingdom, the unauthorized resale of football tickets is heavily restricted and, in many circumstances, prohibited outside approved channels established by clubs and governing bodies. That issue surfaced in Kaiser, where plaintiffs alleged sales occurring outside authorized distribution systems and when the plaintiff showed up at Hotspurs World, it became apparent that the plaintiff was the only one not in on the joke. In other words, at least some jurisdictions have already concluded that unrestricted secondary-market sales of football tickets create risks significant enough to warrant legal restrictions.

The timing could hardly be worse for StubHub.

The company recently resolved an FTC enforcement action involving allegedly deceptive pricing practices and so-called “junk fees.” The FTC accused StubHub of using drip-pricing tactics that advertised one price while revealing mandatory fees later in the purchasing process. The resulting settlement required changes to pricing disclosures and a $10 million payment.

But hidden fees were only part of the story.

The FTC’s broader rulemaking record also discussed speculative ticketing as a potentially deceptive practice under the same rule. In fact, commenters specifically raised concerns that platforms were facilitating the sale of tickets that sellers did not actually possess or could not yet transfer. The Commission cited those concerns in its rulemaking discussion, recognizing that speculative ticketing may present consumer-protection issues distinct from hidden fees alone. Numerous states have outlawed speculative ticketing outright, concluding that selling tickets you do not possess is not innovation—it’s such serious consumer harm they outlaw the practice.

That point deserves emphasis. Critics of speculative ticketing were not simply complaining on social media or filing isolated lawsuits. They participated in the federal rulemaking process itself. The concerns raised in litigation such as Kaiser and in comments submitted to the FTC were sufficiently significant that the Commission expressly addressed them when adopting its junk-fee framework. The FIFA controversy therefore does not emerge from nowhere. It arrives against a backdrop of years of consumer complaints, litigation, regulatory comments, and public warnings that the industry has largely resisted.

If a platform represents inventory as available when the seller lacks the present ability to transfer or deliver it, the issue extends beyond pricing disclosures and into the integrity of the marketplace itself. That distinction is significant because it supports expansion of available legal prosecutions.

A civil RICO plaintiff would likely argue that repeated electronic communications marketing unavailable or non-transferable tickets constitute a pattern of wire fraud. And that puts you squarely in racketeering land. Whether such a claim could succeed would depend heavily on evidence of knowledge, intent, and the scale of the conduct. But the FIFA controversy inevitably invites the question raised in Kaiser: at what point does a recurring business practice stop looking like isolated misconduct and start looking systemic?

No one should assume that a criminal RICO case is around the corner. Federal prosecutors would need far stronger evidence and proof of knowing participation in criminal conduct. Yet once allegations involve recurring speculative inventory, consumer deception, electronic communications, and a potentially nationwide pattern of conduct, the discussion inevitably broadens from customer service to compliance and governance. The FTC has been partway down this path before with StubHub—while FTC can’t bring a criminal prosecution, it’s a short stop to a Department of Justice referral, Especially if you know who gets involved.

And that is what makes this episode different.

For years, StubHub could treat these controversies as disputes with unhappy customers. Today, StubHub is a public company. It has benefited from access to public capital markets and the confidence of public investors. With that status comes heightened expectations regarding compliance systems, risk management, internal controls, and regulatory oversight.

Angry fans are one thing. Invited guests in our country are another thing entirely, as are regulators, institutional investors, securities lawyers, and the SEC.

The problem for StubHub is not merely that critics predicted these issues. The problem is that critics raised them in court, raised them before federal regulators, and saw those concerns acknowledged in the FTC’s own rulemaking record—yet the complaints continue to surface.

The problem for StubHub is not that critics are saying something new. The problem is that critics appear to be saying the same thing they were saying in Kaiser—only now the whole world is watching.

If the FIFA complaints ultimately prove as widespread as it appears, investors may begin asking uncomfortable questions that go well beyond customer service. Is speculative ticketing a disclosed business risk? Is it primarily a compliance problem? Or is it so deeply embedded in the economics of the marketplace that meaningful reform would materially affect revenue and growth? And, as they say, “have a materially adverse affect on StubHub’s business.”

Those are not questions typically asked by disappointed fans on social media. They are the kinds of questions asked by regulators, analysts, institutional investors, auditors, and securities lawyers.

The secondary ticketing industry has spent years arguing that it provides efficiency and liquidity. Governor Polis defended the practices as an “innovative online ticket waiting service” (yes, he really said that). The FIFA fiasco suggests something different: a system that privatizes gains, socializes risk, and too often leaves consumers holding the bag.

For a public company operating under the gaze of both the FTC and the SEC, that should no longer be good enough.

Because the real risk for StubHub may not be the next user lawsuit, the next consumer arbitration demand, or even the next FTC inquiry. The real risk is that investors begin to conclude that what defenders have long described as isolated incidents are, in fact, permanent features of the unsavory business model itself.

@Artist Rights Institute Newsletter 3/24/25

The Artist Rights Institute’s news digest Newsletter

New Survey for Songwriters: We are surveying songwriters about whether they want to form a certified union. Please fill out our short Survey Monkey confidential survey here! Thanks!

Songwriters and Union Organizing

RICO and Criminal Copyright Infringement

AI Piracy

@alexreisner: Search LibGen, the Pirated-Books Database That Meta Used to Train AI (Alex Reisner/The Atlantic)

OpenAI and Google’s Dark New Campaign to Dismantle Artists’ Protections (Brian Merchant/Blood in the Machine)

Alden newspapers slam OpenAI, Google’s AI proposals (Sara Fischer/Axios)

AI Litigation

French Publishers and Authors Sue Meta over Copyright Works Used in AI Training (Kelvin Chan/AP)

DC Circuit Affirms Human Authorship Required for Copyright (David Newhoff/The Illusion of More)

OpenAI Asks White House for Relief From State AI Rules (Jackie Davalos/Bloomberg)

Microsoft faces FTC antitrust probe over AI and licensing practices (Prasanth Aby Thomas/Computer World)

Google and its Confederate AI Platforms Want Retroactive Absolution for AI Training Wrapped in the American Flag(Chris Castle/MusicTechPolicy)

AI and Human Rights

Human Rights and AI Opt Out (Chris Castle/MusicTechPolicy)

No Bots, No Billionaires: StubHub’s Grotesque IPO Demonstrates Another Artist Ripoff By Our Tech Oligarchs

By Chris Castle

StubHub is one of the richest thieves in the live ticket arbitrage market. The company is also a direct beneficiary of the U.S. government’s abysmal failure to enforce the Better Online Ticket Sales (BOTS) Act. Just like Spotify, another Goldman Sachs’ grifter, StubHub’s main objective is about to be a reality–a $16.5 billion initial public offering that will make its executives even richer. In case you were wondering where the value of all that touring was going, now you know. And StubHub’s IPO is yet another slap in the face to artists, not to mention the fans exploited by this tech oligarch.

Given the government’s newly acquired interest in the ticketing business as measured by the Department of Justice antitrust lawsuit against Live Nation, you would think that the DOJ and FTC would also step up to their obligation to enforce the BOTS Act. Remember, The BOTS Act, signed into law by President Obama in 2016, was designed to curb the use of automated software (bots) that purchase large quantities of event tickets, often within seconds of their release, to resell them at inflated prices through market makers like StubHub. It is so under-enforced that StubHub will no doubt be able to sneak out an IPO and slurp up money from the pubic trough before anyone knows better.

BOTS-driven Risk Factors

If it were ever enforced, the BOTS Act could have a significant financial downside for StubHub. I can’t wait to see the risk factors about bots in their IPO prospectus because let’s face it–if there were no bots and no boiler room operations, StubHub probably wouldn’t have much of a business. No bots, no billionaires. This one is not a theoretical antitrust case, this one is dealing with real-time massive consumer fraud about to be perpetuated and funded by the public financial markets.

The government’s enforcement of the BOTS Act is so poor that Senator Marsha Blackburn, a gifted legislator and one of the law’s co-authors, found it necessary to introduce even more legislation to try to get the FTC to do their job. The Mitigating Automated Internet Networks for (MAIN) Event Ticketing Act is a bill introduced in 2023 by Senators Blackburn and Ben Ray Luján that aims to give the FTC even fewer excuses not to enforce the BOTS Act. It would further the FTC’s consumer protection mission against IPO-driven ticket scalping. 

The sad truth is that the FTC didn’t take its first action to enforce the 2016 law until 2021. And that’s the only action it has ever taken. Yet we live in hope.

When the drafting sessions get started for the StubHub IPO, the underwriters really need to ask themselves how big a hit the company’s valuation will take when prosecutors figure out how dependent reseller platforms are on bots and market manipulation to extract hard-earned dollars from enthusiastic fans.

And it isn’t just bots by the way. MTP readers will recall our discussions about speculative ticketing which turns live event tickets into commodities to be traded like pork bellies–minus the consumer protection of the securities laws. Speculative ticketing is when a market maker like StubHub allows shady operators to offer the public a ticket that the seller doesn’t actually own and may not even exist. This is what happens when an artist has publicly announced a concert tour but has not yet put the tickets on sale. Speculative ticketing lets a scalper offer a ticket that doesn’t exist without properly disclosing that the seller doesn’t own the ticket being sold.

Now that just sounds criminal, doesn’t it? Selling something you don’t own?

StubHub RICO Suave

And speaking of criminal, StubHub is currently defending a civil RICO case in New York, accused of making a market for tickets it is not able to sell. The Kaiser v. StubHub class action lawsuit, filed on January 3, 2024, in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, alleges fraudulent ticket sales by StubHub, Inc. The plaintiff, Daniel J. Kaiser, a resident of Brooklyn, New York, claims that StubHub knowingly and repeatedly advertised and sold fraudulent tickets, thereby defrauding consumers and violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. 

What’s RICO? Civil RICO can be brought by private plaintiffs like Mr. Kaiser, but criminal RICO has to be brought by the government. Criminal RICO cases are initiated by government prosecutors, who must first obtain an indictment from a grand jury, followed by a criminal trial. While both civil and criminal RICO cases address racketeering activity, criminal RICO focuses on punishing and deterring criminal behavior, requiring a high standard of proof and resulting in severe penalties. Now there’s a risk factor. How’s this sound:

Potential Liability Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)

We are currently under investigation for potential violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). RICO is a federal law designed to combat organized crime by allowing for both criminal and civil penalties for acts performed as part of an ongoing criminal organization. The investigation is focused on allegations that certain activities conducted by our company and its affiliates may constitute a pattern of racketeering activity under RICO.

Uncertainty and Potential Impact on Business Operations

The outcome of this investigation is uncertain, and we cannot predict the timing, outcome, or potential impact on our business, financial condition, or results of operations. If we are found to have violated RICO, we could face severe penalties, including substantial fines, forfeiture of assets, and significant reputational damage. Additionally, a criminal conviction under RICO could result in imprisonment for our key executives, which would severely disrupt our management and operations.

Nothing says white collar crime like RICO. This kind of consumer fraud is happening on a massive scale, yet the FTC apparently doesn’t feel it rises to the level of an investigation priority. 

Making it Stop

In the face of this weak-kneed approach to law enforcement, artists could simply prohibit the resale of their concert tickets. If companies like StubHub keep trying, that very well may be the result, particularly with fan-to-fan solutions like Twickets competing with the likes of StubHub. How about this risk factor:

Restrictions on Ticket Resales Could Adversely Affect Our Business

Our business model relies significantly on the resale of concert tickets. However, many artists and event organizers have implemented policies that prohibit the resale of their tickets above the face price. These restrictions are designed to prevent ticket scalping and ensure that fans can purchase tickets at reasonable prices.

If artists or event organizers enforce these resale restrictions, it could limit our ability to sell tickets at a premium, which is a key component of our revenue generation. This could result in reduced profit margins and negatively impact our financial performance. Additionally, compliance with these restrictions may require us to implement new systems and processes, which could increase our operational costs.

Furthermore, any violation of these resale restrictions could lead to legal actions against us, including fines and penalties, and could damage our relationships with artists, event organizers, and customers. This could harm our reputation and result in a loss of business opportunities.

Investors should consider the potential impact of these resale restrictions on our business and financial condition before making an investment decision. There can be no assurance that we will not face additional restrictions or legal challenges related to ticket resales in the future, which could further adversely affect our business.

Underwriters be thinking, where do I sign up, right? Maybe not.

[This post previously appeared on MusicTechPolicy]

What would Lars say? Artificial Intelligence: Nobel or RICO?

All the true promise of AI does not require violating writers, artists, photographers, voice actors etc copyrights and rights of publicity. You know, stuff like reading MRIs and X-rays, developing pharmaceuticals, advanced compounds, new industrial processes, etc.

All the shitty aspects of AI DO require intentional mass copyright infringement (a RICO predicate BTW). You know stuff like bots, deep fakes, autogenerated “yoga mat” music, SEO manipulation, autogenerated sports coverage, commercial chat bots, fake student papers, graphic artist knockoffs, robot voice actors etc. But that’s where the no-value-add-parasitic-free-rider-easy-money is to be made. That’s why the parasitic free-riding VCs and private equity want to get a “fair use” copyright exemption.

Policy makers should understand that if they want to reduce the potential harms of AI they need to protect and reinforce intellectual property rights of individuals. It is a natural (and already existing) brake on harmful AI. What we don’t need is legislative intervention that makes it easier to infringe IP rights and then try to mitigate (the easily predictable and obvious) harms with additional regulation.

This is what happened with Napster and internet 1.0. The DMCA copyright infringement safe harbor for platforms unleashed all sorts of negative externalities that were never fairly mitigated by subsequent regulation.

Why do songwriters get 0.0009 a stream on streaming platforms? Because the platforms used the threat of the DMCA copyright safe harbor by “bad actors” (often connected to the “good actors” via shared board members and investors*) to create a market failure that destroyed the value of songs. To “fix” the problem federal legislation tasks the Copyright Royalty Board in LOC to set royalty rates and forced songwriters to license to the digital platforms (songwriters can not opt out). The royalty setting process was inevitably captured by the tech companies and that’s how you end up with 0.0009 per stream.

TBF the DMCA safe harbor requires the platforms to set up “technical measures” to prevent unlicensed use of copyrights, but this part of the DMCA safe harbor were never implemented and the federal government never bothered to enforce this part of the law. This is the Napster playbook all over again.

1. Unleash a technology that you know will be exploited by bad actors**.

2. Ask for federal intervention that essentially legalizes the infringing behavior.

3. The federal legislation effectively creates private monopoly or duopoly.

4. Trillions of dollars in wealth transferred from creators to a tiny cabal of no-value-add-parasitic-free-rider-easy-money VCs in silicon valley.

5. Lots of handwringing about the plight of creators.

6. Bullshit legislation that claims to help creators but actually mandates a below market rate for creators.

The funny thing is Lars Ulrich was right about Napster. [See our 2012 post Lars Was First and Lars Was Right.] At the time he was vilified by what in reality was a coordinated DC communication firm (working for Silicon Valley VCs) that masqueraded as grassroots operation.

But go back and watch the Charlie Rose debate between Lars Ulrich and Chuck D, everything Lars Ulrich said was gonna happen happened.

If Lars Ulrich hadn’t been cowed by a coordinated campaign by no-value-add-parasitic-free-rider-easy-money Silicon Valley VCs, he’d probably say the same thing about AI.

And he’d be right again.

Guest Post: Follow the Money: YouTube’s Failure to Pay Retroactively Gives “Conversion Rate” a Whole New Meaning

[Cross-posted from MusicTechPolicy]

by Chris Castle

Conversion

A performance metric one hears from the digerati is the term “conversion rate.”   “Conversion rate” for a streaming service usually means the rate at which users of an ad-supported free service are “converted” to paying users.  That motivation is usually because they are so fed up with the advertising they are willing to pay.  (This was one of the many failed pitches from Spotify before people stopped trying to justify hanging on until the IPO riches flowed in.)

YouTube, of course, has never been too terribly interested in anything that moves users away from advertising.  That resistance (and potential internal competition between the massive ad sales team and the ever changing YouTube managers), may explain the many failed efforts at launching a YouTube subscription service by a company that knows more about user behavior than anyone in history.  They just couldn’t seem to get it right for the longest time.  You don’t suppose that YouTube’s apparent lack of interest in getting large numbers of users to substitute away from free to subscription was because YouTube made a lot more money from the ads than they ever would from the subscriptions?

One of the ways that YouTube (and Google) makes money from advertising is by taking money that is not theirs to take (sometimes called “monetizing” content).  The civil law calls that act a claim of “conversion” and   the criminal law calls it the crime of “theft”.  Conversion and theft are two sides of the same coin and often one implies the other, albeit with different burdens of proof.

theft

YouTube’s Content ID tool is a way for copyright owners to block or permit advertising on user-generated content that includes their copyrights, often music.  Users of Content ID will tell you that it works just well enough that Google can say it is an effective tool, but even with Content ID music still gets through (and is often monetized by YouTube) for a variety of reasons.  This requires time consuming and costly manual searches.  Companies like AdRev make it a bit easier, but are essentially third party Content ID users.  These companies are compensated with a commission on infringing works they find on YouTube that they convert–there’s that word again–from infringing to monetized, which means that YouTube now splits the advertising revenue with the copyright owners who in turn split their share with an AdRev.

But see what happened there?  If you have Content ID, you can block on the upload some of the time, or you can do a search.  If you don’t have Content ID (see Maria Schneider’s class action) then you can’t block on the upload only chase the infringements manually.  But quite rightly from an economic perspective, companies like AdRev are not that interested in doing that work on a rev share basis if there’s no rev share when you block.

Here’s the point–you have a property right in your copyright.  You have a property right to license that copyright.  Any revenue derived from exploitations of that copyright is your money.  YouTube uses its monopoly power to impose a deal to monetize your copyright (under duress, of course, due to whack a mole DMCA).  That deal involves a revenue share.  (Let’s just assume you decide to take the King’s shilling and accept Google’s deal under duress which you shouldn’t have to do and which may not even be enforceable.)

The question is, when should that revenue share attach–when they start exploiting your copyright in violation of your property rights or when you catch them doing it.  And if (1) you catch them violating your property rights and (2) agree to monetize, when should they pay you your agreed upon share of the revenue from monetizing?  Should they pay retroactively to the first exploitation?  Or only prospectively after you catch them?

The correct answer is they should pay retroactively.  But they don’t.  They just keep the money.  For millions of infringements.  And they get away with it because of their monopoly power, which leaves one choice most artists won’t make, which is to sue them like Maria has.

Remember–Content ID operates largely like any other fingerprinting tool.  (Psychoacoustic fingerprinting is old technology–remember Jonesy in “The Hunt for Red October”?  That’s fingerprinting.  A “fingerprint” is simply a mathematical rendering of the waveform of an audio file.)

There is a reference databases of recordings that are “known knowns” (which is why it is important to be included in the Content ID database as Maria Schneider correctly points out in her class action.)  The fingerprinting tool encounters a new file, takes a fingerprint, then looks for a match in the reference database and reports a result that triggers an action.  Typically, fingerprinting tools are binary:  match or no match.  What happens after the tool finds a match is entirely in the control of the operator.  (So while the tool could have a match rate of 90%, the operator could report a random number of matches or a fixed number of matches, like one every ten, or one every 1000.  That means 90% accuracy could turn into a much lesser percentage of reported matches.  It’s important to know how many matches trigger an action.)

Having had some experience with audio fingerprints, I think you will find that once a fingerprint is in the reference database, the recognition tool (Content ID in this case) will spot the reference fingerprint a very, very high percentage of the time.  The fingerprinting tool I’m most aware of caught matches over 90% of the time.  I can’t imagine that a tool developed by the biggest technology company in commercial history would do less–unless they wanted it to.  Remember, this is not taking into account re-records unless the re-record is itself in the database, or pitch bends.  This is an exact match which is very common use of Content ID.  (See Maria’s class action complaint, and Kerry Muzzey has a great description of this in his recent Senate testimony.)

If Content ID is actually missing matches to known knowns on the upload (assuming exact matching is possible), I find it very odd that Content ID is missing much.  Maybe it’s not, but one way to find out is to force Google to reveal the inner workings through discovery in the class action case.

But if Content ID does miss exact matches, it would be interesting to know what percentage of those misses end up being monetized, and of those, what percentage end up getting caught later by a subsequent use of Content ID or a manual investigative process.  This will give an idea of the scale of the retroactive payment issue.

As Maria rightly points out, it is virtually impossible for an artist or film maker without Content ID to catch YouTube monetizing infringing works.  But I think the analysis has to go a step further–even if you have Content ID, at the moment you catch YouTube monetizing illegal versions, you are in no different position than the artist who lacks access to the Content ID tool.

Both have the same problem–YouTube is profiting from illegal copies.  If when you catch them you then elect to monetize, YouTube will pay you going forward, i.e., prospectively.  But I do not believe they will pay you retroactivelyfor the illegal use.  (There is a rumor that some music publishers do get paid retroactively under some settlement, but that needs to be confirmed.)

That means that YouTube is directly profiting from piracy for the retroactive views which could total into the hundreds of millions per day given the massive number of daily views on YouTube.  If you elect to monetize due to YouTube’s monopoly power, you are essentially releasing them from liability under duress.  If you catch them.

So YouTube takes your property, monetizes it, and refuses to pay you for how much they made before you caught them if you ever do catch them.  They dare you to sue them because you would be taking on the biggest company in commercial history that controls 90% of the access to information in the world and routinely defies governments.  Not everyone has the spine of Maria Schneider.

Failing to license at all or failing to pay retroactively means that YouTube profits from piracy by converting your property to their own.  And as Maria rightly points out, Google scrapes user data through non-display uses in the background even if YouTube is not monetizing overtly which they then use to compile user profiles in “millions of buckets” (which dribbled out before Judge Koh in the Gmail litigation (In Re: Google, Inc. Gmail Litigation,  Case No. 13-MD-02430-LHK, (U.S.D.C. N.D. California, San Jose Division, Sept. 26, 2013)).

In either case, the value of the amount converted or stolen should rightly include the value of these user profiles scraped in the background, as well as the advertising revenue.

And don’t forget that Google is controlled by Larry Page, Sergei Brin, and Eric Schmidt through their “supervoting” shares of stock.  It’s hard to believe that this YouTube policy was created without their blessing.

The simplest move for Google would be to simply pay both retroactively and (if the copyright owner elects to monetize) prospectively.  Otherwise, it seems like a huge number of crimes are going on in a very planned and organized way dreamed up by YouTube and Google employees.  “Dreamed up” is also called a conspiracy, and if there’s an actual conspiracy it’s not a theory (which came up in an interesting trade secret misappropriation RICO case against Google they managed to wriggle out of, at least for the moment).

The law has another word for organized theft at scale–we sometimes call it “racketeering.”

racketeering